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Abstract
The world trading system is governed through an everexpanding web of trade agreements,
which subtly but powerfully determine the terms of market competition and how rents are
distributed between countries, ﬁrms and consumers. This thesis studies two such agree-
ments: ﬁrstly, Customs Unions  regional agreements with a wide coverage of goods and a
common external tariﬀ  and secondly the Information Technology Agreement, a plurilateral
agreement to eliminate import tariﬀs on a narrow range of goods.
The Silent Success of Customs Unions, the ﬁrst chapter, joint work with Hinnerk Gnutz-
mann, studies theoretically the incentives of governments  which may be subject to lobbying
 to form bilateral trade agreements, considering both exceptions to the MFN principle
permitted under GATT/WTO rules: namely, the Free Trade Area, where partner coun-
tries liberalise internal tariﬀs to zero but retain independent in their external policy, and a
Customs Union, which goes beyond FTA by requiring the countries to adopt a harmonised
common external tariﬀ. We show that it is always a political equilibrium to implement CU.
Crucially, while CUs may be formed because of lobbying, we show that they improve the
welfare of member countries as long as trade with the rest of the world remains positive. In
line with these results, we show empirically that CUs are much more important to world
trade  in terms trade volume and membership scope  than so far acknowledged in the
literature.
Surprisingly little is known empirically about the eﬀect of Customs Unions on tariﬀ pol-
icy. In my second chapter, Determining the Common External Tariﬀ in a Customs Union:
Evidence from the Eurasian Customs Union, I seek to ﬁll the void. Using a large panel
data set from the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), established from 2010 between Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, I demonstrate the importance of mutual protectionism: member
states user their bargaining power to spill over to CU partners high tariﬀs for those goods
which were previously strongly protected nationally. There is little evidence of the reverse
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eﬀect, i.e. tariﬀs being negotiated down for lines that were previously handled liberally in
national tariﬀ policy. This eﬀect is demonstrated using three methodologies: analysis of
variance using unique explanatory power of each variable, determining Shapley value from
analysis of variance and OLS regression. The chapter also develops a simple model to ratio-
nalise the eﬀect.
Trade facilitation, the reduction of administrative and other barriers barriers, has be-
come a key policy priority. Customs Unions may eliminate internal border controls. But
how strongly can such measures beneﬁt trade? In the ECU, the elimination of borders pro-
ceeded in two stages, which allows me to study the Trade Impact of NonTariﬀ Trade Costs
in chapter 3. I control for tariﬀ changes and other factors to show that the growth in internal
trade between the ECU member countries can be attributed to reduced trade costs, rather
than trade diversion due to tariﬀ increases. The natural experiment of border removal thus
allows more precise estimates of trade costs than approaches that capture nontariﬀ costs
merely as a residual.
Finally, The Layers of the Information Technology Agreement Impact  joint work with
Christian Henn  turns to plurilateral agreements. We show how the WTO's Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) aﬀected trade ﬂows and value chain participation in the IT
sector. We show that this agreement did not only lead to increased imports, but  by
reducing the cost of intermediate goods  ITA members were also able to increase their
exports of ﬁnal goods. Our estimation strategy is based on the plausibly exogenous entry of
late signatories to the agreement, who ratiﬁed the ITA as part of a broader policy objective.
Using productlevel data, we are able to take into account the various layers of ITA impact,
dissecting the impact of tariﬀ reduction, tariﬀ elimination to zero, and over and above tariﬀ
reductions, including through ﬁrm relocation via intermediate goods channel. We ﬁnd that
having zero tariﬀs is associated with more imports of intermediate than ﬁnal goods, and
with participation in global value chains. This ﬁnding also supports the line of thought that
trade policy certainty attracts investment.
Chapter 1
The Silent Success of Customs Unions
Hinnerk Gnutzmann1
Catholic University of Milan
Arevik Mkrtchyan2
European University Insitute
Abstract
Customs Unions are the silent success story of regional integration, now surpassing Free
Trade Areas in trade volumes and prevalence among neighbouring countries, the quintessen-
tial natural trading partners. Yet their importance has often been concealed from the lit-
erature because CUs are few in number compared to other agreements. We show that the
standard regionalism model implies that CUs dominate all other PTAs in political viabil-
ity even with asymmetric production - hence FTAs may turn into CUs with higher tariﬀs,
challenging the view that endogenous trade agreements necessarily beneﬁt third countries.
Moreover, Customs Unions can be an engine for development: even when governments are
politically biased, we demonstrate that CU maximises social welfare in member states among
the alternative agreements as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease entirely.
1.1 Introduction
Customs Unions (CUs), regional trade agreements committing members to zero internal
tariﬀs and a common external tariﬀ (CET), are few in number compared to the sprawling
of Free Trade Areas (FTAs), accounting for less than 10% of trade agreements (Facchini
et al., 2013). But this statistic conceals the fundamental importance CUs now play in the
1Contact: hinnerk@gnutzmann.info
2Contact: arevik.mkrtchyan@eui.eu
5
6 Chapter1
world trade system: we show that natural trading partners form Customs Unions rather
than Free Trade Areas, leading CUs to carry more trade than FTAs! Since CUs have more
protectionist tariﬀ policies than FTAs when tariﬀs are set endogenously, this observation
potentially has important implications for our understanding of the welfare eﬀects of region-
alism. For example, Goyal and Joshi (2006) envision an evergrowing network of bilateral
FTAs eventually leading to free trade, while Ornelas (2005b) studies a model with lobbying
and shows that politically viable FTAs lead to lower tariﬀs and hence improve welfare of all
countries globally. But these papers do not consider CUs, the issue taken up in this paper.
As we show, CUs are more politically viable than FTAs, and FTAs can be turned into CUs;
this reduces global welfare, because tariﬀs rise for third countries. But we also show that
Customs Unions can be an engine for development: even when governments are politically
biased, social welfare in member states is highest under CU as long as trade with the rest of
the world does not cease.
We employ the canonical regionalism model with imperfect competition3, augmented to
allow for lobbying of governments by domestic ﬁrms and endogenous tariﬀ setting as in
Ornelas (2005b). We show that a Customs Union maximizes the political objective of each
potential member government among all possible bilateral agreements, including those not
feasible under GATT principles. While it is well known that formation of a Free Trade Area
is sometimes politically viable when countries previously engaged trade under MFN (Ornelas,
2005a,b), analysis shows them to be ineﬃcient agreements  they lead to tariﬀs that are too
low, both from a political and member social welfare perspective. Turning an FTA into a
CU is therefore politically viable, but leads to excessively high external tariﬀs from a welfare
perspective if the government is biased. However, there are limits to the adverse eﬀects of
Customs Unions: as long as trade with the rest of the world remains positive, member social
welfare under a CU is higher than under FTA.
These results help to understand the rapid proliferation of Customs Unions in recent
decades. Figure 1.1(b) provides a global view of the prevalence of Customs Unions today.
The European Union Customs Union, which now includes also Turkey to form the world's
largest CU in economic terms, accounts for 25% of world trade alone WTO (2011). Since
2010, this CU is bordered eastwards by the Eurasian Customs Union  one can now travel
from Porto to Almaty, passing eleven countries but only encountering a single customs point.
With the exception of Chile, Latin America divides into three customs unions, the Andean
Community, Mercosur and CARICOM. Various Customs Unions are active in Africa and the
3See Krishna (1998), Freund (2000), Ornelas (2005b), Saggi (2006), Goyal and Joshi (2006), and Zissimos
(2011)
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Middle East, too. Compare this to part (a) of the same ﬁgure, which shows CUs in eﬀect
after the end of the Cold War in 1992. In contrast, all FTAs combined account for only 15%
of world trade (Carpenter and Lendle, 2010) combined. It is clear that countries choose to
manage their most important trade links through the institution of a Customs Union.
(a) 1992
(b) 2012
Figure 1.1: Proliferation of Customs Unions, 199220124
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we show empirically how strongly
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Customs Unions  and not FTAs  have proliferated between natural trading partners over
the past 20 years. Second, a number of very interesting theoretical studies have emphasized
benign consequences of Free Trade Areas, showing that even tariﬀs on non-members may
endogenously fall (Richardson, 1993), that politically viable FTAs must be globally welfare
improving (Ornelas, 2005b) and can pave the path towards multilateral liberalization (Goyal
and Joshi, 2006, Saggi and Yildiz, 2010). We show that it is politically feasible to turn any
bilateral trade relation, including FTA and MFN, into CUs, and that the stricter equilibrium
tariﬀ policy under CU quite profoundly alters welfare conclusions. Finally, we provide a
suﬃcient  and easily observable  condition for a Customs Union to improve social welfare
of members in a political economy setting: as long as trade with non-member states remains
positive, CU improves member social welfare.
We proceed by giving more evidence on the silent success of CUs in section 1.2. Section
1.3 then introduces the model; the tariﬀ setting stage is solved in the following section.
Section 1.5 then turns to central results of political viability and welfare. Subsequently,
the next section develops extensions regarding border eﬀects and asymmetric production
structures. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
1.2 Silent Success: Neighbours form Customs Unions
Figure 1.1 shows graphically how CUs proliferated across the globe. This section more
formally conﬁrms that natural trading partners turn to Customs Unions.
Data: We study a large crosssection bilateral trade relations of 207 countries. For each
country pair, we observe membership in an FTA or CU in 2012 and 1992 using data from
the WTO's Trade Agreements Database. Additionally, geographical data were obtained from
Mayer and Zignago (2011). 2012 was the last year available in the dataset; we chose 1992
as the comparison year since it was the ﬁrst year when the independent states of the former
Soviet Union appear in the statistics.
Neighbouring countries have quickly turned to forming CUs in the past decades. Table
1.1 summarises bilateral trade relations. By 2012, 10% of country pairs in the sample engage
in an FTA, while less than half - 4.5% - are in a Customs Union. Since CUs tend to have
more members than FTAs, the discrepancy is much less striking than when counting the
number of agreements. However, turning to neighbouring countries  those  which share
a common land border, reverses the pattern. 45% of pairs engaged in a Customs Union in
4Based on the Customs Unions notiﬁed to the WTO, sourced from the WTO Trade Agreements Database,
see section 1.2.
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All Country Pairs Neighbouring Pairs
PTA 1992 2012 1992 2012
None 96% 85% 79% 27%
FTA 2% 10% 9% 28%
CU 1% 4% 12% 45%
Table 1.1: Share of Trade Agreements by Country Pairs
Dep.Var CU membership in 2012
(1) (2)
Estimation OLS Probit
(Intercept) 0.03∗∗∗ −1.92∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Common Border 0.30∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.06)
FTA in 1992 0.13∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.05)
CU in 1992 0.87∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.09)
R2 0.28
McFadden R2 0.26
Num. obs. 38612 38612
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 1.2: Probability that a country pair is in CU (2012)
2012! This high number  and its rapid increase since 1992  is driven by the popularity of
CUs in Europe, Africa and Latin America. In contrast, FTAs rank a distant second with
28%. As the gravity model suggests, neighbouring countries are natural trading partners;
and neighbours are prone to turning to CU.
Regression analysis shows that FTAs may graduate to becoming a Customs Union.
Table 1.2 presents regression estimates for the probability of a country pair being in a CU in
2012, as a function of whether the countries share a common border and dummies indicating
common FTA or CU membership in 1992. The linear probability model is presented in
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Coeﬃcient Marginal Eﬀect
Common Border 0.106∗∗∗
(0.005)
FTA in 1992 0.063∗∗∗
(0.004)
CU in 1992 0.238∗∗∗
(0.007)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 1.3: Probit Model: Marginal Eﬀects at Sample Mean
equation (1), with probit estimation taking into account the limited dependent variable
in equation (2). Marginal eﬀects of the probit model are in table 1.3; both models yield
consistent results: a common border and CU membership in 1992 are strongly positively
correlated with CU membership in 2012. Furthermore, FTA membership in 1992 raises the
probability of being in CU by 2012 by 6% at the sample mean. In this sense, one may expect
more of the current FTAs, which are still young, to eventually turn into Customs Unions.
CUs are distinctively regional, especially in contrast to free trade agreements. Partly
this may be explained by the fact that a country cannot be member of two CUs. But CUs
also allow the closure of internal customs points; this is especially valuable for geographically
contiguous areas. We augment the model to allow for border eﬀects below.
1.3 Model
Our set-up closely follows the standard regionalism model under imperfect competition with
segmented markets as in Brander and Krugman (1983). As in Ornelas (2005b), governments
take an active role  endogenously setting their external tariﬀ policy and choosing preferen-
tial trade agreements to optimally meet their objectives. The main departure from previous
papers is that we model Customs Unions as a potential trade agreement in addition to FTA
and MFN (i.e., absence of agreement). Thus, our analysis covers all exceptions to GATT
XXIV in a uniﬁed setting.
Countries and Markets : Our world economy consists of two potential partner countries in
a trade agreement - indexedX and Y respectively - and the rest of the world, Z. Each country
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has n ﬁrms producing a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale with marginal
cost normalised to zero (called imperfectly competitive good). Markets are nationally
segmented and have Cournot competition; thus, each ﬁrm in country i sets a vector of
quantities {qij} for all j = X, Y, Z determining its output in a given market j. Furthermore,
there is one numeraire good produced competitively.
There is a representative consumer in each country, whose utility is linear in the competi-
tive good and quadratic in the imperfectly competitive good. Hence, the utility function of a
consumer in country i is given by u(Qi) = ΓQi− (Q2i /2), where Qi =
∑
k∈{X,Y,Z}
qik is the total
output available in the country. Government Objective: In each country, the government
maximises a political objective function, which is a weighted combination of producer and
consumer surplus:
Gi(ti; t−i) = CSi(ti; t−i) + TRi(ti) + (1 + α)PSi(ti; t−i) (1.3.1)
where CSi and PSi are consumer and producer surplus respectively, and TRi denotes the
tariﬀ revenue . α ≥ 0 represents the political bias, through which producer interests are
overweighted when policy is determined. Due to the segmented markets assumption of the
model, a government's ﬁrst order condition for tariﬀ setting does not depend on tariﬀs of
other countries; hence we drop the arguments t−i henceforth to simplify the notation. This
objective function arises, for example, from the bargaining game between government and
lobbies of Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
Trade Agreements and External Tariﬀs : We model all three permissible trade regimes
under article XXIV. In a Customs Union (CU), the external tariﬀ is set cooperatively; in
practice, an intergovernmental body is often created that determines the external tariﬀ
policy. In line with the literature, we assume that the external tariﬀ is chosen to maximise
the joint welfare of the partner countries. Two important constraints apply: ﬁrst, internal
tariﬀ barriers must be eliminated as in an FTA. But additionally, the external tariﬀs imposed
by each partner country X and Y on the rest of the world must Z must be equal:
tCU = argmax
tX ,tY
GX(t) +GY (t) (1.3.2)
s.t. tXY = 0, tY X = 0
tXZ = tY Z
In a free trade area (FTA), the member government is committed to a zero internal tariﬀ
with its partner; it remains to impose, noncoperatively, the politically optimal tariﬀ on l.
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This yields the problem
tFTAi = argmax
ti
Gi(t) (1.3.3)
s.t. tik = 0, i ∈ {X, Y }
for each member state.
When no agreements are in place  so tariﬀs are set merely according to the most favoured
nation principle (MFN)  the government of country i imposes equal tariﬀs on both other
countries k and l in the world of our model. Hence, each government's problem is
tMFNi = argmax
ti
Gi(t) (1.3.4)
s.t. tik = til, i, k, l ∈ {X, Y, Z}
Ratiﬁcation and Timing : In the ﬁrst period (ratiﬁcation stage), countries X and Y
simultaneously announce a trade agreement they would be willing to enter with the other
country, φi ∈ {FTA,CU,MFN}. If countries make the same announcement, the agreement
is implemented; otherwise, MFN obtains. Then follows the tariﬀsetting stage, in which
the governments or Commission of the Customs Union determines external tariﬀ so as to
maximise the objective functions just described. Finally, ﬁrms produce and consumers con-
sume in the market outcome stage.
Solution Method : Given the sequential, perfect information structure of the game, the
solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and we proceed by backwards in-
duction. Since solution of the last stage  market outcomes  is standard, we relegate the
relevant calculations to the appendix.
1.4 Trade Agreements and Tariﬀ Policy
It is a safe bet (Freund and Ornelas, 2010) that preferential trade agreements profoundly
alter the incentives of governments to set external tariﬀs, and the tariﬀ channel is the funda-
mental reason why FTA and CU aﬀect world trade diﬀerently. Hence this section establishes
a comparative view of external tariﬀ policy, ﬁrst comparing the two types of preferential
trade agreement, and then a discussion of CU visavis MFN.
Customs Union vs FTA: In a free trade area, each partner country unilaterally solves
problem 1.3.3, while a single supranational institution determines the joint external tariﬀ
for both members under CU, solving problem 1.3.2. While in principle, FTA members could
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charge diﬀerent tariﬀs, it is an equilibrium outcome that their external tariﬀs are identical;
hence one may compare the FTA and CU tariﬀ levels directly:
Proposition 1.1. External Tariﬀs: Customs Union vs FTA
1. A Free Trade Area imposes a strictly lower external tariﬀ than a Customs Union,
tFTAiZ < t
CU
iZ
2. The stronger the political bias, the more CU external tariﬀ exceeds FTA
Proof. i. Under FTA, policy solves the ﬁrst order condition of problem 1.3.3
dGi
dtFTAiz
=
dCSi(t
FTA
i )
dtFTAiz
+
dTRi(t
FTA
i )
dtFTAiz
+ (1 + α)
dPSii(t
FTA
i )
dtFTAiz
= 0 (1.4.1)
Under a CU, the ﬁrst order condition of problem 1.3.2 is given by
dGi
dtiz
=
dCSi(ti)
dtiz
+
dTRi(ti)
dtiz
+ (1 + α)
(
dPSii(ti)
dtiz
+
dPSji(ti)
dtiz
)
= 0 (1.4.2)
Evaluating the latter condition at the FTA tariﬀ yields
dGi
dtiz
|tiz=tFTAiz = 0 + (1 + α)
dPSji(ti)
dtiz
> 0 (1.4.3)
Note that whenever the bias is not too high and the tariﬀ is not prohibitive and we
have interior solution, the objective of the government must be concave (second-order
polinomial). Due to the concavity of Gi(t), the tariﬀ that solves the CU problem must
be higher than the FTA level.
ii. Using the implicit function theorem on the ﬁrst order conditions 1.4.1 and 1.4.2,
dtFTAiz
dα
= − PSii(t
FTA
i )
d2Gi(t
FTA
i )/dt
FTA
iz
dtCUiz
dα
= −PSii(t
CU
i ) + PSji(t
CU
i )
d2Gi(t
CU
i )/dt
CU
iz
Combining,
d(tCUiz − tFTAiz )
dα
= −
(
PSii(t
CU
i
)− PSii(tFTAi )) + PSji(tCUi )
d2Gi(t
CU
i )/dt
CU
iz
> 0 (1.4.4)
Since the external tariﬀ under CU is higher, producer surplus PSii is also higher under
CU than under FTA. Second, PSji(tCUi ) ≥ 0, so the numerator is positive. Since the
denominator is negative by concavity of the government objective Gi(t), the overall
product is positive, as required.
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As Saggi (2006) and Ornelas (2007) emphasise, centralised tariﬀ setting in a Customs
Union leads to consideration of proﬁts arising from crossborder trade; hence, tariﬀs are
higher. While a stronger political bias leads to higher tariﬀs both under FTA and CU, the
eﬀect in a CU is even stronger  because the marginal political returns to higher tariﬀs are
larger in CU than FTA. This is due to absence of leakage, in the terminology of Freund
and Ornelas (2010): a higher tariﬀ always beneﬁts also the partner country, and only under
CU are those gains internalised in endogenous tariﬀ setting. However Bohara et al. (2004)
ﬁnd some evidence for the tariﬀ complementarity in the formation process of MERCOSUR
in Argentina's tariﬀs - as the average tariﬀ went up to be closer aligned with the Brazilian
tariﬀ and the internal tariﬀ was going down, the tariﬀs in the sectors most aﬀected by the
trade diversion saw a decrease.
Estevadeordal et al. (2005) study the impact of the RTAs of 10 Latin American countries
on the non-member tariﬀs. Consistently with theory, they ﬁnd that moving from an FTA
to a CU (cases of MERCOSUR and Andean Community) leads to an increase in the tariﬀs
towards non-members.
Customs Union vs Most Favoured Nation: MFN tariﬀs are higher than CU ones, but the
eﬀects are complex. In an MFN regime, tariﬀ revenue and domestic proﬁts are higher than
under CU, calling also for higher tariﬀs at the margin. On the other hand, consumer surplus
is lower, and would call for a lower tariﬀ. In principle, the comparison could thus go either
way. In Ornelas (2007), for example, the potential partners each have a single ﬁrm while
the number of ﬁrms in the rest of the world is a parameter. In this environment, the CU
tariﬀ is higher than MFN when the number of ﬁrms abroad is suﬃciently large and otherwise
below. In contrast, the present model has an arbitrary, but symmetric, number of ﬁrms in
each country, allowing a deﬁnitive comparison of the tariﬀs:
Proposition 1.2. External Tariﬀs: Customs Union vs MFN
i. The stronger the political bias, the larger the tariﬀ decrease from MFN to CU
ii. The stronger the political bias, the more MFN tariﬀs exceed CU external tariﬀs
Proof. i. The government's ﬁrst order condition under MFN is
dGi
dtMFNiz
=
dCSi(t
MFN
i )
dtMFNiz
+
dTRi(t
MFN
i )
dtMFNiz
+ (1 + α)
dPSii(t
MFN
i )
dtMFNiz
= 0 (1.4.5)
Substituting into the FOC of a customs union, 1.4.2, we obtain after some algebra
dGi
dtiz
|CUt=tMFN =
n2(8α2n2 + α(16n2 − 6n− 4) + 8n2 − 1)
2(n+ 1)2 ((1− 2α)n2 + 3n+ 1) < 0 (1.4.6)
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Similarly to the previous case, whenever the solution is interior, Gi(t) is concave in
tariﬀs, the external tariﬀ in CU must be lower than in MFN.
ii. Using the implicit function theorem on the ﬁrst order conditions 1.4.5 and 1.4.2,
dtMFNiz
dα
= − PSii(t
MFN
i )
d2Gi(t
MFN
i )/dt
MFN
iz
dtCUiz
dα
= −PSii(t
CU
i ) + PSji(t
CU
i )
d2Gi(t
CU
i )/dt
CU
iz
Substituting the required expressions,
dtMFNX
dα
− dt
CU
dα
=
4n(Γ + 2ntMFN)
2(1 + n)2 + (1− 2αn)2n −
4n(Γ + ntCU)
2(1 + 2n)2 + (1− 4nα)n > 0
Both the nominator and denominator are positive as tMFN > tCU and α < 1/4n
Magee and Lee (2001) show that the European Economic Community, created from an
MFN basis, led to a mild decrease (0.9%) in the average tariﬀs, similar to the theoretical
prediction.
1.5 Political Viability and Welfare
Given the political tariﬀs determined in the previous section, we now study which agree-
ments are politically viable. We show that the Customs Union dominates all other PTAs
in this regard, and hence that formation of a CU can always occur in equilibrium; however,
an example demonstrates that this does not rule that the possibility that an FTA may be
formed. We then turn a careful welfare analysis, and provide the central result: a CU also
leads to the highest social welfare in member countries as long as trade with the rest of the
world does not cease. This holds in spite of excessively high tariﬀs due to lobbying. One
may thus say that political viability and member welfare go hand in hand.
The Politically Optimal Agreement : Consider ﬁrst the agreement that two governments
would optimally like to conclude if the restrictions of GATT XXIV did not apply, i.e. there
would be no requirement to eliminate internal tariﬀs on substantially all trade and the
external tariﬀ need not be a common one. As the following proposition shows, the partner
countries optimal bilateral agreement would still satisfy these constraints  they are not
binding in the benchmark model  and implement the customs union policy:
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Proposition 1.3. Among all possible bilateral agreements, the Customs Union yields highest
political payoﬀ, for each member individually and collectively. In the absence of political bias,
the Customs Union tariﬀs implement the bilaterally social welfare maximizing policy.
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition for this result is twofold. First, tariﬀs on internal trade are a transfer
from producers in the partner country and domestic consumers to the government purse;
especially if producer lobbying is politically important, governments thus want to eliminate
internal tariﬀs - even if they were not forced to do so - when forming an optimal bilateral
agreement. In fact, if import subsidies were allowed, they would be called for both to further
boost proﬁts and reduce underproduction implied by imperfect competition. Second, due to
the symmetry of the model, there is no reason for the partner countries to want to charge
diﬀerent tariﬀs; hence this constraint is also non-binding. As we show in section 1.6.2,
the result is robust to having asymmetric production structures. Finally, when there is no
political bias, the governments problem coincides with the social planner's; in this case, CU
tariﬀs are set at the bilaterally welfare maximizing level.
Politically Viable Agreements : Since Customs Unions are so successful in raising govern-
ment welfare, it is a corollary that forming such a trade agreement is always an equilibrium
of the ratiﬁcation subgame:
Corollary 1.1. There is always an equilibrium where a Customs Union is formed
Proof. By proposition 1.3, the government is maximised under CU among all possible bi-
lateral agreements. This implies that there is no proﬁtable deviation to another PTA when
both countries propose CU, and hence formation of CU is always an equilibrium.
However, this equilibrium need not be unique. As Ornelas (2005b) has shown, there are
cases when a Free Trade Area can be ratiﬁed from the status quo of a Most Favoured Nation
trade regime. Thus, for some parameter constellations  in particular, when the number of
ﬁrms is not too large  there are cases when formation of an FTA can also arise in equilibrium.
However, if such an agreement were to be formed, it would be due to coordination failure
 from the perspective of member states, the agreements are Pareto ranked. Likewise, if
country X were to expect that country Y would propose MFN, it is also in X's best response
to propose MFN. One may speculate that such coordination failures are especially likely to
arise if potential partners are not politically aligned  and indeed, evidence shows that both
CU and FTA are more likely to be formed among political allies rather than rivals. Crawford
and Fiorentino (2005), Fiorentino et al. (2007) discuss the importance of political alliances
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in forming of the RTAs and hurdles to creating them in the presence of political diﬀerences)
while Whalley (1998) highlight the importance of political alliance in deepening the trade
agreements.
Customs Unions may also be hampered by institutional challenges. Our analysis presup-
poses that a supranational organization is formed that sets the external tariﬀ to maximize
joint member welfare. As Facchini et al. (2013) demonstrate, a Customs Union that suﬀers
from strategic delegation may yield poor outcomes: the median voter in each country is
tempted to strategically delegate a highly protectionist representative to the CU commis-
sion; but this then causes the CU to set extraordinarily high tariﬀs. In their setting, a CU
may fail to be formed for some parameter cases. As our analysis shows, if such issues can be
overcome, the political case for formation of a CU becomes rather compelling.
Welfare TradeOﬀs Among PTAs : When governments are politically biased, they will
not implement optimal policies from a social welfare perspective. Interestingly, in an FTA,
the government's political bias actually promotes social welfare. This is because proﬁts in the
partner countries, while important to welfare, are neglected when tariﬀs are set unilaterally.
As bias increases, although driven by concern for domestic producers, the external tariﬀs in
an FTA rises; hence it moves in the right direction from a member social welfare perspective.
For a CU, external tariﬀs are set the welfare maximizing level when no bias is present; they
continue to rise as bias is strengthened, hence reducing welfare. Summarizing, we have
Proposition 1.4. As political bias increases, the welfare gain from CU over FTA increases
less.
Proof. The welfare change as the government bias changes in CU is given by
dWCUi
dα
= −αdΠ
CU
i
dα
= −αdΠ
CU
i
dt
dtCU
dα
and in FTA is
dW FTAi
dα
= −αdΠ
FTA
ii
dα
+
dΠFTAji
dα
= (−αdΠ
FTA
ii
dt
+
dΠFTAji
dt
)
dtFTA
dα
We know from proposition 3.1 dt
CU
dα
> dt
FTA
dα
. Also note that
−αdΠi
CU
dt
− (−αdPi
FTA
ii
dt
+
dP iFTAji
dt
) =
2αn(Γ + ntFTA)
(3n+ 1)2
− 4αn(nt
CU + Γ)
(3n+ 1)2
− 2n(Γ + nt
FTA)
(3n+ 1)2
< 0
Combining the two results we have veriﬁed that dW
CU
dα
− dWFTA
dα
< 0
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With α > 0, politically optimal tariﬀs under CU will always exceed the member welfare-
maximising level. Given assumption 1, i.e. that political bias is not so strong as to lead
countries into autarky under any trade regime, it turns out that the equilibrium tariﬀ under
FTA is always below what welfare maximization would require  as proﬁts in the partner
country are neglected when the external tariﬀ is set. The question then becomes, in view of
the linear-quadratic structure of the model: which regime is further away from the welfare
optimum? A simple, observable condition ensures that CU is better for member welfare:
Proposition 1.5. Given that trade with the rest of the world does not cease, member social
welfare is higher under CU than FTA
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case where α = 0. By proposition 1.3, in this case the CU im-
plements member welfare maximising tariﬀs, which obviously dominates the (lower) FTA
tariﬀs.
Now consider the case where trade with the rest of the world is about to cease, i.e.
α = 1
4n
. In this case, the distance of the political CU tariﬀ to the welfare maximising tariﬀ
is
‖tCU − tW‖ = Γ
1+2n
− 4nΓ
2(1+2n)2+n
(1.5.1)
Similarly, the distance between FTA and welfare maximising tariﬀ is
‖tFTA − tW‖ = 4nΓ
2(1+2n)2+n
− Γ(2n+ 32 )
( 1
2
+2n)n+2(1+2n)2
(1.5.2)
Then,
‖tFTA − tW‖ − ‖tCU − tW‖ = Γ (3n+ 1) (32n
3 + 4n2 − 17n− 6)
(2n+ 1) (8n2 + 9n+ 2) (20n2 + 17n+ 4)
>, 0
The inequality follows because n ≥ 1, and hence each bracket is of positive sign. Thus,
member social welfare under CU is higher at α = 1
4n
.
It remains to check the intermediate values of α. From proposition 1.4, we know that
the welfare gain of CU vs FTA is monotone decreasing in α; but since welfare under CU is
still larger at α = 1
4n
, this means welfare must also be higher under CU in the intermediate
range (α ∈ (0, 1
4n
)).
This result shows that social welfare and political viability go handinhand for the
transition from FTA to CU. The intuition behind this rather surprising result is as follows:
governments want to maximise social welfare; we already showed that CU is viable, so
member social welfare must be higher than under FTA. As the political bias increases, we
have the following forces:
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1. CU becomes worse for member social welfare. This is because the external tariﬀ rises
and moves further away from the social-welfare maximising level.
2. FTA member welfare improves when the political bias rises. This part was quite
surprising to us, but the intuition is clear: an FTA does not internalise cross-border
externalises, causing the external tariﬀ to be ineﬃciently low. As political bias gets
stronger, the external tariﬀ of the FTA goes up, and moves closer to the welfare-
maximising level. So the political bias is good for welfare under FTA!.
One can indeed ﬁnd examples with strong political bias, where the CU already ceased
external trade, but the FTA is actually quite close to implementing the member-welfare
maximising tariﬀ. What the proposition shows is that trade with the rest of the world being
positive under CU is a suﬃcient condition to ensure that member welfare is also higher under
CU than FTA. The link to the non-members positive exports is also intuitive: the bias, while
aﬀecting the members, also has a strong negative impact on non-member exports. We think
this particular bound is interesting because it's a very conservative requirement and can
easily be observed empirically.
Customs Unions also imply greater member welfare than under MFN. As the preceding
discussion showed, the MFN regime implies by far the highest tariﬀ wall. Implementation
of a CU improves market access in the partner country  beneﬁting producer proﬁts  and
reduces the prices consumers face, as tariﬀs are either eliminated (with respect to the partner
country), or reduced (vis-a-vis the rest of the world). Formally, we have
Proposition 1.6. Given that trade with the rest of the world does not cease, member social
welfare is higher under CU than MFN. The stronger the political bias, the larger the welfare
gain under CU
This result may hold in a setting with nonlinear demand. Saggi and Yildiz (2005)
extend the standard model in this direction and conﬁrm that a lot of properties found in the
baseline fully symmetric linear demand case extend to the non-linear demand. In particular,
even though the tariﬀ complementarity of the bilateral agreements cannot be guaranteed,
the welfare domination of the bilateral agreement over the MFN is found up to the tariﬀ level
tbilateral ≤ 2tMFN . If we move to comparing the FTA and CU, the fundamental advantage
of the CU that it internalises the cross-border eﬀects remains. Thus one can conclude that
for welfare-maximising governments even under more general demand functions the CU is
expected to deliver the highest welfare. One can also expect that introducing the political
concerns, similar to the linear demand case, will erode the welfare advantages of the CU over
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FTA. What will remain is the upper limit on this erosion set by non-negative production
of the rest of the world. It is unclear which of the thresholds would be reached ﬁrst under
non-linear demand function, one can expect that for the government objective close to the
welfare-maximising the result will still hold. Extending the model for nonlinear demands
is a promising direction for future research.
Impact on Outsiders and Global Welfare: Yi (1996) shows that the formation of a cus-
toms union with benevolent governments reduces the welfare of non-members compared to
the MFN setting. And the position of the non-members is worsening as the number of
countries in a customs union increases. The presence of the political motivations of the
governments only makes negative impact stronger. At the same time, the global welfare is
higher under a customs union. Indeed, the positive tariﬀs increase the distortions of the
imperfect competition by reducing the total production. Thus, as the customs union has
lower tariﬀs than the MFN world, aggregate welfare increases.
1.6 Extensions
1.6.1 Trade Costs and Border Eﬀects
As discussed in the World Bank's Trading Across Borders reports, trade costs are often
administrative: the need to prepare documents, waiting time for customs clearance, etc. The
question then becomes how the external tariﬀ in a customs union responds to a reduction
in internal nontariﬀ trade costs, e.g. because border controls were abolished or documents
harmonised.
We now augmented the model to allow for real trade costs. Let tcij be the nontariﬀ
cost, per unit, incurred when trading from country i to country j. A reduction in trade cost
tXY then leads to a fall in the external tariﬀ of a CU:
Proposition 1.7. The larger the reduction in internal trade costs in a CU, the more the
external tariﬀ falls
Proof. After augmenting the model with trade costs tcij ≥ 0 for each bilateral pair, and
solving for external tariﬀ analogously to the procedure in section 3 above5, one ﬁnds that:
dt∗CU
dtcXY
= n(2αn+5n+2)
8n2+(9−4αn)n+2 (1.6.1)
Since α < 1
4n
by assumption 1, the expression is positive. Hence a reduction in internal trade
costs leads to a lower external tariﬀ, as claimed.
5Detailed calculations are available upon request from the authors
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Reduction in trade costs provide a further rationale for CU formation, which also at-
tenuates adverse eﬀects on nonmember countries. Aside from the direct positive welfare
eﬀect of a reduction in trade costs, tariﬀ complementarity forces also lead to a reduction
in the external tariﬀ once internal borders are eliminated. This may oﬀset some of the
tariﬀ increase expected when a CU is formed. Empirical evidence from both MERCOSUR
and the Eurasian Customs Union showed typically mild tariﬀ increases after CU formation,
consistent with the eﬀect of reduced trade costs.
1.6.2 Asymmetric Production
We now extend the baseline model to incorporate asymmetric production structures. As
in Facchini et al. (2013), we now consider the case of two imperfectly competitive goods;
each of the potential partner countries has n ﬁrms, but produces only one of the goods.
In the rest of the world, both goods are produced by n ﬁrms each. Letting x denote the
good produced in country X, and y the good produced in country Y , we have the following
production structure:[
n 0 n
0 n n
]
The utility function is linearquadratic in each good, directly generalising from the base-
line above. All other elements of the model remain unchanged. It follows that the best
response functions of each ﬁrm remains the same. The government, however, now sets two
tariﬀ lines: one for the good produced domestically, and one for the imported good. This
yields the following optimal external tariﬀs:
Proposition 1.8. External Tariﬀs under Asymmetric Production
i. The external tariﬀ for the domestically produced good a is invariant to the trade regime:
tMFNi,a = t
FTA
i,a = t
CU
i,a
ii. The external tariﬀ on the nonproduced good b is lowest in FTA, intermediate in MFN
and highest under CU: tFTAi,b < t
MFN
i,b < t
CU
i,b .
In the asymmetric production setting, CU is now the most protectionist trade regime.
For the domestically produced good, government incentives for tariﬀ setting do not change
when a PTA is formed with the partner country: there is, by construction, no competition
from ﬁrms in the partner country when an FTA is formed  hence removing the tariﬀ
complementarity eﬀect. When forming a CU, due to symmetric utility functions, the CU
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objective for setting of the external tariﬀ simply becomes a monotonic transformation of
the original problem; this also leaves tariﬀs unchanged. Regarding the nonproduced good,
tariﬀs are lowest under FTA  due to tariﬀ complementarity, since the country already
committed to a zero internal tariﬀ with the partner  and highest under CU, because proﬁt
eﬀects are fully internalised. In contrast to the symmetric setting, tariﬀs under MFN are
now lower than under CU.
These diﬀerences in tariﬀ structures do not aﬀect results on political viability and member
welfare of CU compared to the baseline setting. In the CU the tariﬀ on the good that is not
produced domestically is matched to the level of the partner country tariﬀ. Thus it is clear
that the consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenue for the only-import good in the CU is lower
than under the MFN and FTA,  the country engages in extra protection the good it has
no ﬁrms in. However the upside comes from gaining similar protection in the domestically
produced good in the partner country. The home country extends fully its level of protection
to the partner. The trade-oﬀ between the losses in the only-import good and gains in the
home-produced good deﬁne the overall outcome. Hence,
Proposition 1.9. i. There is always an equilibrium where a CU is formed
ii. Member social welfare is maximised under CU, as long as trade with the rest of the
world does not cease.
Intuitions from the symmetric model carry over to the asymmetric extension. In partic-
ular, political viability of CU is promoted by the fact that crossborder proﬁt externalities
are internalised under CU; this beneﬁts lobbies, in particular when α is large and hence the
external tariﬀ is high. However, member social welfare is still promoted by the CU: the tariﬀ
on the nonproduced good is ineﬃciently low, and by trading protection, the countries
achieve a welfare improvement. As long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease in
either product, the member welfare improvement in fact dominates the ineﬃciency brought
by excessively high political tariﬀs under CU.
1.7 Conclusion
Customs Unions have rapidly proliferated in recent decades. Among neighbouring countries,
the most natural trading partners, CUs are now much more widespread than FTAs. Probit
analysis conﬁrmed the statistically and economically signiﬁcant role played by common bor-
ders in CU formation; moreover, we showed that past FTA membership of a country pair
increases the probability of a trade link graduating to become a customs union. These
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results are consistent with the political and welfare advantages of a CU regime over both
FTA and MFN.
These empirical facts are explained by our model. We show that Customs Unions dom-
inate all other bilateral agreements, including those not permitted under GATT XXIV,
from a political objective perspective. This dominance is driven by improved management
of crossborder elasticities as well as greater scope for protection of proﬁts, especially im-
portant when governments are subject to lobbying pressures. But we also show that CUs
improve the social welfare of member states, so long as trade with the rest of the world does
not cease entirely. Thus, Customs Unions can be an engine for development.
These results highlight the importance of Customs Unions to our understanding of prefer-
ential trade and its consequences. In particular, the static gains from FTAs to third countries
 due to tariﬀ complementarity  may not last long if FTAs then turn into CUs. On the
other hand, CUs can bring welfare beneﬁts to member countries, and may lead to a reduction
in trade costs that could not be achieved under FTA.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Market Outcomes
The problem of any of the n ﬁrms in, say, country X is given by
max
{qxx,qyx,qzx}
= P (Qx, qxx)qxx +
(
P (Qy, qyx)− tyx
)
qyx (1.8.1)
+
(
P (Qz, qzx)− tzx
)
qzx
where Qj denotes the total quantity produced in the market by all other ﬁrms, and Qj
denotes the market output.
And similarly for ﬁrms in the other countries, Y and Z. To ﬁnd the equilibrium in country
j, sum the 3n ﬁrstorder conditions for qxx, qxy, qxz respectively to ﬁnd the equilibrium output
for given tariﬀs:
0 = 3n(Γ−Qx)−Qx − ntji − ntjk
Q∗j(tji, tjk) =
3nΓ− n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
and, again, symmetrically for the other countries. The output of the representative ﬁrm in
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each country is then given by
q∗jj =
Γ + n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
(1.8.2)
q∗ji =
Γ− (1− 2n)tji + ntjk
3n+ 1
(1.8.3)
q∗jk =
Γ + ntji − (1 + 2n)tjk
3n+ 1
(1.8.4)
1.8.2 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.3: First, consider the problem of maximising the government objective
of country X, subject only to tariﬀs being nonnegative, i.e.
max
tXY ≥0
tXZ≥0
GX(t) = max
tXY ≥0
tXZ≥0
CSX(t) + TR(t) + (1 + α) (PSXX(t) + PSY X(t)) (1.8.5)
= max
tXY ≥0
tXZ≥0
Q2X(t)
2
+ nqX(t)t
T + (1 + α)nq2XX(t) + (1 + α)nq
2
Y X(t)
Remark: In any solution, t∗XY ≤ t∗XZ . Indeed, assume the opposite were true, and
there was a solution where t∗XZ < t
∗
XY . That implies GX(t
∗
XY , t
∗
XZ) ≥ GX(t∗XZ , t∗XY ).
GHX(t) = CSX(t) + TR(t) + (1 + α)PSXX(t) is a symmetric polynomial in (tXY , tXZ) and
thus has the same value for permutations. However (1 + α)PSY X(t) is decreasing in tXY
and increasing in tXZ and thus PSY X(t∗XY , t
∗
XZ) < PSY X(t
∗
XZ , t
∗
XY ) as t
∗
XZ < t
∗
XY . It follows
that GX(t∗XY , t
∗
XZ) < GX(t
∗
XZ , t
∗
XY ) - contradiction to the assumption that (t
∗
XY , t
∗
XZ) was a
solution.
Now, suppose ﬁrst ﬁrst were an interior solution with no constraint binding. By the ﬁrst
order conditions:
t∗XY = − (2α+1)Γn+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2)
t∗XZ = − Γα(2(α+1)n+1)n+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2)
Testing the second order condition: For a maximum, the function should be concave.
This requires | H |> 0 and H(1, 1) > 0, where
H =
[
n−2n
2−n+2α(5n2+4n+1)
(3n+1)2
n2 4n+1−2α(n+1)
(3n+1)2
n2 4n+1−2α(n+1)
(3n+1)2
n−8n
2−9n−2+4αn2
(3n+1)2
]
is the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives.
The | H |= n+α(2n2α−4n2−5n−2)
(3n+1)2
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It follows that n+ α(2n2α− 4n2− 5n− 2) > 0 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the concavity of the function and the local extremum being the global maximum.
However the extremum is outside of the feasible set wherever the function is concave, the
internal tariﬀ found with the FOC tXY < 0.
Wherever the function is concave, i.e. n + α(2n2α − 4n2 − 5n − 2) > 0, the function
is monotone and decreasing on the right of the extremum and, hence, the constraint on
non-negative tariﬀs is binding. The Remark implies then that tXY = 0 and tXZ ≥ 0. The
problem thus converges to that of the customs union.
When the function is not concave, i.e. n + α(2n2α − 4n2 − 5n − 2) ≤ 0, the borders of
the feasible set and the prohibitive tariﬀs have to be considered. The Remark implies that
either t∗XY = 0 or t∗XZ = tXZ is true in any solution.
Thus we are comparing the candidates of the form (t∗XY , t∗XZ) = (0, tXZ) to the candi-
dates of the form (t∗XY , t∗XZ) = (tXY , tXZ).
Remember that G(0, tXZ) is concave and maximised at (t∗XY , t∗XZ) = (0, tCUXZ) for α ≤
1/(4n)
Moreover, the function
G(tXY , tXZ) =
(Γ2n− tXY )2
2 (2n+ 1)2
− ntXY (Γ− n(1 + tXY ))
2n+ 1
+
(1 + α)n (Γ + ntXY )
2
(2n+ 1)2
+
(1 + α)n+ (Γ− n(1 + tXY ))2
(2n+ 1)2
is concave if the second order derivative ∂
2G(tXY,tXZ)
∂t2XY
= n−n+α(4n
2+4n+2)
(2n+1)2
Thus wherever α < n
4n2+4n+2
, the function is concave and the extremum is found at:
tXY =
(2α + 1) Γ
−n+ α(4n2 + 4n+ 2)
As the extremal point is negative when the function is concave, the function is maximized
at tXY = 0 and the candidates of the form (tXY , tXZ) collapse to (0, tXZ). And we know
that for any α ≤ 1/(4n) (0, tCUXZ) is the solution of the function G(0, tXZ).
Instead, if α ≥ n
4n2+4n+2
, the function G(tXY , tXZ) is not concave. Thus the function
reaches its highest point at either tXY = 0 or tXY = tXY .
G(0, tXZ) =
2Γ2n(n+α+1)
(2n+1)2
G(tXY , tXZ) =
Γ2n(n+2α+2)
2(n+1)2
G(0, tXZ)−G(tXY , tXZ) = Γ
2n(3n+2+2α(1−2n2))
2(n+1)2(2n+1)2
> 0 for α ≤ 1/(4n)
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Thus, G(tXY , tXZ) < G(0, tXZ) < G(0, tCU).
Proof of Proposition 1.8:
i. The problem in the MFN for good a is, as before,
tMFNi,a = argmax
ti,a
Gi(t)
s.t. tik,a = til,a
while in the FTA the problem for good a is
tFTAi,a = argmax
ti,a
Gi(t)
s.t. tik,a = 0
However as there are no ﬁrms producing good a in the partner country the change
in the constraint from tik,a = til,a in MFN to tik,a = 0 in FTA has no impact on the
government objective - in both cases the government only sets the tariﬀ til,a.
tCU = argmax
tX ,tY
GX(t) +GY (t)
s.t. tXY = 0, tY X = 0, tXZ = tY Z
CSX,a + TRX,a + PSXX,a + CSY,a + TRY,a + PSXY,a because PSXX,a = PSXY,a and
CSX,a + TRX,a = CSY,a + TRY,a by construction
the CU problem is equivalent to CSX,a + TRX,a +PSXX,a which is the MFN problem.
ii. The tariﬀ on the only-import good in MFN and FTA is determined by the consumer
surplus and tariﬀ revenue considerations. The arguments behind the tariﬀ complemen-
tarity make the comparison straightforward.
The increase in the tariﬀ paid by the rest of the world in the CU compared to the other
two trade regimes is presented in part i. It follows that once the country has to match
the tariﬀ level to the partner level where the producer interests are being protected, its
tariﬀ would be higher than when no producer interests are involved. Indeed, following
a similar approach to the symmetric case in derivations, the customs union tariﬀ of
the welfare maximising government is:
tCU,b =
Γ(2n+ 1)
2n2 + 5n+ 2
The Silent Success of Customs Unions 27
Meanwhile the MFN tariﬀ in the good that the country does not produce does not
depend on the political bias and is:
tMFN,b =
Γ
2(n+ 1)
It follows that the diﬀerence between CU and MFN tariﬀ is positive when α = 0, a
diﬀerence that will only grow as α increases:
Γn
2(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
> 0
Proof of Proposition 1.9:
i. The consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenue in the only-import good in the CU and in the
FTA has the following form:
CSX,b + TRX,b =
(2Γn− ntXZ,b)2
2 (2n+ 1)2
+
ntXZ,b (Γ (−n− 1) tXZ,b)
2n+ 1
While the proﬁts in the partner country have the following form:
PSXY,a = n
(ntY Z,a + Γ)
2
(2n+ 1)2
Note that as the countries are a mirror image of each other, tXZ,b = tY Z,a
The comparison of the government payoﬀs in each trade agreement regime leads to the
following outcome:
G∗CUi −G∗FTAi =
8 (α + 1)2 Γ2n3 (n+ 1)2
(4n2 + 5n+ 2)2 (2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2) > 0
for all α < 1/(2n)
G∗CUi −G∗MFNi =
Γ2n (2α2n2 + 4αn2 + 2n2 + 7αn+ 5n+ 6α + 4)
4 (n+ 1)2 (2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2) > 0
ii. The diﬀerence in social welfare between CU and FTA is given by:
W ∗CUi −W ∗FTAi =
8 (α + 1) Γ2n3 (n+ 1)2 (2n2 + 5n+ 2− 6αn2 − 5αn− 2α)
(4n2 + 5n+ 2)2 (2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2)2 > 0
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as at α = 1/(2n)
W ∗CUi −W ∗FTAi =
Γ2n (2n+ 1) (4n3 + 4n2 − n− 2)
2 (n+ 1)2 (4n2 + 5n+ 2)2
> 0
for all α < 1/(2n)
W ∗CUi −W ∗MFNi =
Γ2n (2α2n2 + 4αn2 + 2n2 + 7αn+ 5n+ 6α + 4)
4 (n+ 1)2 (2n2 + 5n+ 2− 2αn2) > 0
The welfare advantage of the CU over the MFN follows from the welfare advantage of
FTA over MFN.
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Determining the Common External
Tariﬀ in a Customs Union: Evidence
from the Eurasian Customs Union
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European University Institute 1
Abstract
How do member states determine the Common External Tariﬀ (CET) in a Customs Union?
While a large theoretical literature studies the incentives faced by governments when nego-
tiating the CET, empirical evidence is so far scant. This paper studies a large panel data set
of tariﬀ data from the Eurasian Customs Union and demonstrates the importance of mutual
protectionism: member states bargain to expand to their partners the protection of goods
that were protected nationally. Moreover, there is almost no evidence of exercising bargain-
ing power to keep keep the CET down for goods where one of the member states would
see large tariﬀ increases. Thus countries bargain for mutual protection, rather than mutual
liberalisation concessions. I show that the mutual protectionism ﬁnding emerges using three
methodologies: analysis of variance using unique explanatory power of each variable, deter-
mining the Shapley value from analysis of variance and ﬁnally OLS regression. Furthermore,
I develop a simple model to explain the mutual protectionism eﬀect.
1EUI. Contact: arevik.mkrtchyan@eui.eu
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2.1 Introduction
Regional trade agreements, in particular FTAs but also CUs have been studied comprehen-
sively in the literature2. The general theme of this literature is that a Customs Union allows
member countries to internalise crossborder externalities, e.g. relating to proﬁts arising
from trade or terms of trade eﬀects, that are ignored by policymakers under MFN or FTA
tariﬀ setting. As a result of extending the tariﬀ protection to partners, tariﬀs in a Customs
Union tend to be higher than in a free trade area. When decisionmakers are biased towards
the interests of producers, this eﬀect is particularly strong.
Much less is known about trade policy in a Customs Union empirically and performance of
the theory in practice. This study makes its contribution by providing insights on these two
areas for the case of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This Customs
Union is ideal to study how national tariﬀs are translated into a common external tariﬀ of
the CU for several reasons. First, the countries were all linked through FTAs before forming
the CU with zero internal tariﬀs; and thus all the external tariﬀ changes are attributed to
the CU. Second, there is a high level of compliance with CU tariﬀ and quick implementation
of the common external tariﬀ, so it is a genuine Customs Union. Third, the three members
have rather similar GDP per capita, allowing to apply a theoretical model with symmetric
consumer preferences.
I develop a theoretical model showing how pre-CU national tariﬀ lines are related to
post-CU CET lines through political economy factors and market structure. Theoretical
considerations imply that the individual tariﬀs of the CU members prior to the agreement
are determinants of the common external tariﬀ in the CU. Indeed, all the forces that would
impact the CU tariﬀ are already behind the individual country tariﬀ. These forces can be
ampliﬁed or diminished in the CU due to changes in the market power or internalisation of
cross-border eﬀects. This may be reﬂected in the weight of one country's tariﬀ lines in the
determination of CET. Following this line of reasoning, this paper examines the CET of the
Customs Union after its creation at the 6-digit level as an aﬃne function of the national
tariﬀ proﬁles of the members prior to the CU.
Theoretical derivations of the common external tariﬀ in a CU exhibit internalisation of
cross-border proﬁts, that is spillover of the domestic tariﬀ protection to the CU partners.
If the production proﬁles are diﬀerent among members, then the country with the highest
protection will push for the protection of its goods of interest. Thus empirically we should
expect to observe a similar phenomenon, coined as mutual protectionism.
2e.g. Freund and Ornelas (2010) provide a survey
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The analysis of the creation of the common external tariﬀ (CET) and impacts each mem-
ber had is done both on aggregate and speciﬁc sector types. Findings support qualitatively
the theory in determining the weights of each national tariﬀ in the CET. Most of the speci-
ﬁcations attribute a lower weight to the Russian tariﬀ than it is predicted by theory due its
signiﬁcantly larger economy. This suggests that Russia could have oﬀered tariﬀ concessions
in negotiations in exchange for concessions non-tariﬀ issues.
Interestingly, 40% of the tariﬀ lines (HS 6 level) were identical prior to the Customs Union
for all members and more lines have similar tariﬀs. In order to account for this, multiple
regression analysis of variance is employed. In this regard two approaches of determining
the relative weight of the variable is used. The ﬁrst one hinges on analysing the diﬀerence
between the full model and the model without the variable of interest. The second determines
the relative weight of the variable by calculating the Shapley value of each variable in the
common external tariﬀ.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is the strong support for the phenomenon of mutual protec-
tionism, - countries successfully extend their domestic protection of goods to the members.
This result is found using the techniques of analysis of variance described above by looking
at the groups of goods protected by each CU member.
There is relatively little empirical research on tariﬀ setting in a Customs Union and its
determinants. The world's largest Customs Union, the European Union, was established
in 1958 and then referred to as European Economic Community; data availability is thus
very limited. According to Magee and Lee (2001), the initial external tariﬀ was set as a
simple average of the previous national tariﬀs and was slightly decreased over the following
15 years. But little is known about the ex ante structure of national tariﬀs. The tariﬀ policy
in the Mercosur area has been studied more extensively (e.g Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998),
Bohara et al. (2004),Roett (1999)). Compliance to to the common external tariﬀ in Mercosur
is limited, around 30% of tariﬀs are exempted, and similarly some goods are exempt from
internal free trade (Esteradeordal et al., 2001).
Most closely related to this paper, Olarreaga et al. (1999) study the Mercosur external
tariﬀ. Using a cross section of industries  at both the HS6 and ISIC4 levels  they estimate
a Tobit model of the CET. Using the bloc's market share in world imports as a proxy
for export elasticity and various proxies for labour and capital lobbying respectively, they
seek to disentangle terms of trade and political economy motivations in Mercosur tariﬀ
determination. Terms of trade motives are found to account for up to 28% of the variation
in tariﬀs according to their estimates, lending some support to an eﬃciency rationale for
customs unions. However, seeking to explain the determinants of tariﬀs - particularly at
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the ﬁne level of disaggregation provided by HS6 - is a daunting task. An advantage of the
present study is our ability to use previous years of national tariﬀs. Since these tariﬀs were
presumably optimally set, they should contain all the relevant information driving domestic
policy - be it lobbying or eﬃciency. This lets us focus on the more tractable problem how
the formation of a Customs Union speciﬁcally inﬂuences tariﬀ policy.
Estevadeordal et al. (2008) conduct an empirical study of preferential tariﬀ liberalisation
on MFN tariﬀs for Latin American countries. The authors regress the current MFN tariﬀ on
the preferential tariﬀ for the same line in the previous year and on some control variables.
Their main ﬁnding is that tariﬀ complementarity of preferential tariﬀ liberalisation is empir-
ically supported for FTA, but not when the preferential tariﬀ is granted in a Customs Union
where no such eﬀect rises. This kind of analysis, unfortunately, is not possible to do for
the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan as prior to the Customs Union the
countries were in an FTA with zero internal tariﬀs on practically all goods. Hence, virtually,
no extra tariﬀ preference was given since the creation of the CU.
The paper is organised in a following manner. It continues by providing an overview
of key facts about the Customs Union in Section 2. The following Section 3 presents the
data and summary statistics. Next, the paper continues with the theoretical model for the
estimation strategy in Section 4. Section 5 turns to the empirical analysis of common tariﬀ
determinants and mutually protected sectors. Finally, the conclusion follows in Section 6.
2.2 The Customs Union at a Glance
Just 2 years prior to joining WTO, Russia formed the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) with
Belarus and Kazakhstan  pointing to a more regionally oriented trade approach. Since the
Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBKCU) was ratiﬁed in November
2009, regional integration within this institution has proceeded at a rapid pace. A common
external tariﬀ was implemented in January 2010. Internal customs controls in the union
were abolished in July 2010 (between Russia and Belarus) and July 2011 (between Russia
and Kazakhstan). The Customs Union developed in May 2014 into the Eurasian Economic
Union, modeled after early European integration policies. There are current attempts to
extend the membership of the Customs Union to other CIS countries, complicated by possible
associated revision of WTO bound tariﬀs for the WTO members.
Membership: Current Customs Union members Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have an
annual GDP exceeding $2trn. In PPP terms, Russia accounts for 86% of the block's GDP
and 84% of its population. Kazakhstan accounts for 8% of GDP and 10% of population,
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while the Belorussian economy and population both amount to approximately 5% of the
total.
Volume of Internal Trade: In the years prior to formation of the Customs Union, internal
trade between the three countries amounted to $44bn., about 16% of total imports by the
three countries. The bilateral ﬂows are highly uneven: in 2009, Russian exports to Belarus
and Kazakhstan respectively accounted for 46% and 24% respectively of the total. Belorus-
sian exports to Russia made up another 18%, and Kazakh exports to the same destination
10%. Belorussian-Kazakh trade, at just over 1% of the total, was almost insigniﬁcant. This
asymmetric trade pattern prompted concerns of trade diversion towards Russia (Tarr, 2012)
as a result of the CU. Isakova and Plekhanov (2012) provide evidence for small CU im-
pact on trade promotion and some evidence of trade diversion for the case of Kazakhstan.
Similarly, Isakova et al. (2013) extends the analysis to include Russia and Belarus and ﬁnd
tariﬀ increases lead to small positive impact on imports from Russia, and anticipating larger
beneﬁts to members could come from reduced internal trade costs.
Goods Traded Internally: The importance of energy exploitation in the region is reﬂected
in its trade patterns. Petroleum and natural gas alone accounted for $11bn, or a third of
internal trade, in 2009, largely driven by Russian transit exports to Belarus.
By 2011 trade in these two key resources had further grown - to $15.5bn - but, due to
the overall increase in internal trade, their share had diminished to a quarter. Other sectors
with large absolute increases were vehicles, iron, machinery and other equipment as well as
dairy products. Some of this growth was due to new product lines being internally traded,
which in the two Customs Union years rose approximately 10% to 4473.
Internal Tariﬀs: Even before the formation of the Eurasian Customs Union, internal tar-
iﬀs between the members were largely eliminated. Data set records just 8 lines where Russia
imposed tariﬀs on its partners - involving sugar, alcohol and tobacco - in the immediate
pre-CU years. For Kazakhstan, there are 36 positive lines covering similar products and ad-
ditionally some rice varieties. Our data set has no record of positive internal tariﬀs imposed
by Belarus. From 2010 onwards, internal tariﬀs had been fully eliminated.
Most-Favoured Nation Tariﬀs: Even prior to the Customs Union, Russia and Belarus had
similar tariﬀ regimes - with average rates around 12%. By 2009, close to 80% of MFN tariﬀ
lines by the two countries already agreed. In contrast, Kazakhstan pursued a relatively liberal
policy, imposing on average just a 6.5% tariﬀ in 2009 (reﬂecting a period of liberalisation
after 2007 that is apparent in the sample).
Common External Tariﬀ: In 2010, the overwhelming majority of MFN tariﬀs - 4360 lines
or 86% - were harmonised into the Common External Tariﬀ, with many exceptions found
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in textiles. The CET mean a large tariﬀ increase for Kazakhstan - to 10.29%, or nearly a
60% increase. But Russian tariﬀs fell to 10.7%, nearly a 20% cut, and Belorussian tariﬀs by
10%3. Shepotylo (2011) calculates the tariﬀ changes of trade-weighted tariﬀs for Kazakhstan
and ﬁnds an increase from 5.3% to 9.5%.
Other Trade Agreements and commitments: Existing bilateral free trade agreements be-
tween CIS countries are in place, notably with Ukraine. Russia's WTO accession negotiation
is an important background part of the Customs Union's creation. The accession has been
negotiated for many years, and the slow pace of the process could have contributed to Rus-
sia's interest in the regional integration. One has to also note the immediate impact of
the Customs Union on the speeding up of Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO. Dragneva
and Wolczuk (2012) discuss the impact of the Customs Union on the EU's relationship with
eastern neighbours, in particular, Ukraine. The paper also mentions that EU has become as-
sociated with modernization and rules-based governance, promoting Russia to adopt similar
approach for its regional policy.
Coronel et al. (2010) brieﬂy review the CU experience of Kazakhstan in the context of
an IMF country report, noting increase in tariﬀ revenue of government, a result of higher
tariﬀs. The paper argues that some trade diversion may arise towards CU partners away from
non-member neighouring countries, especially Central Asian countries, but do not expect a
strong impact on imports from China. Krotov (2011) presents a detailed discussion of the
Customs Union's administration system, customs legislation and clearance. He ﬁnds that
the CU is functional and the necessary institutions and legislation for Customs Union's work
are at place. Carneiro (2013) is a good survey of the perspectives on ECU.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Tariﬀ Data: The tariﬀ data was obtained from the ITC MacMap platform as it provides
highquality tariﬀ data at various classiﬁcation levels, including the ad valorem equivalents
of speciﬁc tariﬀs. We were able to obtain applied tariﬀs at HS2007 6-digit level for Russia
and Kazakhstan for 2007-2012 and for Belarus for 2009-2012.
Other Data: We also collected data on GDP and population from the IMF World Economic
Outlook.
Descriptive Statistics: The members of the Customs Union, prior to its creation, had 40% of
the tariﬀ lines (HS 6 lines) harmonised, and in November 2009 they agreed on the Common
3Table 3.2 in the following chapter provides more detailed data on the evolution of MFN tariﬀs in the
ECU region.
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External Tariﬀ (CET). The CET was harmonising around 86% of the tariﬀ lines.
Table 2.1 summarises the tariﬀ averages of the members and the number of product lines
with zero tariﬀ. The tariﬀ means are calculated as simple averages of the tariﬀ lines of the
HS6 disaggregation level. Russia and Belarus had similar tariﬀ averages prior to the ECU
while Kazakhstan had noticeably lower average tariﬀ. The tariﬀ harmonisation in the CU
led to 1.5% and 1.2% decrease in mean MFN tariﬀ for Russia and Belarus, respectively and
3.8% increase in mean MFN tariﬀ for Kazakhstan.
Table 2.1: Trends in MFN Tariﬀs
Year All goods
Goods with zero MFN tariﬀ Mean MFN tariﬀ (simple)
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Belarus Kazakhstan
2007 5052 369 - 914 12.12 - 8.26
2008 5052 420 - 1154 12.12 - 6.59
2009 5052 445 373 1164 12.18 11.81 6.49
2010 5052 554 554 712 10.67 10.60 10.30
2011 5015 547 547 655 11.07 10.99 10.82
2012 5205 550 550 641 10.94 10.87 10.74
The diﬀerences in the pre-CU trade policy of Russia and Belarus on one side and Kaza-
khstan on the other side is seen also through the number of 6-digit goods with zero tariﬀ.
In Kazakhstan 1164 product lines were subject to free trade prior to the ECU, almost three
times more than in the partner countries. Furthermore, Kazakhstan negotiated a transition
period to reduce that number over the course of several years.
2.4 Theoretical Background of Empirical Strategy
This section develops a model of trade under imperfect competition that gives rise and
explains the mutual protectionism in the formation of customs unions. The model makes
several predictions that will be addressed below. The model suggests that the level of
political inﬂuence of a sector will transfer into the protection through a higher tariﬀ. This
will translate into a larger weight during common tariﬀ bargaining. Thus, the most protected
sectors will be mutually protected by the partners.
We follow the standard oligopoly model that is often employed in studies of regional
agreements. Two countries, X and Y , will be the potential trade agreement partners while
rest of the world is denoted as Z. Each country produces two homogeneous goods under
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constant returns to scale and with marginal cost normalised to zero. The ﬁrst good, A, set to
balance the trade accounts, is traded in perfectly competitive markets, and each country has
an arbitrary number of ﬁrms producing this good. The remaining L goods are produced and
sold in imperfectly competitive markets (ﬁrms compete a-la Cournot). National markets are
segmented: a ﬁrm in country i sets the output of good l to sell to country j, qlij, separately
from the output it sells in country k, qlik.
In general, each country has nli ≥ 0 ﬁrms producing good l. The representative consumer's
utility is linear in the competitive good A, and linear-quadratic in imperfectly produced
goods: u(Qli) = ΓQ
l
i − (Qli)2/2) and associated inverse demand function pli = Γ − Qli where
Qli is the total output of good l in country i.
Countries may have diﬀerent number of consumers.
Each country i may impose a per unit tariﬀ on country j's exports of good l, denoted by
tlij. Tariﬀs are set endogenously to maximise the objective function of the government.
Governments. In each country, government policies regarding trade are chosen to
maximise a weighed sum of consumer surplus, tariﬀ revenues and producer surplus - CSli,
TRli and PS
l
i, respectively, and its objective is denoted as G
l
i. In particular, due to lobbying
or other contributions, the government may be subject to a political bias, αli ≥ 0, which
overweights producer interests in its objective:
Gli = CS
l
i + TR
l
i + (1 + α
l
i)PS
l
i (2.4.1)
There are three possible trade regimes: Most Favoured Nation setting where no trade agree-
ment is in place, and each country is bound to set a non-discriminatory tariﬀ tij = tik; a Free
Trade Area setting where the members of the FTA i and j trade freely between themselves,
tij = 0 and set independently their external tariﬀ on the rest of the world; a Customs Union,
or a cooperative setting, where the members trade freely between each other and have to set
a common tariﬀ on the rest of the world tij = 0, tik = tjk.
The model is being solved backwards by ﬁrst ﬁnding the market outcomes given the tariﬀ
and trade regime and then determining the optimal tariﬀs. The market outcomes stage is
standard and is presented in the Appendix. The governments take as given the market
response function of the last stage in their tariﬀ setting.
Tariﬀ Setting. In MFN the countries set up the trade policy non-cooperatively with
the only restriction to apply non-discriminatory tariﬀs. If the two countries make a FTA,
then they are constrained to have zero tariﬀs for internal trade. In FTA the members set
tariﬀs applied to the rest of the world non-cooperatively, like in MFN.
Finally, if the two countries form a CU, they not only have to keep the internal zero
tariﬀs but also set cooperatively the common external tariﬀ. One way the two countries
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might set the cooperative tariﬀ is through maximising the total government welfare (social
welfare plus the bias component) as it is typically done in the literature.
The government objectives are as in equation (1) given the ﬁrm responses from the
market outcomes stage. The optimal tariﬀs are found with the standard ﬁrst and second
order conditions. Below the optimal unit tariﬀs in each trade regime are presented. Note
that the product superscripts are omitted for expositional clarity:
tMFNij = t
MFN
ik = Γ
1 + 2(1 + αi)ni
(1− 2αini)(nj + nk) + 2(1 + ni)2
tFTAij = 0, t
FTA
ik = Γ
1 + 2(1 + αi)ni
(1− 2αini + 2nj)nk + 2(1 + ni + nk)2 (2.4.2)
tFTAij = 0, t
CU
ik = Γ
1 + 2(1 + αi)ni + (1 + αj)nj
(1− 2αjnj − 2αini)nk + 2(1 + ni + nj)2
If the CU members i and j have diﬀerent sizes a and b, respectively, then the CU objective
becomes aGi + bGj and the common external tariﬀ is:
tFTAij = 0, t
CU
ik = Γ
a+ b+ 4bnj(αj + 1) + 4ani(αi + 1)
(a+ b− (4bαj + 2b− 2a)nj − (4aαi + 2a− 2b)ni)nk + 2(1 + ni + nj)2(b+ a)
The governments charge unit tariﬀs in the model while the dataset presents all tariﬀs,
including unit tariﬀs in their ad valorem equivalents. So the optimal unit tariﬀs have to be
converted into ad valorem, i.e. percentages. The ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariﬀ is the
tax share of the price found as the ratio of the unit tariﬀ to the equilibrium price:
τ =
t
p
Substituting in the formula of the ad valorem tariﬀs the equilibrium tariﬀs and price in each
trade regimes gives equilibrium ad valorem equivalent tariﬀs:
τMFN =
1 + 2ni(1 + α)
2(ni + 1)
τFTA =
1 + 2ni(1 + α)
2(ni + nj + 1)
(2.4.3)
τCU =
1 + 2ni(1 + α) + 2nj(1 + α)
2(ni + nj + 1)
τCU =
a(1 + 4ni(1 + αi)) + b(1 + 4nj(1 + αj)
(a+ b)2(ni + nj + 1)
Note that τFTA < τMFN < τCU . The AVE tariﬀs are easy to interpret - being the share
of the price that is being taxed, they allow to determine trivially the prohibitive tariﬀ - it is
the level of bias α such that τ = 1, i.e. the eﬀective tariﬀ rate is 100%.
38 Chapter2
Importantly for the empirical analysis, notice that the Customs Union tariﬀ can be
presented as an aﬃne combination of either national MFN or FTA tariﬀs of the CU members.
Below is the representation for countries of equal size:
τCU = τMFNi
1
2
(ni + nj + 1)(1 + 4ni(1 + αi))
(ni + 1)(1 + 2ni(1 + αi))
+ τMFNj
1
2
(ni + nj + 1)(1 + 4nj(1 + αj))
(nj + 1)(1 + 2nj(1 + αj))
(2.4.4)
τCU = τFTAi
1
2
1 + 4ni(1 + αi)
1 + 2ni(1 + αi)
+ τFTAj
1
2
1 + 4nj(1 + αj)
1 + 2nj(1 + αj)
If instead the countries have diﬀerent number of consumers, in particular, country i has
a consumers and country j - b consumers, the aﬃne combination becomes:
τCU = τMFNi
a
a+ b
(ni + nj + 1)(1 + 4ni(1 + αi))
(ni + 1)(1 + 2ni(1 + αi))
+ τMFNj
b
a+ b
(ni + nj + 1)(1 + 4nj(1 + αj))
(nj + 1)(1 + 2nj(1 + αj))
(2.4.5)
τCU = τFTAi
a
a+ b
1 + 4ni(1 + αi)
1 + 2ni(1 + αi)
+ τFTAj
b
a+ b
1 + 4nj(1 + αj)
1 + 2nj(1 + αj)
The number of consumers, whenever a representative consumer exists, does not aﬀect
the non-cooperatively set tariﬀ. However it is not the case for a cooperatively set tariﬀ.
Indeed, if the number of consumers is normalised to 1 or is equal in each country then the
maximisation objective in the Customs Union is simply the sum of each consumer's problem
corrected for governments' biases.
2.5 Empirical Analysis of Common External Tariﬀ
The theoretical model above makes a number of predictions regarding the formation of the
CET. There are several properties of this CU tariﬀ as a function of individual FTA tariﬀs
that can be tested empirically.
Testable hypotheses:
(a) The CET is well-represented as an aﬃne combination of the national tariﬀs.
(b) Country i's weight is proportional to a/(a + b) while country j's weight is lower and
proportional to b/(a+ b). Everything else same, the larger country is expected to have
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Table 2.2: Macroeconomic indicators: 2009
Indicator Share %
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan
GDPpc PPP 38.3 32.7 29
GDP PPP 87.5 5 7.5
Population 84.7 5.7 9.6
higher weight. Note that this theoretical outcome comes from the assumption of equal
Γ across countries, an analog of the GDP per capita. The CU members are a really
good ﬁt for that as they have very close GDP per capita. As a result we can compare
the empirically obtained weights with either GDP or population share, as they are very
close.
Country size ratio: Using data on population and GDP from the IMF's World Economic
Outlook, the model would predict the CET formation function to give a weight ratio for GDP
and population as in Table 2.2, controlling for sectoral variation.
(c) Country's weight in the CU tariﬀ is higher for goods that are protected by this country
in FTA more than in partner country. This hypothesis is mutual protectionism.
(d) The sum of weights of individual tariﬀs should be higher than one, - CU is more
protectionist than the FTA. In the remaining part we are conducting regression analysis
based on several estimating strategies in order to explain the determination of the
Customs Union tariﬀ that later we will put together with the model's predictions.
2.5.1 Regression Results
As a starting point of empirical analysis of the common external tariﬀ, we look at the
harmonised tariﬀs in 2012 as a linear function of national tariﬀs in 2009 prior to Customs
Union formation:
tECU2012i = α + β1tRU2009i + β2tBY 2009i + β3tKZ2009i + ei (2.5.1)
The results are presented in column (1) in Table 2.3. This simple regression provides
an adjusted R-squared of 95%, explaining very well the tariﬀ variation. This exploratory
regression is pooling the sectors, thus ignoring sectoral variation. The country coeﬃcients
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correspond to the country weights obtained by averaging across all sectors. The sum of
coeﬃcients is 0.95, i.e. very close to 1, a property that will be observed in almost all of the
speciﬁcations.
Russian tariﬀs enter with the coeﬃcient 0.615 which corresponds to 65% of sum of the
coeﬃcients, a very large number but well below its 84.7% population share and 87.5% of
total GDP share. Both Belarus and Kazakhstan thus have greater weights than their popu-
lation or GDP shares would suggest, particularly the latter with 19.5%. Kazakhstan's tariﬀ
policy is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the policy of the other two members and the average
tariﬀ was much lower. Kazakhstan's share is higher in overall CU; even if we pull together
Belarus and Russia due to their similarities prior to the CU, the result stands. As the more
elaborate analysis below will show, this regression result probably comes from Kazakhstan
being successful in achieving tariﬀ spillover in the partner countries for goods it protects.
Table 2.3: CET in 2012 and national tariﬀs in 2009
Dep. Variable t2012
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tRU2009 0.615
∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(39.54) (30.72) (27.29) (43.40) (31.54)
tBY 2009 0.146
∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(9.09) (6.06) (3.17) (12.79) (6.85)
tKZ2009 0.187
∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0565∗∗∗
(19.35) (14.50) (15.67) (6.63) (4.81)
tmax2009 0.191
∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(8.77) (6.69)
Constant 0.603∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(8.47) (7.20) (8.04) (8.37) (7.70)
Coef. sum4 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.89
Fixed eﬀects HS2 groups HS2 groups
Observations 4318 2447 4318 4318 4318
Adjusted R2 0.914 0.908 0.916 0.934 0.935
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01, ∗∗∗ p <0.001
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The next speciﬁcation, presented in column (2) of Table 2.3, considers the subsample
of product lines for which the tariﬀs were not harmonised in 2009. As more than 40% of
all tariﬀs were equal already in 2009, this speciﬁcation excludes the lines that were equal as
we are interested to assess the weights of individual country tariﬀs in determining the tariﬀs
that actually had to be harmonised:
tECU2012i = α + β1tRU2009NHi + β2tBY 2009NHi + β3tKZ2009NHi + ei (2.5.2)
The results are very similar to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation.
The speciﬁcation in column (3) is aiming to capture the spillovers of protectionism from
national level to partners in the CU. The tariﬀs in 2012 are regressed on national tariﬀs, like
in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, and on a variable tmax. The latter variable equals to the highest
tariﬀ in 2009 among the three members for each product line. As theory predicts, the country
will have a higher weight in the CU tariﬀ for goods that it protected more than its partners
in the FTA. The null hypothesis that the country receives no extra weight in goods that it
protects more than the partners, would lead to an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. However if the
CET determination exhibits mutual protectionism eﬀect  that is, spillover to partners, then
the coeﬃcient of variable tmax is expected to be positive and signiﬁcant.
tECU2012i = α + β1tRU2009i + β2tBY 2009i + β3tKZ2009i + β4tmax2009 + ei (2.5.3)
The column (3) in Table 2.3 summarises the estimation results; the tmax coeﬃcient is 0.19.
This implies that on average the weight of each country is 20% higher for goods that it
protects more than the partners, and these will be protected by all members in the Customs
Union. The highest tariﬀ charged by any member country enters with an additional eﬀect:
a 1% increase in the maximum tariﬀ raises the common tariﬀ by 0.2% on top of national
tariﬀ weight.
Interestingly, the inclusion of the maximum tariﬀ decreases the weight of Belarus to 6.4%.
Note that Russia and Belarus had very similar tariﬀs already prior to the CU which can be
attributed to Belarus having extra weight in the pooled regression.
The speciﬁcations presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.3 are analogous to (1) and
(3), respectively, with the only diﬀerence that they control for the sectoral ﬁxed eﬀects at
the 2 digit level:
tECU2012i = αj + β1tRU2009i + β2tBY 2009i + β3tKZ2009i + ei (2.5.4)
The results remain of the same magnitude with the sector dummies for Russia but are
much lower for Kazakhstan. This speciﬁcation gives the we country weights, controlling for
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diﬀerences in products, and thus is best ﬁt to test the hypothesis b). Indeed, still well below
the population and GDP share of Russia, its weight goes up to 70% while Kazakhstan's share
decreases to 10%, much closer to its population and GDP share. Moreover, the number for
Russia can be biased downward as its tariﬀ is very similar to the one of Belarus and thus
the regression can wrongly attribute to Belarus part of Russia's weight. To account for this,
the next part is analysing the sample variance.
2.5.2 Mutually Protected Sectors
Table 2.4 presents the tariﬀ averages prior and after the creation of the Customs Union
for several groups of products for each member. The ﬁrst row presents the means for all
products, showing that in the process of harmonisation tariﬀs of Belarus and Russia went
slightly down while Kazakhstan's tariﬀs increased.
The following rows show the changes for the groups of protected goods. Following theory,
goods protected in FTA more in one country, will be protected by all members of the CU.
To test this hypothesis, let us look at goods that we protected in each country prior to the
CU. For empirical purposes, a good is considered protected in country i if the pre-CU tariﬀ
in this country is at least 1% higher than in the partner countries5.
Across all protected goods, the picture is similar to that of mean all goods - noticeable
decrease for Russia and Belarus and even more signiﬁcant increase for Kazakhstan.
However the picture is very diﬀerent for the last three rows where the protected goods
are grouped by countries that protected these goods pre-CU in 2009. Although Kazakhstan
saw a 65% increase in mean tariﬀ (from 6.5% to 10.7%), it actually decreased tariﬀs for
the goods the goods it protected more than the partners. And just the opposite is true for
Belarus and Russia: the two countries had to decrease their tariﬀs on average (tariﬀ down
from around 12% to around 11%) and in the goods they protected, but in goods protected
by Kazakhstan were 4% higher post-CU.
Similarly, Kazakhstan saw the mean tariﬀ up by 65% but for the goods protected by
partners, Russia and Belarus, - by 98% and 72%, respectively.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the hypothesis that the tariﬀ determination in a CU is not only
driven by the economic weights of its members but is an outcome of a process where each
side is willing to concede to protect the partners' goods in exchange for similar protection.
Some example sectors. Closer look at the sectors with largest spillovers of protection from
5The minimum margin of 1% was chosen to avoid arbitrary cases where all countries have same speciﬁc
tariﬀs but when these are converted into ad valorem tariﬀs as they appear in the dataset, they might be
slightly diﬀerent.
Common External Tariff 43
Table 2.4: Tariﬀ changes by product groups
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan
No t2009 t2012 t2009 t2012 t2009 t2012
All goods 5052 12.18 10.94 ↓ 11.81 10.87 ↓ 6.49 10.74 ↑
Protected goods 901 24.42 19.74 ↓ 22.20 19.35 ↓ 12.61 19.82 ↑
Protected by Russia 405 40.86 29.53 ↓ 30.84 28.74 ↓ 14.97 29.71 ↑
Protected by Belarus 309 11.12 10.35 ↓ 18.26 10.30 ↓ 5.79 9.94 ↑
Protected by Kazakhstan 187 10.77 14.40 ↑ 10.01 14.32 ↑ 18.79 15.11 ↓
one member to partners reveals the following observations. Sector 4(Dairy products, eggs
and etc) was one of the most protected sectors in Kazakhstan with tariﬀ 25,78%, signiﬁcantly
higher than in Russia and Belarus, and the adopted average tariﬀs in 2010 in that sector are
between 23-24% for these countries.
Instead, Russia was very successful in pushing up tariﬀ for sector 02(Meat and edible
meat oﬀal). The meats sector was well-protected in all members prior to the CU, but way
below Russia's 45% average tariﬀ, however in 2010, all three countries adopted mean tariﬀ
rates 46% for meat. Other sectors where Russia and Belarus had very high tariﬀs in 2009
while Kazakhstan - moderate ones but then the protection was spilled over to Kazakhstan
are: 44(Wood and etc), 48 (Paper and etc), 71(Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc),
88(Aircrafts and etc).
We also note that there are many more sectors with mutual protectionism eﬀect than
sectors that saw liberalisation over the weighed average during CET determination. The
most prominent liberalised sector is 22 (Beverages, spirits and vinegar), which had lines at
HS 6 of more than 300% tariﬀ. We believe that the extremely high tariﬀs for these few lines
explain the outlier behaviour of that sector.
2.5.3 Analysis of Variance
The previous two subsections gave already a lot of insight into the CU tariﬀ determination.
However the relatively high level of tariﬀ harmonisation of 40% prior to the CU gives an
opportunity for biased weight estimators. The linear model can bias towards more equal
weights. To determine the country weights, in particular for the protected goods, this sub-
section analyses the variance of multiple regression models. The basic idea of such analysis
is comparing the explanatory power of the model with and without the variable of interest.
There are three explanatory variables in the full model under consideration: the three
national tariﬀs in 2009. The unique explanatory power of each variable is then determined by
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Table 2.5: Analysis of Variance based on Exclusion Test
Relative Importance
2012 MFN tariﬀ Obs aR2 tRU2009 tBY 2009 tKZ2009
All goods
tRU2012 4876 92% 0.73 0.05 0.21
tBY 2012 4876 89% 0.68 0.07 0.25
tKZ2012 4876 87% 0.67 0.02 0.31
Harmonised goods
tharm2012 4239 92% 0.83 0.03 0.14
tharm2012 4318 91% 0.77 0.04 0.19
Protected by Russia
tRU2012 393 94% 0.96 0.03 0.01
tBY 2012 393 93% 0.96 0.03 0.02
tKZ2012 393 91% 0.98 0.01 0.01
Protected by Belarus
tRU2012 306 84% 0.67 0.19 0.15
tBY 2012 306 86% 0.57 0.31 0.12
tKZ2012 306 84% 0.49 0.29 0.22
Protected by Kazakhstan
tRU2012 183 85% 0.10 0.14 0.77
tBY 2012 183 85% 0.11 0.00 0.89
tKZ2012 183 89% 0.17 0.05 0.79
exclusion test, that is, by looking at the diﬀerence of the explanatory power of the full model
and without the variable in question. If such exclusion test is done for all three variables, the
unique explanatory power of all variables will be found. The weight of each national tariﬀ
is then found as the ratio of its unique explanatory power to the sum of unique explanatory
power of the three variables.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the analysis for the 2012 tariﬀs as functions of national
2009 tariﬀs. Note that the 2012 tariﬀs were highly harmonised but still below 100%. To avoid
possible diﬀerences depending on which of the 2012 tariﬀs is used as depending variable, the
results are shown for all three countries. As expected, for almost all cases the results are not
too sensitive to that choice, with qualitative ﬁndings being intact.
Each country has a tremendous increase in its weight in the 2012 tariﬀs for the goods it
protects. Russian tariﬀs' weight is 0.96− 0.98, for Belarus the weight is 0.19− 0.31 and for
Kazakhstan 0.77− 0.79 for the groups protected by respective country.
For the full sample and for harmonised goods the country weights go closer to the eco-
nomic size ratios. Kazakhstan's weight remains signiﬁcantly higher than its economic size
which is explained by its ability to extend the protection in the CU of goods it protected
before the CU. Note that there are two samples of harmonised tariﬀs: fully harmonised and
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those were there is still diﬀerence but lower than 1%.
The analysis of unique explanatory of each variable is very useful in the case in hand
where the explanatory variables had a lot in common. It allows to pick the extra bit added
by each variable speciﬁcally.
It is useful, however, to determine the overall value added by each variable. Lipovetsky
and Conklin (2001) demonstrate the advantages and consistency of using the Shapley value
for identifying the relative importance of regressors in the presence of multicollinearity. To
calculate a Shapley value of a regressor, all possible combinations of explanatory variables
should be considered. How much each variable is able to explain on its own, how much it
adds when added to either of the other two and how much explanatory power it adds to both
other two variables. Fur this task of ﬁnding the extra explanatory power of each variable in
all possible combinations Shapley value for each variable is calculated. The Shapley value of
explanatory variable i, φi(v), is (Shapley (1953)):
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! (n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) (2.5.5)
where n is the number of explanatory variables in the full model (3 in this case), N is the
set of variables of full model, S is set of variables included in a regression model and v is the
regression sum of squares.
Note that the Shapley value takes into account the extra explanatory power of the variable
for each possible combination, including the empty set. And as each variable alone is able
to predict the CU tariﬀ rather well, the Shapley value will suggest less unequal weights than
the analysis of variance by unique explanatory power of each variable.
The results are presented in Table 2.6.
Indeed, the weights determined by the Shapley values are close to each other. At the
same the results point to the spillover of protectionism within the CU. In particular, the
weight for Kazakhstan goes up to 37-38% for goods it protected in the FTA from 26-27%
for all goods or all harmonised goods. Similarly, Belarus' weight reaches its peak of 37-39%
in the common CU tariﬀ of goods it protected in the FTA.
Note that Russia's tariﬀ weight does not see such a spike in its weight for sample of goods
it protects. Instead, Kazakhstan's tariﬀ weight is slightly higher than for the sample of all
goods and harmonised goods. This case is the only slight evidence of Kazakhstan's attempts
to negotiate down the CET for the goods where it would have to make the most signiﬁcant
increases.
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Table 2.6: Analysis of Variance based on Shapley Value
Shapley Value: Relative Importance
2012 MFN tariﬀ Obs tRU2009 tBY 2009 tKZ2009
All products 4876 0.39-0.40 0.33-0.35 0.26-0.27
tharm2012 4239 0.39 0.35 0.26
tharm2012 4318 0.39 0.35 0.26
Protected by Russia 393 0.39 0.32 0.29
Protected by Belarus 306 0.41-0.43 0.37-0.39 0.19-0.21
Protected by Kazakhstan 183 0.32 0.30-0.29 0.37-0.38
2.5.4 Discussion
All the speciﬁcations are very simple and yet explain around 93-94% of variation in common
external tariﬀ. All estimations highlight the large role of Russian tariﬀs in 2009 in determin-
ing the common external tariﬀ. However compared to the theoretical prediction where tariﬀs
are driven by population (or GDP) share, the Russian weight is considerably lower (70% vs
87% ) and especially Kazakh inﬂuence is stronger (20% vs 8%). Thus the theoretical model
that is used for structural support of the estimation strategy has a lot of embodied structure
but still captures important patterns of common tariﬀ determination in a Customs Union.
The Customs Union brought on average only a very modest increase of the tariﬀs above the
weighted average but on sectoral level there is evidence of mutual protectionism.
We also found that there are large diﬀerences in the determination of common external tariﬀs
among the two subgroups of ad valorem and speciﬁc tariﬀs. The former are on average much
lower for all the three countries and for these lines Russia had a very strong, decisive, impact
on common tariﬀ. The latter tariﬀs are on average several times larger than ad valorem
tariﬀs. In these lines Kazakhstan had on average much lower tariﬀs than Russia and Belarus
prior to the CU, but also for these lines we found the strongest impact of Kazakh tariﬀs and,
weaker than for ad valorem tariﬀs, impact of Russian tariﬀ policy. The lower than predicted
share of the coeﬃcient of the Russian tariﬀs in the sum of all coeﬃcients can be seen as evi-
dence that Russia entered into compromises on the external tariﬀ. This appears as a natural
conclusion given that Kazakhstan in any case experienced large adjustments and increase
in tariﬀs and in order to make the Customs Union participation incentive compatible for
Kazakhstan, certain room for negotiation above the weight based on population size was
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available. Belorussian tariﬀs had the lowest impact on the determination of the CET, and
that can be also potentially explained through transfers. Indeed, Belarus is located between
the EU countries and Russia and thus a large part of the imports from the EU enter through
Belarus. Positive externalities from transit could be a possible explanation why Belarus
seems to have been the least active in tariﬀ determination.
2.6 Conclusion
Customs Unions are perhaps among the most far-reaching preferential trade agreements,
which naturally have consequences on external tariﬀ policy. While extensive theoretical
results are available, which largely predict Customs Unions to be more protectionist than
Free Trade Areas, surprisingly little is known about the eﬀects of CUs empirically. This
paper seeks to ﬁll the void through a detailed study of tariﬀ policy in the newly-formed
Eurasian Customs Union using a large panel data set.
Using three diﬀerent methodologies, I show that mutual protectionism powerfully shapes
tariﬀ structure in a Customs Union. If a member state strongly protected an industry before
the formation of the CU, this state is able to assure protection for the same industry after
CU formation too - but extended also the partner countries. There is little evidence of a
mutual liberalisation eﬀect, where countries would bargain to keep previously low tariﬀs at
similar levels after CU formation. These ﬁndings are consistent with a simple model of tariﬀ
formation in an imperfectly competitive setting.
Given the asymmetry of the members of the Eurasian Customs Union, it is of some
interest to estimate the relative decision weights to given to each country in the determination
of the CET. One of the most immediately noticed impacts of the Customs Union of Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan was the rise of the import tariﬀs in Kazakhstan. Furthermore,
suggestions were made that the common external tariﬀ (CET) was dictated by Russia. We
discuss in this work that as a larger market, Russia could be theoretically expected to have a
large inﬂuence in the common tariﬀ, even in the absence of any power abuse. However I ﬁnd
that Russia had much lower impact in tariﬀ determination than GDP-weighed bargaining
would suggest. Depending on speciﬁcation, Russian role varies roughly between 53-64%,
even if we only look at the tariﬀs that were not harmonised prior to the Customs Union.
As the 40% percent of tariﬀ lines were identical for all three members prior to the Customs
Union, counting the share of the lines of the CET that were equal to the Russian ones in
2009 overestimates Russia's inﬂuence. Having said that, Russia and Belarus both had more
highly protected sectors than Kazakhstan. In the CET for most of these highly protected
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sectors we observe mutual protectionism - the sectors that were not protected before in
partner markets, become protected.
Our tariﬀ data includes years 2011 and 2012 and shows continuing harmonisation between
members and the fall of CET. And although Russia joining the WTO only towards the end
of 2012, the decrease in the CET could either be explained by further moderation of Russian
and Belorussian tariﬀs with Kazakhstan's 2009 tariﬀs or requirements imposed by WTO
accession protocol. Determining which of the two caused mild decreases of the CET in 2011
and 2012, though an interesting challenge, is left out of scope of this project.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Market Outcomes
In the following superscript l is omitted for expositional purpose The problem of any of the
ni ﬁrms in country i is given by
max
{qii,qji,qki}
= P (Qi, qii)qii +
(
P (Qj, qji)− tji
)
qji (2.7.1)
+
(
P (Qk, qki)− tki
)
qki
where Qj denotes the total quantity produced in the market by all other ﬁrms, and Qj
denotes the market output.
And similarly for ﬁrms in the other countries, j and k. To ﬁnd the equilibrium in country
j, sum the 3n ﬁrstorder conditions for qii, qij, qik respectively to ﬁnd the equilibrium output
for given tariﬀs:
0 = 3n(Γ−Qi)−Qi − ntji − ntjk
Q∗j(tji, tjk) =
3nΓ− n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
and, again, symmetrically for the other countries. The output of the representative ﬁrm in
each country is then given by
q∗jj =
Γ + n(tji + tjk)
3n+ 1
(2.7.2)
q∗ji =
Γ− (1− 2n)tji + ntjk
3n+ 1
(2.7.3)
q∗jk =
Γ + ntji − (1 + 2n)tjk
3n+ 1
(2.7.4)
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Trade impact of non-tariﬀ trade costs:
An Assessment of the Customs Union of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
Arevik Mkrtchyan
European University Institute 1
Abstract
Trade facilitation, the reduction of administrative and other non-tariﬀ barriers, has become
a key policy priority. But how strongly can such measures beneﬁt trade? This paper studies
the most comprehensive trade facilitation measure possible  complete elimination of cus-
toms points  using a rich panel data set incorporating the staged border removal in the
recently established Eurasian Customs Union. The Customs Union abolished the customs
controls between the members in two stages. This allows to estimate the eﬀect of border
elimination which is particularly strong for intra-CU trade. Controlling for tariﬀ changes and
other factors, trade growth can be attributed to reduced trade costs, that is, not driven by
trade diversion due to tariﬀ changes. The time diﬀerences of removing the internal customs
controls allows to estimate the border eﬀects directly, instead of inferring them indirectly
from the diﬀerence between intra-country and inter-country trade as it is typically done in
the literature.
1Contact: arevik.mkrtchyan@eui.eu. I am grateful to the Economics Education and Research Consortium
(EERC) for the grant No 11-5811 that supported this research
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3.1 Introduction
Since the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBKCU) was ratiﬁed
in November 2009, regional integration within this institution has proceeded at a rapid pace.
A common external tariﬀ was implemented in January 2010. None of the CU members was a
WTO member by the time the Customs Union was created. The unexpected announcement
and rapid implementation suggest the Customs Union appeared as an exogenous shock.
Internal customs controls between the three members were successfully abolished. The
elimination of the internal customs controls can potentially have an important non-tariﬀ
impact on trade patterns. Freund and Pierola (2012) ﬁnd that border crossing times and
variations in time can strong impact on trade; similarly, ﬁndings from Martincus et al.
(2013) suggest that customs delays have a signiﬁcant negative impact on exports. That is
particularly true in the case of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan: UNECE (2012), UNECE
(2013) and Vinokurov (2013) found very large manmade costs at the border crossings of
the CU countries. Among those are complex customs procedures at border crossing points
that increase waiting times for vehicles and rolling stock. The CU creates an opportunity
to reduce these costs, for example, the goods that belong to the Single List of Products
Imported to the CU, subject to a mandatory conformity assessment in the CU framework
with issuance of the uniform documents need to be certiﬁed only once when they enter the
CU. This change brought by the CU should lower the trade costs of exporting to the CU
countries.
The members of the ECU rank near the bottom of World Bank's Trading Across Borders
index, hinting at large trade costs on top of formal tariﬀs. The removal of the last inter-
nal customs posts  eﬀective from July 2011  may thus bring gains, creating the potential
for integrated supply chains in the ECU area  and going beyond what could be achieved
multilaterally. Foreign exporters may also beneﬁt from reduced trade costs, somewhat oﬀ-
setting adverse tariﬀ eﬀects: since rules of origin (Krueger, 1997) are no longer in eﬀect,
they can import to the ECU market through either of its members. In time, this may lead
to competitive pressure on the member countries to improve the eﬃciency of their borders.
Just 2 years prior to joining WTO, Russia formed the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU)
with Belarus and Kazakhstan  pointing to a more regionally oriented approach. There are
farreaching plans to further develop the Customs Union into a Common Economic Space
modeled after early European integration policies. There are current attempts to extend the
membership of the Customs Union to other CIS countries, in particular Armenia and Kyr-
gyzstan and possible associated revision of bound tariﬀs for these countries. Russia's WTO
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accession negotiation is an important background part of the Customs Union's creation. The
accession has been negotiated for many years, and the slow pace of the process could have
contributed to Russia's interest in the regional integration.
The timing of the elimination of borders gave rise to a natural experiment setting that
this paper explores. The elimination of internal customs controls happened in two stages: in
July 2010 (between Russia and Belarus) and July 2011 (between Russia and Kazakhstan).
The table below demonstrates that. The two-stage process allows to distinguish the overall
eﬀect of the Customs Union that came into force in 2010 from the impact of the border
elimination and thus assess the importance of border barriers. This method also allows to
estimate the eﬀect of the borders directly rather than inferring it from the diﬀerence between
the intra-country and inter-country trade as previous studies did (starting with McCallum
(1995)). These studies attribute to the border eﬀect (after controlling for a variety of factors)
the diﬀerences between the pairs of regions within the countries and across the countries.
That approach attributes to the border eﬀects many unobserved diﬀerences between the
countries that could persist even if the borders would be eliminated. Instead the approach
based on the analysis of the trade ﬂows before and after the removal of internal customs
checks allows for a more speciﬁc assessment of the border eﬀects.
This study uses highly disaggregated bilateral trade within the CU and with main trade
partners of the CU members from 2007 to 2012 to disentangle the tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ impact.
Clausing (2001) demonstrates that using product-level data allows to capture trade eﬀects
that are blurred in the pooled data while Anderson and Yotov (2010b) and Anderson and
Yotov (2010a) show the estimation bias of aggregation. The disaggregation level of 6-digit
HS2007 classiﬁcation and signiﬁcant tariﬀ changes brought by the CET give the necessary
variation in the observed data of about 600000 observations across four dimensions: importer,
exporter, product and period. The empirical strategy involves estimations with country-pair
ﬁxed eﬀect and country-time ﬁxed eﬀects controlled for, as well as with those where major
macroeconomic variables (GDP, exchange rate) are used.
The results point to a positive and strong impact of the removal of borders on trade ﬂows
across several speciﬁcations. The eﬀect is estimated to be the strongest for the intra-CU
trade. That is rather intuitive as the CU partners enjoy the unique environment of trading
across borders without customs checks. There are several economic mechanisms that stand
behind the result. First, the checks at the borders can signiﬁcantly increase the trade costs
if the trucks have to stop for long periods for the documents and goods checks. Second,
the lack of internal borders and the associated reduction in trade costs induces the ﬁrms
to look at the CU members as a common market. That, in turn, may attract investment
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and increase in trade for the smaller members of the CU as they now provide access to
the whole of the CU. First examples of improved investment attractiveness in peripheral
members due to ECU are available. Anishenko (2014) reports that China, a major investor,
is focusing intensively on Belarus due to its relatively investment and doing business friendly
environment and the access to Russia through Customs Union.
More generally, the removal of customs controls oﬀers equal gains from access to a larger
market to everyone. However as the barriers for entering the CU remain in place, we see
smaller impact on the non-members. Second channel for the positive impact of the non-tariﬀ
changes on the trade with non-members could be that the increase in the intra-CU trade
leads also requires increased use of intermediate inputs from external partners that are world
export leaders. This is intuitive as plants of foreign multinationals use intermediate inputs
imported from other countries (Frost and Davies (2014))
While Russia is a prime import partner of Belarus and Kazakhstan, the reverse is not
true. This pattern prompted concerns of trade diversion towards Russia (Tarr, 2012) as a
result of the CU; supporting evidence for this is provided by Isakova and Plekhanov (2012)
for the case of Kazakhstan.
The common external tariﬀ introduced in the Customs Union brought many changes to
the applied tariﬀs of the members. These changes create suﬃcient variation to estimate
precisely tariﬀ elasticity of bilateral trade ﬂows. As expected, the relationship is strong
and negative (elasticity between -0.5 and -1). But, crucially, the creation of the Customs
Union can have trade eﬀects that go well beyond the tariﬀs. Speciﬁcally, the elimination of
internal customs controls in the CU creates a potential for common economic market and
has signiﬁcant positive impact trade. The results suggest that ﬁrms from member countries
beneﬁt the most, doubling their exports; but also non-members gain, exporting 50% more
due to lack of intra-CU borders. These numbers are in line with the ﬁndings of the seminal
work by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). They ﬁnd that borders reduce trade between
the US and Canada by about 44% and by 30% between other industrialised countries. This
paper uses a more direct assessment of borders, i.e. a more narrow deﬁnition close to actual
border crossing costs, thus everything else the same, the impact should be slightly lower.
However the analysis is done for countries with border-related costs hat are tmuch higher
than for average country, and that implies that the impact is expected to be higher as indeed
the results suggest.
Overall, the eﬀect of the Customs Union is a composite of tariﬀ changes and alleviated
trade costs. With moderate tariﬀ increases, CU has, although asymmetric with respect to
members and non-members, trade creation eﬀect.
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The paper proceeds by discussing the relevant literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the data and descriptive statistics. The following Section 4 turns to the empirical strategy,
while Section 5 presents the results. Section 5 presents results, whose robustness is examined
in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Related Literature
Theory: PTAs, in particular FTAs but also CUs have been studied comprehensively in the
regionalism literature (e.g. Freund and Ornelas (2010) provide a survey). The general theme
of this literature is that a Customs Union allows member countries to internalise crossborder
externalities, e.g. relating to proﬁts arising from trade or terms of trade eﬀects, that are
ignored by policymakers under MFN or FTA tariﬀ setting. As a result, tariﬀs in a Customs
Union tend to be higher than in a free trade area; and through higher tariﬀs, imports from
the rest of the world are diverted towards the partner country. When decisionmakers are
biased towards the interests of producers, this eﬀect is particularly strong. Hence, CUs are
often seen negatively by multilateralists; however, in related theoretical work (see Chapter
1), we show that even in the presence of political bias, CUs can be welfareenhancing for
members. In practice, it is important to understand to what extent Customs Unions have
tariﬀ eﬀects, and whether they lead to trade diversion empirically.
Trade eﬀects of PTAs have been extensively studied, particularly for the case of NAFTA
(Clausing, 2001, Treﬂer, 2001). Of particular interest is the work of Romalis (2007), who
identiﬁes trade eﬀects of NAFTA using diﬀerences in diﬀerences visavis Europe as an
identiﬁcation strategy. In his estimation, NAFTA had a substantial eﬀect on trade volumes,
particularly in protected sectors, but only moderate price and welfare eﬀects. Clausing (2001)
assesses the impact of Canada-US FTA tariﬀ changes on disaggregated bilateral trade ﬂows
in a panel setting. The paper provides trade theory motivation for the estimation strategy
employed which is very similar to our basic approach. The goal of the present section is
to decompose the changes in trade patterns that occurred under CU into those that can
be attributed to tariﬀ changes and those due to nontariﬀ factors. The regression analysis
decomposes the trade changes into tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ factors. The structure of the panel has
three cross-sectional dimensions - importer, exporter and product and one time dimension -
year.
Empirical estimations of border eﬀects as the diﬀerence between intra-national and across
the border trade start with the gravity estimation of Canada and U.S. trade by McCallum
(1995). Anderson and VanWincoop (2001) pointed to the overestimation of the border eﬀects
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by McCallum (1995) due to omitted variable bias - country-speciﬁc price index. Further,
Feenstra (2002) suggests the use of importer-exporter ﬁxed eﬀects over the computational
method of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) of controlling for price index as ﬁxed eﬀects
provide consistent estimates, control for other possible country-speciﬁc omitted variables
and are simple to apply. Olper and Raimondi (2008) follow Feenstra (2002) in their gravity
estimation of border eﬀects follow and for OECD countries. Requena and Llano (2010) and
Emlinger et al. (2008) use sectoral data and include the country- and industry-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Similar to this paper Chen and Novy (2011) apply a gravity model of bilateral trade for
disaggregate panel data.
These studies rely on the theoretical model behind the gravity equation as in Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2004).
Analysis of the CU of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan: Isakova and Plekhanov (2012)
investigate the impact of the Customs Union on the structure of imports in Kazakhstan.
They note that KazakhRussian trade fell before the Customs Union became eﬀective, cre-
ating the possible problem that increases in bilateral trade could be due to a natural recovery
 which would have happened even in the absence of a CU being formed  rather than causal.
Using ITC Trade Map time series data from 20062010 disaggregated at the 10digit level
and statutory tariﬀs the authors then estimate a panel of the form
∆IMj,t = α∆dj,t + βIMj,t−1 + λZj,t + j,t (3.2.1)
with IM being the (log) import ﬂows, d the change in the tariﬀ, and Z a vector of controls,
which include lagged import changes (to account for possible natural recovery eﬀects). Their
parameter of interest is α - captures change in trade due to change in tariﬀs, and the model
is separately estimated by trading partner. In addition, there are ﬁxed eﬀects at the product
group (i.e. 2 digit) level. Estimated for the Customs Union partners, their model yields a
positive and signiﬁcant estimate of α. A 1% increase in tariﬀs would promote intraCU by
0.8%. For other trading partners  they consider China, European Union, CIS and Rest of
the World, the estimate is of α is negative, but small and not signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
They conclude that the Customs Union had a small impact on trade promotion and some
evidence of trade diversion.
Using similar strategy, Isakova et al. (2013) extends the previous work to include Russia
and Belarus. The study explains the change in the trade between 2009 and 2010 through
tariﬀ changes. They ﬁnd some trade creation for Russia with the rest of the world due to tariﬀ
falls in that country. The ﬁnd positive impact of tariﬀ increases on imports from Russia. The
authors note that the magnitude is however small and they anticipate that the larger beneﬁts
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could come from reduced internal trade costs. Tarr (2012) argues that previous attempts
for deep regional integration projects of Russia were failing as they involved transfers from
potential members to Russia, and in this respect the current Customs Union aims to reduce
internal trade costs in which case other members will also beneﬁt. The author also suggests
that Russia's WTO accession will be a step in the direction of reducing non-tariﬀ barriers
to trade.
Krotov (2011) presents a detailed discussion of the Customs Union's administration sys-
tem, customs legislation and clearance. He ﬁnds that the Customs Union is functional and,
although the rules are yet to be fully formed, the necessary institutions and legislation for
Customs Union's work are at place.
Dragneva and Wolczuk (2012) discuss the impact of the Customs Union on the EU's
relationship with eastern neighbours, in particular, Ukraine. The paper also mentions that
EU has become associated with modernization and rules-based governance, promoting Russia
to adopt similar approach for its regional policy, speciﬁcally, by highlighting the economic
gains and rules-based functioning of the Customs Union for potential members.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Trade Flows
Bilateral trade ﬂows were obtained from the TradeMap platform of the International Trade
Center (ITC) (original source UN COMTRADE) and have a panel structure. The study
requires bilateral trade ﬂow data disaggregated at the goods level. For each crosssection,
the data set contains the trade ﬂows (exports) from the main trading partners  China,
Ukraine, the European Union and United States  to the ECU member countries, Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as internal trade ﬂows. The trade ﬂows are disaggregated
at the HS6 level for 2007-2012.
The data is inaccurate for some bilateral intra-CU trade ﬂows in 2010. Whenever possible,
the mirror data was used. However in the case of exports of Russia to Kazakhstan in 2010
the mirror data did not resolve the problem, and this trade ﬂow will be controlled for by a
dummy in the regressions.
In the years prior to formation of the Customs Union, internal trade between the three
countries amounted to $44bn., about 16% of total imports by the three countries. The
bilateral ﬂows are highly uneven: in 2009, Russian exports to Belarus and Kazakhstan
respectively accounted for 46% and 24% respectively of the total. Belarussian exports to
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Table 3.1: Intra-CU bilateral trade exports
Exporter Importer 2008, USD mln 2011, USD mln Growth, %
RU BY 23 500 24 700 0.05
RU KZ 12 900 163 00 0.26
BY RU 10 600 14 400 0.36
BY KZ 365 668 0.83
KZ RU 6 227 7 514 0.21
KZ BY 171 104 -0.39
Russia made up another 18%, and Kazakh exports to the same destination 10%. Belarussian-
Kazakh trade, at just over 1% of the total, was almost insigniﬁcant.
The table 3.1 summarises the changes in intra-CU export ﬂows for a pre-crisis year 2008
before the creation of the CU and for 2011, by which year intra-CU borders were removed. By
2011 some changes were already apparent. Internal trade grew by about 19% from pre-crisis
level of 2008 to $63.7bn, faster than the 10% growth of overall trade. Thus, the intra-CU
trade share rose from 20.8% to 22.4%. Exports from both Belarus and Kazakhstan to the
Russian market increased signiﬁcantly, overall by 30% compared to 2008. Exports from
Belarus to Kazakhstan grow by 83%, making these bilateral trade ﬂows the fastest growing.
However Kazakhstan's exports to Belarus went down 40%. Russia increased its exports to
the CU partners as well, very slightly to Belarus and by 26% to Kazakhstan.
The Figure 3.1 presents the trend in exports to the CU member countries using the
exports in 2007 as index. The trends suggest a noticeable increase in export ﬂows after
2010. Figure 3.3 in Appendix shows the export to the Customs Union countries as shares to
total exports, year 2007 is again a base year.
3.3.2 Tariﬀ Data
The tariﬀ data was also obtained from the ITC through the MacMap platform as it provides
highquality tariﬀ data at various classiﬁcation levels. The data on applied tariﬀs HS 6 level
was available for 2007-2012 for Russia and Kazakhstan for 2007-2012, and for 2009-2012 for
Belarus. For each good, country pair and year, we have matched the tariﬀ that is actually
applied  taking into account regional agreements and the Generalised System of Preferences.
Table 3.2 summarises the tariﬀ averages of the members and the number of product lines
where no tariﬀ was levied in each year. The tariﬀ means are calculated as simple averages
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Figure 3.1: Trends in Exports
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Table 3.2: Trends in MFN Tariﬀs
Year N of rows
N of rows with zero tariﬀ Mean MFN tariﬀ
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Belarus Kazakhstan
2007 5052 369 - 914 12.12 - 8.26
2008 5052 420 - 1154 12.12 - 6.59
2009 5052 445 373 1164 12.18 11.81 6.49
2010 5052 554 554 712 10.67 10.60 10.30
2011 5015 547 547 655 11.07 10.99 10.82
2012 5205 550 550 641 10.94 10.87 10.74
of the tariﬀ lines of the HS6 disaggregation level.
Internal Tariﬀs: Already before the formation of the Eurasian Customs Union, internal
tariﬀs between the members were largely eliminated. Our data set records just 8 lines
where Russia imposed tariﬀs on its partners - involving sugar, alcohol and tobacco - in
the immediate pre-CU years. For Kazakhstan, there are 36 positive lines covering similar
products and additionally some rice varieties. Our data set has no record of positive internal
tariﬀs imposed by Belarus. From 2010 onwards, internal tariﬀs had been fully eliminated.
Most-Favoured Nation Tariﬀs: Even prior to the Customs Union, Russia and Belarus had
similar tariﬀ regimes - with average rates around 12%. By 2009, close to 80% of MFN tariﬀ
lines by the two countries already agreed. In contrast, Kazakhstan pursued a relatively liberal
policy, imposing on average just a 6.5% tariﬀ in 2009 (reﬂecting a period of liberalisation
after 2007 that is apparent in the sample).
Common External Tariﬀ: In 2010, the overwhelming majority of MFN tariﬀs - 4360 lines
or 86% - were harmonised into the Common External Tariﬀ, with many exceptions found in
textiles. The CET mean a large tariﬀ increase for Kazakhstan - to 10.29%, or nearly a 60%
increase. But Russian tariﬀs fell to 10.7%, nearly a 20% cut, and Belarussian tariﬀs by 10%.
Table 3.2 provides more detailed data on the evolution of MFN tariﬀs in the ECU region.
The members of the Customs Union prior to its creation had 40% of the tariﬀ lines (HS
6 lines) harmonised, and in November 2009 they agreed on the Common External Tariﬀ
(CET). The CET was harmonising around 86% of the tariﬀ lines.
Table 3.2 shows that Russia and Belarus had similar tariﬀ averages prior to the ECU
while Kazakhstan had noticeably lower tariﬀ average. The creation of the Customs Union
and tariﬀ harmonisation led to 1,5% and 1,2% decrease in mean MFN tariﬀ for Russia and
Belarus, respectively and 3,8% increase in mean MFN tariﬀ for Kazakhstan. The MFN tariﬀ
is applied among important trade partners, in particular, to the EU and US.
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The diﬀerences in the trade policy of Russia and Belarus on one side and Kazakhstan on
the other side prior to the creation of the Customs Union is seen also through the number
of tariﬀ lines where no tariﬀ is levied. In Kazakhstan 1164 product lines were subject to
free trade prior to the ECU, almost three times more than in the partner countries, and
Kazakhstan got a transition period to reduce that number over the course of several years.
All three members of the ECU applied various tariﬀ regimes besides the MFN regime.
Moreover, some of the most important trade partners were beneﬁting from the special tariﬀ
regimes. In particular, China had access to the General System of Preferences (GSP).
The GSP does not apply to all the tariﬀ lines and, wherever if applies, it typically oﬀers
25% discount of the MFN tariﬀ. Interesting observation here is that Russia and Belarus
were including signiﬁcantly more lines in the GSP than Kazakhstan prior to the ECU.
That diﬀerence is somewhat compensating the MFN tariﬀ diﬀerences before 2010 for the
developing countries. In particular, if we look at Russia, the average tariﬀ paid by the
countries in the GSP in 2009 (that is, where the preference margin was positive) was 10.89%
while the corresponding MFN tariﬀ mean for these products was 14.26%.
3.3.3 Other Controls
The data on GDP and population was collected from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
With an annual GDP exceeding $2trn. in PPP terms, Russia accounts for 86% of the
block's GDP and 84% of its population. Kazakhstan accounts for 8% of GDP and 10% of
population, while the Belarussian economy and population both amount to approximately
5% of the total.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The paper follows the basic structural model of gravity equation developed by Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2003) for cross-sectional aggregate trade ﬂows. However in adopting the
panel approach and varying trade costs across goods, the structural model and estimation
speciﬁcation have to be adjusted.
Already Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) discuss the advantages of using the disag-
gregate data to account for varying trade costs and elasticities across goods as this study
does. The basic model adapted for the industry level analysis if following.
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ΠkiP
k
j
)1−σk (3.4.1)
where xkij denote import of country j from country i of good k, y
k
i - total production of good
k by ﬁrms from country i, xkj - total expenditure for good k in country j. Further, T
k
ij stands
for bilateral trade costs, Πki is outward trade barriers of country i and P
k
j are inward trade
barriers of country j. The latter two terms comprise the multilateral resistance and lead to
higher bilateral trade.
The bilateral trade costs T kij consist of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ costs. In particular, T
k
ij =
(1 + tkij)bij where t
k
ij) is the bilateral import tariﬀ on good k and bij is the bilateral border
barrier. If there is no border between two countries then bij = 1 and otherwise it is one plus
the tariﬀ equivalent of the border barrier.
The model presented in logarithms becomes linear:
lnxkij = (1− σk)ln(1 + tkij) + (1− σk)lnbij + lnyki (Πki )1−σk + lnxkj (P kj )1−σk − lnyk (3.4.2)
The unobservable terms yki (Π
k
i )
1−σk and xkj (P
k
j )
1−σk are estimated with the exporter- and-
importer-product ﬁxed eﬀects, thus leading to the structural model based gravity equation
(world production of the good k omitted):
lnxkij = (1− σk)ln(1 + tkij) + (1− σk)lnbij + αki + βkj + kij (3.4.3)
The traditional structural gravity model is not adapted for the panel data. Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006) argue that the gravity equation with time-invariant controls developed for
cross-sectional data cannot be used for panel data. To account for changing multilateral
trade resistance, the authors recommend to use pair ﬁxed eﬀects and country-time ﬁxed
eﬀects. Olivero and Yotov (2012) develop a dynamic version of the structural gravity model
that leads to the estimation equation for panel dataset. The estimation equation for the
panel dataset then becomes:
lnxkijt = (1− σk)ln(1 + tkijt) + (1− σk)lnbijt + αkit + βkjt + kijt (3.4.4)
Further, to account for bilateral unobserved trade-related eﬀects (e.g. unobserved trade
costs), estimation with the country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects will be included.
3.4.1 Border Removal
In particular case of the Customs Union, the bilateral cost T kij was changing both due to
tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ costs, - the changing number of borders to be crossed when exporting.
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Figure 3.2 visualises the order in which the internal customs checks in the CU were removed.
As the time-line of the CU indicates, the borders were removed in two stages: ﬁrst, in 2010
between Russia and Belarus and only in 2011 between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Figure 3.2: Stages of Border Removal in the CU
pre-CU July 2010 July 2011
There are several implications from the border removals. First, there are fewer adminis-
trative obstacles to trade within the CU. All import and export within the CU can happen
without any customs check crossing leading to savings in customs waiting times, document
checks, possible bribes and etc. Second, similar eﬀect extends to the non-CU partners. In-
deed, once the goods go through the customs clearance at the borders of the CU, they can
be easier transported to all the CU members.
Further, the lack of internal customs controls creates a base for the common economic
market, in particular from the investment perspective. In the common economic market the
ﬁrms can invest in either of the CU members and sell the products in all the CU countries.
At the same time foreign investment is often associated with imports of equipment and
materials from rest of the world. There are already examples of investment and production
decisions oriented to the common market, e.g. China's investment in Belarus with the focus
on potential exports to Russia (Anishenko (2014)).
Finally, the international fragmentation of production of recent decades has been well
established. This means that, mainly apart from agricultural products, any trade creation in
the intra-CU trade will necessarily imply increase in demand in imports from non-members.
As an example, among the automotive companies with local plants in Russia, Renault-
Nissan is the leader with 70% sourcing locally, while others are much lower: Volkswagen and
Hyundai with 50% and Ford, General Motors and Toyota around 10-30% (Frost and Davies
(2014)).
The presence of various impacts of border removal, primarily, that ﬁrms from the CU do
not have to cross customs controls while non-members do, the bilateral border costs bijt could
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have changed diﬀerently for members and non-members. Furthermore, one could expect the
border removal to have diﬀerent eﬀect on trade partners that pay MFN tariﬀ or enjoy free
trade due to multiplier eﬀects. To control for this diﬀerence, the three border costs dummies
are used:
lnbijt =
noborderijt = 1 if j = (RU,BY), t = 2010− 2012noborderijt = 1 if j = (RU,BY,KZ), t = 2011, 2012
noborderijt = 0 otherwise
∗
members = 1 if i = CU member (RU,BY,KZ)fta = 1 if i = FTA partner (UA)
external = 1 if i = No Agreement (CN,EU,US)
The ﬁrst dummy is one if the importer is Russia or Belarus in 2010-2012 and Kazakhstan
in 2011 and 2012 while the exporter is a CU member. The other two bilateral costs are
deﬁned similarly with the exporter being an FTA partner and MFN-based trade partner (no
trade agreement), respectively. This diﬀerentiation also accounts for indirect eﬀects across
diﬀerent exporters - decrease in trade cost for some exporters has negative impact on the
remaining exporters.
Later the impact will be further diﬀerentiated among individual exporters.
3.4.2 Bilateral Tariﬀs
The indirect channel of impact of a cost-amending policy could be present not only for border
removals but also for tariﬀ changes. Indeed, higher tariﬀ imposed on one partner, puts the
unaﬀected partner in a better position, and vice versa. In the case of the Customs Union
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, this argument is very relevant. As it has been shown
above, although the internal tariﬀs were zero already before the CU, the MFN tariﬀs saw
signiﬁcant changes. These changes have a clear expected eﬀect on intra-CU trade: increase
in MFN tariﬀ should be positively associated with the intra-CU trade.
The augmented gravity estimation that accounts for diﬀerentiated border and tariﬀ eﬀects
for various exporters becomes:
lnxkijt = αln(1 + t
k
ijt) + βln(1 + t
k
MFNjt) ∗ partner + γ1noborder ∗memberijt +
+ γ2noborder ∗ ftaijt + γ3noborder ∗ externalijt + αkit + βkjt + kijt (3.4.5)
where tkijt is the applied tariﬀ for each bilateral trade ﬂow; it is zero for the FTA and CU
exporters, and MFN or GSP tariﬀ for the other exporters. Similarly, tkijt is the MFN tariﬀ
applied to the exporters that are not in an FTA or CU with the importers. The coeﬃcient
of this variable interacted with the dummy that equals to one for FTA and CU partners,
is expected to be positive: when the MFN tariﬀ rises, ﬂows that enjoy preferences of zero
tariﬀs are expected to increase, other things being equal, due to trade diversion.
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Zero trade ﬂows are included in all OLS estimations. To avoid taking a logarithm of zero,
an inﬁnitesimal number is added. However this approach does not address the possible bias of
the OLD estimations in the presence of zero trade ﬂows, non-linear model of gravity equation
using the Poisson estimator is applied. In order to have standard elasticity interpretation,
the trade ﬂows enter as levels while the regressors enter in logs (Silva and Tenreyro (2006)).
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the OLS and Poisson estimations (column 7).
Results point to a strong impact of border removal on trade ﬂows across various ap-
proaches and estimations. The CU members appear to be the main beneﬁciaries of the
border removal: the most conservative estimate suggests a 52% increase in bilateral ﬂows
associated with no internal borders. That is rather intuitive as the CU partners enjoy the
unique environment of trading across borders without customs checks. Most comprehen-
sive ﬁxed eﬀects OLS estimation model suggests more than 130% increase while the Poisson
estimator of the same model is more conservative, although still very high at 61%. The
divergence of the OLS and Poisson estimators speaks about the importance of controlling
for zero trade ﬂows in the dataset.
Although smaller in magnitude, all exporters appear to have beneﬁted from the border
removal. The OLS regressions with the most comprehensive sets of ﬁxed eﬀects imply that
having access to a larger market with no internal borders increases trade by around 85%
for FTA partners and 60% for exporters that are not in a regional trade agreement with
export destination. Again, although signiﬁcant and positive, the Poisson estimator reduces
the magnitude of the impact both for FTA partner and external trade partners. The increase
in bilateral trade is 35% and 3.5%, respectively.
As expected, the increase in the applied tariﬀ has negative impact on the trade ﬂows.
The elasticity of bilateral trade ﬂows to tariﬀs is close to 1 in regressions (1) to (4). However
the elasticity drops down to 0.2 when the country-pair-product ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced.
This is intuitive as the latter ﬁxed eﬀects eliminate the variation between bilateral tariﬀs in
diﬀerent products and leave only the time variation. This means that elasticity can be very
large for some products but, once we account for that diﬀerence, the average elasticity is
lower.
Increases in MFN tariﬀ paid by the external (not in a trade agreement) exporters in
general have a positive impact on the exporters that do not pay a tariﬀ. Similar to the
applied tariﬀs, the elasticity is between 1 and 1.2 in the regressions (1)-(4) and decreases
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Table 3.3: Impact of Border Removal in a Customs Union
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Ln(1+t) -0.933∗∗∗ -1.095∗∗∗ -1.095∗∗∗ -1.363∗∗∗ -0.153 -0.484∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(-8.35) (-6.65) (-6.65) (-8.44) (-0.98) (-3.65) (-245.97)
Ln(1+t_mfn)*partner 1.201∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ -0.0283 0.500∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(10.41) (7.46) (7.46) (6.23) (-0.16) (3.44) (260.95)
noborder*members 0.789∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 1.363∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(7.44) (11.63) (12.52) (18.08) (19.79) (20.44) (700.08)
noborder*fta 0.406∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗
(3.59) (6.95) (6.76) (3.36) (11.08) (10.69) (247.89)
noborder*external 0.121 0.577∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗
(1.61) (5.47) (5.25) (4.10) (10.20) (8.84) (32.09)
cu_underrep 0.167 0.137 -0.681∗∗∗ 0.0769 0.136∗∗
(1.71) (1.77) (-14.20) (1.57) (2.79)
LnExchange rate -0.0139
(-0.55)
LnGDPexporter 0.364∗∗∗
(7.53)
LnGDPimporter 0.857∗∗∗
(15.91)
Fixed eﬀects ij it jt ij it jt p ij it jt p ij p ijp it jt it jt ijp it jt
Random eﬀects ijp
Observations 534422 534422 534422 534422 534422 534422 323487
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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when the pair-product eﬀects are introduced to 0.5. The random eﬀects (6) and ﬁxed eﬀects
Poisson estimator (7) are insigniﬁcant for the OLS ﬁxed eﬀects model (5).
Table 3.4: Impact of Border Removal in a Customs Union: by Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BY KZ RU UA CN EU US
Ln(1+t) -0.873 -1.343∗ -0.445 0.911 0.110 -0.429 -0.228
(-1.79) (-2.17) (-0.57) (1.04) (0.33) (-1.49) (-0.71)
Ln(1+t_mfn)*partner 1.284∗∗∗ -3.268∗∗∗ 0.249 0.882∗∗
(3.78) (-8.15) (0.68) (2.72)
noborder 1.020∗∗∗ 0.0563 1.456∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(19.03) (1.17) (25.55) (5.77) (18.83) (20.90) (6.74)
cu_underrep 0.668∗∗∗ -0.0901
(9.86) (-1.12)
Fixed eﬀects ijp jt ijp jt ijp jt ijp jt ijp jt ijp jt ijp jt
Observations 58432 59094 58924 87595 90516 88493 91368
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.4 presents the impact of the CU for each export country separately, allowing a
look at the export dimension of the CU impact. The ﬁndings are very revealing regards
the results from the Table 3.3. First, note that there is very little variation of the applied
tariﬀ for the CU members and Ukraine as prior to the CU they were in FTAs with only few
products with positive tariﬀs. Hence, the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for these countries.
The indirect impact of MFN tariﬀ on exports of countries that enjoy paying no tariﬀs
has expected positive sign for all countries except Kazakhstan  increases in MFN tariﬀs
of partner countries applied to the external countries had negative impact on Kazakhstan's
exports.
Interestingly, the border eﬀects are also heterogeneous within the types of exporters.
Indeed, Russia and Belarus have beneﬁted from the border removal by doubling their exports,
while the impact is negligible for Kazakhstan. The latter result can be due to the short period
after the Russia-Kazakhstan border removal, and that the eﬀect is fully observed only over
a longer period.
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Highly disaggregated data such as the one used in this paper typically has a lot of product
lines that are not traded or the small trade values are not recorded. It is thus possible that
the policy change that decreases trade costs might increase the number of products traded,
e.g. by increasing the volume of trade to a suﬃcient level for being recorded. That is the
impact of a policy on the extensive margin of trade. The extensive margin of trade ﬂows is
typically analysed using a probit model (e.g. Debaere and Mostashari (2010)). This paper
diﬀers in analysing the number of goods bilaterally traded in each year. Similar to the trade
values, the log-linear gravity model with trade costs would determine the number of goods
traded between the countries. Table 3.5 summarises the results for three estimation models
of extensive margin of trade. The last column reports the Poisson maximum likelihood
estimator of the regression with the dependent variable in levels and explanatory variables
in logs.
The results point to the same direction as the regressions on the intensive margin of trade.
It is noteworthy that on the extensive margin the impact of border removal is practically
identical for CU, FTA partners and external trade partners.
Table 3.5: Impact of Border Removal: Extensive Margin
OLS OLS Poisson
Ln(1+t) -0.0865∗∗∗ -0.0706∗∗∗
(-4.44) (-7.66)
Ln(1+t_mfn)*partner 0.120∗∗∗
(4.83)
noborder*members 0.408∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(58.08) (58.31) (83.00)
noborder*fta 0.403∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(43.31) (43.48) (62.07)
noborder*external 0.352∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(44.59) (45.66) (62.91)
Fixed eﬀects ijp it jt ijp it jt ijp it jt
N 10368 10476 10368
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper showed that much of the trade increase in the Eurasian Customs Union can be
attributed to the removal in internal borders. We beneﬁted from the natural experiment of
CU establishment, which allowed a direct measurement of the eﬀect of border removal. The
trade promoting eﬀect of border removal applies most strongly to internal trade  where
producers already beneﬁted from zero tariﬀs for almost all goods before the formation of
the CU  but were held back by high trade costs. Furthermore, external trade partners also
beneﬁted from the border removal, as reduced trade costs through easier transit had benign
eﬀects on their trade volume.
The overall positive non-tariﬀ impact of the CU on non-CU exports can be explained
through two channels. First, the removal of customs controls oﬀers equal gains from access
to a larger market to everyone. However as the barriers for entering the CU remain in place,
we see a smaller impact on the non-members. The second channel for the positive impact of
non-tariﬀ changes on the trade with non-members could be that the increase in the intra-CU
trade leads also requires increased use of intermediate inputs from external partners.
More generally, these ﬁndings highlight the practical importance of trade facilitation
measures. Indeed, the Eurasian countries were known to have problematic borders  as
reﬂected in their low Trading Across Borders ranking. In these environments, it appears
that a Customs Union can go far in promoting trade.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Timeline of CU Implementation
Key Events in the formation of RBKCU were2
 In 2009 heads of states of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have signed and ratiﬁed
international agreements that formed the basis of Customs Union.
 In November of the same 2009 the decision to create a common customs space with
common external tariﬀ on the territory of the three countries from January, 1st 2010
was taken.
 January, 1st 2010, the common external tariﬀ became eﬀective.
 From July 2010 the Customs Code of the Customs Union became eﬀective.
 From July, 1st 2011 the customs control was removed from between the CU countries.
The control was moved to the external borders of the CU.
 In October 2011 it was announced that Kyrgyzstan would join the Customs Union
 In the same month the Commission of the CU has brought to accordance the norms
of the Customs Union to the norms of the WTO. Moreover, in case of accession to
the WTO, the norms of that organisation would have priority over the norms of the
Customs Union.
2Based on http://www.rfca.gov.kz/7377, http://www.tsouz.ru (Oﬃcial website of the Customs
Union), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.10.2011
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Figure 3.3: Trends in Export Shares to total Exports
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Chapter 4
The Layers of the Information
Technology Agreement Impact
Christian Henn1 Arevik Mkrtchyan2
World Trade Organization EUI and WTO
Abstract
The signatories of the WTO's Information Technology Agreement eliminated import tariﬀs
for a wide range of IT goods, not just among each other but on an MFN basis. We show
that this agreement did not only lead to increased imports, but  by reducing the cost of
intermediate goods  ITA members were also able to increase their exports of ﬁnal goods.
Our estimation strategy is based on the plausibly exogenous entry of late signatories to the
agreement, who ratiﬁed the ITA as part of a broader policy objective. Using productlevel
data, we are able to take into account the various layers of ITA impact, dissecting the
impact of tariﬀ reduction, tariﬀ elimination to zero, and over and above tariﬀ reductions,
including through ﬁrm relocation via intermediate goods channel, rather than just a single
ITA dummy as in the previous literature. Our results suggest that the positive trade and
value chain eﬀects of the ITA are driven entirely by tariﬀ-related eﬀects. In particular,
having zero tariﬀs is associated with more imports of intermediate than ﬁnal goods, and
with participation in global value chains. This ﬁnding also supports the line of thought
that trade policy certainty attracts investment. Moreover, while China stands out among
exogenous joiners, we show that results are not driven just by this country. Our results are
robust to estimation not only with OLS, but also using Poisson estimation to correct for
zero trade ﬂows, as well as adding multilateral resistance terms. 3
3Our study of the disaggregate imports and exports required substantive preparatory work to take care
of some of the issues related to product coverage and membership of the ITA that was possible with the kind
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4.1 Introduction
Among the WTO's plurilateral agreements, the ITA stands out as being probably the most
wideranging, reducing to zero tariﬀs on many information technology products. This makes
it the paramount case for study of the eﬀects zero-for-zero agreements may have on trade
ﬂows. The question becomes particularly policy relevant for two reasons. First, an ITA 2
agreement is currently being debated, which could amplify the product coverage of the orig-
inal ITA agreement considerably further. Second, zero-for-zero agreements in other sectors
are often ﬂoated as proposals, mainly by developed countries, with the aim of bringing the
Doha Round to conclusion.
Yet, the literature examining the trade impact of the ITA is surprisingly scarce. To
our knowledge, only few studies have addressed this topic so far. Bora and Liu (2006) is
the only econometric analysis of ITA imports for members and non-members. The paper
focusses on the impact of the ITA for imports only. They use data up to 2003 on aggregate
ITA imports and thus mainly covers original participants, ﬁnds that ITA signatories were
on average importing more ITA goods than non-signatories.
A more recent study by Anderson and Mohs (2010) presents a mainly descriptive review
of ITA experience while going further in time coverage. In their assessment of main trends
in trade of ITA products the paper outlines the rapid increase in exports of developing
countries that is associated with joining ITA, in particular a shift to Asia and emerging role
of China. The authors attribute this eﬀect to the lower cost of intermediate goods due to
ITA. Complementarily, World Trade Organization (2012) provides a comprehensive analysis
of the formation, membership and coverage overview of the ITA.4
Joseph and Parayil (2006) analyse early ITA trade  until 2003  and note that some
non-ITA members have outperformed the ITA members (China joined the ITA only in 2003
but was already a fast-growing country in IT goods trade). Further, the paper argues that
in agreements like the ITA the developing countries have been passive adopters. In order to
reap the beneﬁts of liberalization, as the authors argue, developing countries should create a
SouthSouth framework in the IT sector; thus late joiners to the ITA may have anticipated
lower gains.
Portugal-Perez et al. (2010) focus on nontariﬀ costs. Their results indirectly suggest
that the impact of a sectoral agreement like the ITA may have furtherreaching impacts if it
leads to harmonisation standards. Analysing the impact of ITA on EU15 imports, the paper
help from the WTO secretariat.
4Dreyer and Hindley (2008) discuss that the partial and complex coverage of the ITA have led to a WTO
dispute on compliance between two ITA signatories.
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ﬁnds a positive trade impact when EU standards are aligned with international norms.
The Global Value Chains literature (Gawande et al. (2011), Milberg and Winkler (2010))
suggests that membership in an agreement like ITA may also promote exports. The trans-
mission mechanism here is that lower import tariﬀs in intermediate goods help exporters
be more competitive, thus increasing their presence on the world market. In line with this,
Feenstra (2008) presents evidence of strongly magniﬁed eﬀect on prices from tariﬀ cuts in
ITA products because of highly fragmented production and oﬀshoring. And indeed, one
may wonder if China would be the same IT export hub if it had not eliminated tariﬀs on the
inputs required for this success. Using the Sturgeon classiﬁcation (Sturgeon and Memedovic,
2010) for intermediate goods5 we thus explore the impact of the ITA on trade of intermediate
goods.
Some countries joined the ITA when ratifying a larger agreement, such as China upon
accession to the WTO. These countries can be plausibly argued to have joined for exogenous
reasons, helping us to overcome identiﬁcation problems. Economic theory suggests that the
decision to join an agreement is typically endogenous (Ornelas, 2005), which has important
implications for empirical analysis (Baier and Bergstrand (2007) pioneered the econometric
methods for this case). Furthermore, higher income countries may have adopted products
covered by the ITA faster, increasing their incentive to join the agreement. But a signiﬁcant
number of countries became ITA signatories while pursuing other goals: since the EU joined
the ITA in 1997, future members automatically became ITA parties too. Some new WTO
members made a commitment to join ITA as part of their accession protocol. Finally, the
US was actively promoting ITA participation as a precondition for FTAs.
Using productlevel data allows us quantify ITA beneﬁts more precisely than the previous
literature, which relied on aggregates. We disentangle ITA beneﬁts into three components:
ﬁrstly, the direct eﬀect of a reduced tariﬀ; this eﬀect is very well understood in the literature.
Second, the elimination of tariﬀs reduces transaction costs of crossing borders. While small
positive tariﬀs do not generate signiﬁcant revenue for the government, they have a ﬁxed cost
for exporters through the eﬀort required for compliance. And ﬁnally, since the ITA also sets
the bound tariﬀ rate for covered products to zero, it removes uncertainty about future tariﬀ
increases. This may inﬂuence the location decisions of MNEs through reduced policy risk.
This paper proceeds by giving a brief overview of the ITA agreement and its impact in
Section 2. Section 3 then turns to a description of the data; the next section turns to the
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents results, whose robustness is examined in section 6.
Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
5The classiﬁcation will become part of a revised BEC classiﬁcation
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4.2 The ITA and a ﬁrst glance at its impact
The ITA is a plurilateral agreement under the WTO, which institutes import tariﬀ conces-
sions by its members on certain IT-related goods. The concessions are oﬀered on MFN basis,
meaning that even WTO members that were not join the agreement enjoy duty-free (applied
and bound) exports to the ITA members. The agreement was initiated by 43 countries in
March 1997 and managed to increase its membership to 74 countries by March 2012. In
order to be implemented within the WTO, the initial members had to cover at least 90%
of world trade in IT products. The agreement is solely about tariﬀ elimination on certain
products and does not include provisions on non-tariﬀ issues. The ITA requires the members
to apply concessions to all WTO members by adjusting the MFN applied and bound tariﬀs.
The agreement has a complex coverage of goods. In particular, there are in total 154 product
lines of 6-digit HS classiﬁcation aﬀected, with 95 product lines being covered fully. The rest
are covered only partially thus creating an issue for empirical analysis of the trade in ITA
goods; we address these issues in more detail in the data section below.
The products covered by the ITA can be roughly classiﬁed into 7 groups of products
(World Trade Organization, 2012) :
1. Computers
2. Instruments and apparatus
3. Semiconductors
4. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment
5. Data-storage media and software
6. Telecommunications equipment
7. Parts and accessories
Computers, semiconductors and parts and accessories are the most traded products,
making up around 80% of trade ﬂows.
Table 4.1 below shows the commitment eﬀect of the ITA as its members continue to
reduce average tariﬀs on ITA goods. Note that the average tariﬀ rate of the ITA participants
is slightly above zero as its recently joined members receive an implementation schedule
spanning several years during which they gradually reduce the tariﬀs.
As noted earlier, the ITA membership has been expanding over time, and almost doubling
the membership by 2012. This process was happening largely through three channels. First,
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Table 4.1: Tariﬀs: ITA Members and Nonmembers
Country group Tariﬀ (%)
1997
ITA Participants 2.47
Non-participants 9.19
2011
ITA Participants 0.047
Non-participants 5.15
some countries that were acceding to the WTO after 1997 members had the commitment
to join the ITA in their accession protocol as a result of accession negotiations. Second,
all recent members of the European Union (EU) had to adopt the trade policy of the EU
upon accession or in the preparatory process and hence join the ITA, unless they had done
it earlier. Third, the US was one of the initiators of the ITA and was actively encouraging
during negotiations with potential FTA partners to join the ITA. This paper is determining
the extent of the impact of the ITA on global trade, as well as on the development of IT
value chains. Methodologically, we distinguish the countries by the circumstances at which
they were joining the ITA. It follows that from this perspective we can identify two groups
among current members. One group is referred to individual joiners and includes all the
initial members and later joiners whose accession was not associated with or tied to any
larger agreement package. The other group, referred to as exogenous joiners, consists of
the ITA members that can be considered to have joined the ITA through a package of a larger
agreement, mainly as a byproduct of a broader policy objective (three channels outlined
above).
It is particularly insightful then to look at the impact on these countries that joined the
ITA as a pre-condition for another agreement rather than due to their national decision.
Clearly, by oﬀering duty-free exports on MFN basis, the consumers in these countries would
most likely gain from lower prices of imported IT goods. But were these countries also able
to boost their IT industries and manage to export more than the non-members?
Table 4.2 below presents the lists of individual and exogenous joiners as well as the year
of joining the ITA. The majority of the exogenous joiners of the ITA became signatories via
WTO accession, in total 13 countries. Chinese Taipei and Estonia have the ITA membership
in their WTO accession protocols as well but these two countries were among the initial ITA
signatories before the WTO accession and thus are classiﬁed as individual joiners. Another
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Table 4.2: List of ITA members categorized by motivation driving their ITA accession
Individual ITA joiners, including all founding members 1
Australia Hong Kong, China New Zealand
Austria Iceland Norway
Belgium India Philippines
Canada Indonesia Poland
Chinese Taipei 2 Ireland Portugal
Costa Rica Israel Romania
Czech Republic Italy Singapore
Denmark Japan Slovak Republic
Egypt (2003) Korea, Republic of Spain
El Salvador Kuwait (2010) Sweden
Estonia 2 Liechtenstein Switzerland
European Union Luxembourg Thailand
Finland Macao, China Turkey
France Malaysia United Arab Emirates (2007)
Germany Mauritius (1999) United Kingdom
Greece Netherlands United States of America
Exogenous ITA joiners, whose ITA accession was likely signiﬁcantly motivated by...
WTO accession EU accession US FTA
Albania (1999) 3 Bulgaria (2002) Bahrain, Kingdom of (2003)
China (2003) Cyprus (2000) Colombia (2012)
Croatia (1999) 3 Hungary (2004) Dominican Republic (2006)
Georgia (1999) 3 Malta (2004) Guatemala (2005)
Jordan (1999) 3 Slovenia (2000) Honduras (2005)
Kyrgyz Republic (1999) Morocco (2003)
Latvia (1999) Nicaragua (2005)
Lithuania (1999) 3 Panama (1998)
Moldova, Republic of (2001) Peru (2008)
Oman (2000)
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of (2005)
Ukraine (2008)
Viet Nam (2006) 3
Sources: Authors' compilation based on WTO (2012) and information obtained through interviews of various WTO Secretariat staﬀ.
1 ITA founding members joined in 1997. Accession year for all non-founding members is given in parentheses.
2 Among ITA founding members, Chinese Taipei and Estonia were the only ones which only joined the WTO subsequently (in 2002 and 1999,
respectively).
3 These countries already joined the ITA during their WTO accession process in the calendar year before WTO accession (only Lithuania acceeded
the WTO two calendar years later, in 2001).
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15 countries were classiﬁed as exogenous joiners because of their ITA accession was related to
negotiating an FTA with the US or EU accession. One can see from table 4.2 that exogenous
joiners entered the agreement in various years.
Trade in ITA goods has evolved in rather diﬀerent ways for the two groups of members.
The Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below present the world import and export shares of ITA individual
and exogenous members and non-members for 1996 and 2012. Note that the countries are
grouped as members or non-members both in 1996 and 2012 based on their ITA member-
ship status in 2012. This is done in order to avoid shifting shares coming from changing
combination of various groups in 1996 and 2012. The world trade in IT products has seen
an enormous growth of China's importance, an exogenous ITA member. Thus there is a
potential concern that a large part of our results could be be driven by this increase in trade
with China. To account for that, for all our later regression speciﬁcations we look at the
eﬀects on the whole sample and on the sample without China.
Figure 4.1: World Import Market Shares in ITA products, 1996 and 2012
Figure 4.2: World Export Market Shares in ITA products, 1996 and 2012
Similarly, other exogenous ITA members also experienced a large increase in their trade
share. The rising importance of exogenous ITA members displaced individual ITA members
with regards to world IT market share, while the non-members largely retained their small
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Figure 4.3: Exports of ITA products: Market Shares (index, 1996=100)
world market share. Notably both for China and other exogenous ITA members the increase
in market share is more impressive for exports than imports. On the ﬂip side, the individual
joiners lost more of their importance in exports than imports. One may therefore hypothesise
that the demand for ITA goods is relatively stable over time. In contrast, the geographical
origin of products changed signiﬁcantly in the last decades, driven by location decisions of
MNEs.
Figure 4.3 presents the nominal export value of ITA products by country groups with
1996 values indexed at 100. Exports of all groups have seen an increase and exports of
individual ITA members and non-ITA members exports as well as the total world trade
show a similar pattern. Exogenous ITA members instead have a much steeper slope. Given
that they generally acceded to the ITA a few years after 1997, this graph does not allow to
identify whether this impressive pattern is related to ITA accession alone.
Indeed, exogenous joiners were not in ITA yet in earlier years. To obtain a ﬁrst notion
of whether ITA accession may have boosted exports of exogenous joiners, we therefore look
at how their exports have evolved prior to ITA accession. To eliminate inﬂuences of global
ﬂuctuations in ITA trade, we again look at market shares, which we rescale to 100 in the entry
year to allow simple averaging across countries. To retain a suﬃcient number of countries in
the sample, we focus only on the 7 years before the ITA entry year and 5 years after. Figure
4.4 presents the results. Twelve exogenous joiners can be observed for such a length of time.
In the Figure 4.4 they are referred to as the Constant Sample. To check the robustness
of the ITA exports pattern over time across larger set of exogenous joiners, we look at all
exogenous joiners ("Changing Sample") during this 12 year period. Both for the constant
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Figure 4.4: Exports of ITA products (index, entry year=100)
and changing sample of countries, the increase in export market share is visibly steeper after
joining the ITA.
4.3 Data
Coverage of the ITA by codes: The empirical analysis of the ITA has been complicated by
the issues related to its product coverage, as also noted by Anderson and Mohs (2010). The
ITA was initially signed in HS1996, however some of the lines were considered to be covered
only partially. In cases when it was considered that the ITA covers a small share of the
products in 6-digit line, the line was dropped. As the deﬁnitions of the product lines were
changing in diﬀerent HS classiﬁcations, the coverage had to be reassessed instead of being
simply mapped. For instance, Line C may have covered a lot of ITA products (relative to
non-ITA products) in 1996 and therefore was considered an ITA product line. However, in
2002, this line may not be considered an ITA tariﬀ line any more, due to (i) changing trade
structure with now more non-ITA products being traded or (ii) because the ITA products
became technologically obsolete. The lines that are covered by the ITA vary for each of the
vintages. With this procedure in place, we obtained the product lines covered by the ITA in
HS1996, HS2002 and HS2007 classiﬁcations, respectively.
Data on Trade values: The bilateral trade ﬂows data was obtained from UN Comtrade. Using
the three coverage sets we obtained three datasets for, respectively, 1996-2001 in HS1996,
2001-2006 in HS2002, 2007-2012 in HS2007. The lines were then mapped into HS1996 using
the correspondence tables.
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Not all products are present in all three sets mapped into HS1996, and this has the
drawback that some products will not be observed in all years and therefore any product
ﬁxed eﬀects may be less reliable for some products.
We use the import ﬂow data and complement with mirror data whenever possible. We
apply the mirror data whenever a certain import-reporter didn't report in the particular
year at all. We restrict the mirror data to such cases only because if a country reports in
the particular year the bilateral trade but doesn't specify some line or it is zero while it is
present in the mirror data, then it is not actually a lack of reporting issue but a diﬀerence
in methodology of classifying products.
Our data cover 234 countries and 106 HS1996 6-digit ITA products over the period 1996-
2012.
Data on Tariﬀs: Data on tariﬀs for ITA lines was downloaded from Trains database from
WITS in HSCombined for years 1996-2012. Using the sets of ITA coverage for HS1996,
HS2002, HS2007, only the lines covered in each time frame were left. Next, using the
correspondence tables, the lines from HS2002 and HS2007 were converted into HS1996.
Note that the coverage in HS1996 in this manner implies that diﬀerent lines in HS1996 were
covered in diﬀerent periods. Further, we had to take into account that the EU is presented as
one country in TRAINS so we had to append the dataset to include all individual members
in various years to have time-consistency.
Sturgeon data on intermediate/ﬁnal: Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010) emphasizes the im-
portance of intermediate goods to understanding global value chains. They develop a novel
classiﬁcation scheme, dividing goods into ﬁnal and intermediate categories. Improving on
the UN's Broad Economic Categories (BEC) scheme, they group capital and consumption
goods as ﬁnal; others are considered intermediate. The data were kindly provided by the
authors, and are used in the estimation section to investigate how ITA aﬀects GVC.
Other RHS variables: Furthermore, we collect any standard gravity variables, which vary
across time within any country or country-pair.6 GDP and GDP per capita were taken from
Penn World Table Version 8.0. RTA and currency union membership data are taken from
De Sousa (2012).7 A remoteness measure was computed analogue to those commonly used
6Non-time variant variables such as distance are controlled for by country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in all our
speciﬁcations.
7De Sousa (2012) data only cover currency union relationships up to 2009. To extent the data, we
added Estonia joining the Euro in 2011. As we are not aware of any other countries joining or exiting a
currency union after 2009 and before 2013, we assume that no further changes in currency union membership
occurred after this time. Like the Glick and Rose (2002) currency union deﬁnition, ours is also transitive,
i.e. if country-pairs xy, and xz are in currency unions, then yz is a currency union. Therefore with both
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in the literature.8. WTO membership data was collected from the WTO website.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Gravity Model of Trade
The paper follows the basic structural model of gravity equation developed by Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2003) for cross-sectional aggregate trade ﬂows. However in adopting the
panel approach and varying trade costs across goods, the structural model and estimation
speciﬁcation have to be adjusted.
Already Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) discuss the advantages of using the disag-
gregate data to account for varying trade costs and elasticities across goods as this study
does. The basic model adapted for the industry level analysis is as follows:
xkij =
yki x
k
j
yk
(
T kij
ΠkiP
k
j
)1−σk (4.4.1)
where xkij denote import of country j from country i of good k, y
k
i - total production of good
k by ﬁrms from country i, xkj - total expenditure for good k in country j. Further, T
k
ij stands
for bilateral trade costs, Πki is outward trade barriers of country i and P
k
j are inward trade
barriers of country j. The latter two terms comprise the multilateral resistance and lead to
higher bilateral trade.
The traditional structural gravity model is not adapted for the panel data. Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006) argue that the gravity equation with time-invariant controls developed for
cross-sectional data cannot be used for panel data. To account for changing multilateral
trade resistance, the authors recommend to use pair ﬁxed eﬀects and country-time ﬁxed
eﬀects. Olivero and Yotov (2012) develop a dynamic version of the structural gravity model
that leads to the estimation equation for panel dataset. We follow their approach by using
appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects.
El Salvador and Ecuador having adopted the U.S. Dollar, they would both be considered to be in a currency
union with the United States as well as each other.
8Our remoteness measure is computed for importers and exporters using the standard formula, weighting
bilateral distances by trading partner shares in World GDP (see e.g. UNCTAD and WTO (2012)). To
obtain a single remoteness measures for any bilateral pair in the interest of parsimony, importer and exporter
remoteness are then multiplied before taking the natural logarithm.
82 Chapter4
4.4.2 Estimation on aggregate data
In our ﬁrst baseline speciﬁcation we replicate the closest study on the ITA, Bora and Liu
(2010) with our extended time coverage9
lnIijt = α(ITAExporter)ijt + β(ITAImporter)ijt+ δ(Non− ITAWTOImporter)ijt
+ θ(OneinWTO)ijt + γControlsijt + αij + yt (4.4.2)
where the ITA importer dummy only takes a value of one in case the exporter is a WTO
member; this is because the concessions of ITA are only guaranteed to the WTO members.
However it makes more sense to deﬁne the exporter ITA membership variable equal to one
simply when the exporter is an ITA member vis-a-vis any trading partner, not just WTO
or ITA members, as higher exports due to more technology transfer should not necessarily
only go to WTO (or other ITA) members.
We ﬁrst extend this model to test whether ITA exporters were really those who mainly
got the beneﬁts of signing the ITA, because IT industry relocated to these countries. We do
so by introducing instead a exporter-ITA participation dummy.
4.4.3 Product and tariﬀ controls
The empirical analysis on aggregate bilateral trade has a number of problems. In particular,
when assessing the impact of an agreement, sectors pooled together hide inside varying
impact of the agreement across sectors due to diﬀerences in elasticity, preference margins,
trade costs and etc. It follows that using product-level data has the advantage that it avoids
and aggregation bias, which may occur on account of trade costs or elasticities with respect
to these costs varying by products or groups of products. This has been acknowledged in the
literature (See Clausing (2001), Anderson and Yotov (2010b),Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2004), Anderson and Yotov (2010a)).
Thus we augment the baseline model to account for such diﬀerences by controlling for
country-pair-product and product-time ﬁxed eﬀects and import tariﬀs, obtaining direct es-
timate of the elasticity of tariﬀs.
9We report the results without the GDP per capita. The estimation with the GDP per capita is overall
very similar, albeit with slightly smaller trade creation magnitude. Overall, we get the message that GDP
per capita seems to work well in regressions without country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. There it picks up a propensity
for richer countries to trade more. However, it does not seem to be the case that large increases in income
between years translate in a straightforward way also into signiﬁcant increases in trade in those years.
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In light of our panel being unbalanced, traditional estimation would require that one
set of ﬁxed eﬀect dummies be held in memory. As each dummy would be more than 3
million observations long, computer memory constraints bind. Traditionally these constraints
implied that only one high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀect could be considered by transforming
the estimation equation (Greene (2003))10. Labor economists have devised solutions to
the challenges of multiple high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects, starting with approximations in
Abowd et al. (1999). Guimaraes and Portugal (2010) provide an iterative technique to obtain
exact estimates of equations with two high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects in a computationally
manageable way and we rely on their technique here11.
Once we control for tariﬀs, we can include the zero tariﬀ dummy as well. This dummy
quantiﬁes whether for IT products there was an additional impact of reducing tariﬀs to
zero. The intuition here is that reducing tariﬀs from 2 to 0% would have a bigger impact
than reducing them from 4 to 2%, because the reduction to 0% also implies that a lot of
bureaucratic hurdles in clearing customs will vanish  and there is a growing "time in trade"
literature12. The latter, as discussed above, is supposed to test the extent to which levying no
tariﬀ rather than a small positive tariﬀ reduces trade costs. This constitutes to the following
empirical speciﬁcation:
lnIijkt = µln(1 + tariﬀ) + λt0 + α(ITAExporter)jt + β(ITAImporter)ijt
+ δ(Non− ITAWTOImporter)ijt + θ(OneinWTO)ijt
+ γControlsijt + αijk + yt (4.4.3)
4.4.4 Addressing endogeneity
This strategy brings to our main speciﬁcations where we control for the reason for joining
the agreement, be it individual (endogenous participation) or through a larger package (ex-
ogenous participation). We distinguish the importer- and exporter-related ITA participation
variables across the two types of participants:
10In a balanced panel, two sets of ﬁxed eﬀects could be stripped algebraically.
11Their technique, available as Stata command reg2hdfe, relies on the notion that the matrices for the
computation of the coeﬃcient estimates are sparse and only identiﬁes non-zero entries. This reduces memory
constraints at the cost of higher computation time.
12Freund and Pierola (2012) show that customs clearings times have a big impact on trade.
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lnIijkt = µln(1 + tariﬀ) + λt0 + α1(ITAExporterInd)jt + β1(ITAImporterInd)ijt
+ α2(ITAExporterExog)jt + β2(ITAImporterExog)ijt + δ(Non− ITAWTOImporter)ijt
+ θ(OneinWTO)ijt + γControlsijt + αijk + yt (4.4.4)
4.4.5 Did joining the ITA lead to higher GVC participation in the
IT sector?
Here we assess the GVC participation in IT sector using the (Sturgeon and Memedovic, 2010)
data on mapping several sectors of HS2007 6-digit classiﬁcation into electronic components,
parts of electronic devices, and ﬁnal goods. Overall, 47 goods covered by the ITA in HS1996
classiﬁcation, were mapped into raw, intermediate and ﬁnal goods. We have split the sample
into intermediate (parts and components) and ﬁnal goods. This gives us an IT sector GVC
participation measure through trade in parts and components versus trade in ﬁnal goods.
Many of the countries that grouped as exogenous ITA participants are associated with
being oﬀshoring destination for manufacturing, especially for IT products. This phenomenon
is at the center of the global value chains discussions. According to that understanding, the
exogenous ITA participants, by oﬀering guaranteed duty-free imports to all WTO members,
could serve as promising oﬀshoring destinations. The hypothesis that follows from this is that
the exogenous ITA participants are expected to import more of the intermediate products
and export ﬁnal products. Similarly, the endogenous participants, many of which are high-
income countries with developed IT industries, are home to the companies that would be
oﬀshoring. Thus we would expect these countries to import less of the intermediate products
and more of the ﬁnal products.
4.4.6 Robustness check estimations
Zero trade ﬂows
All the estimations above contain only the positive trade ﬂows, ignoring the product
lines with no trade. Eliminating zero trade ﬂows by taking logs of the gravity equation had
crucial advantages in deriving our main results discussed above. Foremost, it allowed us
to introduce the two high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀect controls on an already very large dataset
of more than 3 million observations. This ensured that omitted variable bias is kept to a
minimum on product level data which can be subject to many unobserved determinants with
respect to importers, exporters, products, and time. Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) underscore
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the importance of adding such comprehensive ﬁxed eﬀect controls by calling their exclusion
the "gold metal mistake" of gravity estimation.
Nonetheless, we recognize that the existence of zero trade ﬂows is a pervasive problem in
log gravity equations, because it can induce selection bias (Helpman et al., 2008). The most
straightforward common way to handle this, and we will pursue it here, is to avoid taking
logs altogether, thereby preserving the zero trade ﬂows, and estimate the gravity equation in
multiplicative form using Poisson estimation as proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). We
will illustrate that results from such an estimation are broadly comparable to those obtained
by least squares on a log gravity equation. However as inclusion of zero trade lines makes
the size of dataset unworkably large. we switch from the HS 6-digit products to only having
the 7 groups of products (Computers, Instruments and apparatus, Semiconductors, Semi-
conductor manufacturing equipment, Data-storage media and software, Telecommunications
equipment, Parts and accessories)
Multilateral Resistance
Our main estimations addressed multilateral resistance through a combination of three
elements. First, country-pair-product ﬁxed eﬀects accounted for average multilateral resis-
tance patterns during the sample period. Second, we proxied for the time-varying element
of multilateral resistance through two instruments: inclusion of GDP, whose variation tends
to be associated with that of multilateral resistance Anderson and Yotov (2010b) and a
distance-based remoteness index. Latter two instruments can naturally only imperfectly
capture any time variation of multilateral resistance. We therefore implement in this sub-
section an alternative estimation strategy to account for multilateral resistance.
This alternative recognizes that the most common and often preferred way of control-
ling for multilateral resistance in the empirical literature is by including country-time or a
combination of importer-time and exporter-time eﬀects (e.g. Feenstra, 2002; Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2007). However, in our application including such eﬀects would eliminate most
of our explanatory variables of interest, which also only have variation in the country-time
dimension. In order to retain these variables, we thus follow some other authors by instead
adding a set of "country-period" dummies as a third set of ﬁxed eﬀects. Each period covers
either 4 or 5 years, giving us four of such periods for our sample.13 The assumption is that
13Our periods are 1996-2000, 2001-04, 2005-08 and 2009-12. Limiting ourselves to 4 periods keeps the
problem computationally manageable as these dummies need to be created in memory and added as dum-
mies into the reg2hdfe estimation routine of Guimaraes and Portugal (2010), which can only handle two sets
of ﬁxed eﬀects on its own. The division between the 2004-08 and 2009-12 periods is consciously chosen to
coincide with the great trade collapse induced by the global crisis, so as to obtain two relatively homoge-
neous periods. Other authors that have implemented such approach in a gravity setting are Bora and Liu
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multilateral resistance would not vary too considerably within such periods to introduce
serious bias into the estimation.14
4.5 Results
4.5.1 An initial benchmark: Bora and Liu (2010)
Bora and Liu (2010) (BL) have undertaken the, to our knowledge, most comprehensive
investigation of ITA trade impacts to date. We therefore start our results discussion from
their preferred speciﬁcation. BL conduct their estimation on aggregate data, i.e. their panel
dataset includes one observation per country-pair in each year with the total trade value in
ITA products. We repeat BL's results for comparison purposes at the beginning of table
4.3.15 They decompose the "Both in WTO" dummy, which is commonly used in studies on
the trade impact of joint WTO membership (Rose (2004) and subsequent literature), into
two dummies by whether the importing WTO member is also an ITA member or not.
By doing so, they can analyse trade creation and diversion of the ITA. BL ﬁnd that
countries experience trade creation from joining the ITA. After accession, they import 7.25
per cent (= exp(0.07) − 1) more from other WTO members. ITA preferences apply to
all WTO members on an MFN basis. WTO exporters, in light of these preferences, may
therefore have reoriented their exports toward ITA members and away from non-ITA WTO
importers. BL's estimates suggest that such trade diversion does occur with non-ITA WTO
importers now importing 6 per cent less. Taking these two estimates for ITA trade creation
and ITA trade diversion (within the WTO) together, BL conclude that a WTO member
should see its imports increase by 14% (=exp[0.07 − (−0.06)] − 1) upon joining the ITA.
We report this important linear combination of coeﬃcients throughout our tables below the
direct regression output.
In addition, BL ﬁnd that the WTO also diverts trade away from non-members, as high-
lighted by the "One in WTO" coeﬃcient; that RTAs boost bilateral trade substantially; but
they fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive impact of currency unions.
(2010), using biannual dummies in a robustness check, and Ruiz and Vilarrubia (2007) using triennial and
quinquennial dummies.
14We exclude the remoteness index from all our regressions including country-period eﬀects; its continued
inclusion would not aﬀect results.
15See Bora and Liu (2010), Table 2.3, column 2.
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Table 4.3: Aggregate Data: A benchmark and extension for ITA exporter eﬀects 3/
Time coverage of sample 1988-2003 1996-2012
Includes China's Exports Yes Yes No Yes No
Regression No. BL (2010) 4/ 1 2 3 4
ITA Exporter 0.404*** 0.312***
(17.31) (12.88)
ITA Importer 1/ 0.07* 0.422*** 0.156** 0.267*** 0.0478
(2.29) (8.49) (3.00) (5.29) (0.91)
Non-ITA WTO Importer 1/ −0.06* 0.235*** −0.105 0.0646 −0.224***
(−2.07) (4.57) (−1.95) (1.24) (−4.11)
One in WTO −0.16*** −0.00948 −0.184***−0.0598 −0.216***
(−5.11) (−0.21) (−3.96) (−1.35) (−4.66)
RTA 0.42*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.240*** 0.248***
(10.88) (11.20) (11.16) (9.90) (10.17)
Currency Union 0.48 0.293*** 0.264*** 0.266*** 0.245***
(0.59) (4.39) (3.96) (3.98) (3.67)
ln(Remoteness) 0.65 −1.176***−1.177***−1.216***−1.218***
(1.21) (−8.75) (−8.70) (−9.06) (−9.01)
ln(Importer GDP) −0.86*** 1.307*** 1.271*** 1.303*** 1.269***
(−6.79) (32.70) (31.46) (32.61) (31.41)
ln(Exporter GDP) 0.20 1.200*** 0.787*** 1.142*** 0.769***
(1.51) (27.21) (16.96) (25.84) (16.59)
Number of observations 133,352 173,124 170,657 173,124 170,657
R2 adjusted (per cent) 82.0 84.74 84.47 84.76 84.49
Linear combination of coeﬃcients: 2/
ITA Importer minus 0.13* 0.187*** 0.260*** 0.202*** 0.262***
Non-ITA WTO Importer (4.96) (6.97) (5.35) (6.97)
All regressions include country-pair and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
1/ ITA importer variables only take the value of one if exporter is a WTO member.
2/ The diﬀerence of these two variables  ITA trade creation and ITA trade diversion within the WTO  expresses how much
more ITA importers import compared to non-ITA WTO members. In other words, this would be the amount that a country,
which is already a WTO member, could expect to import more from other WTO members by joining the ITA. Statistical
signiﬁcance for the linear combination of coeﬃcients of Bora and Liu (2010) cannot be computed without access to their
dataset. However, it would seem likely that it might be signiﬁcant at the 5% level (which we assume here), given that the two
individual coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at this level.
3/ All regressions include country-pair and time ﬁxed eﬀects. * , ** , *** denote 5, 1, 0.1 per cent signiﬁcance levels. T-statistics
in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by country-pair combinations.
4/ Bora and Liu's (2010) preferred speciﬁcation (their Table 2.3, column 2). In addition, Bora and Liu also include (logs of)
importer and exporter GDP per capitas, a dummy variable for a formal alliance between countries and dummies for existence
of a GSP preference scheme, which we do not report in this table.
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4.5.2 An updated sample: A changing world economy and the rise
of China
To ensure comparability to BL, we also report our initial regressions on aggregate data.
Regression 1 is our closest analogue. It diﬀers mainly in terms of our updated sample,
covering 1996-2012 (versus BL's of 1988-2012).16 Our sample therefore covers many more
years of trade within the ITA after its establishment in 1997, including the rise of emerging
Asia and particularly China as IT production hubs.
The updated sample gives a markedly diﬀerent view of the ITA's impact. Contrary
to BL, our results do not show trade diversion. WTO members import 26 per cent more
IT products, as highlighted by the non-ITA importer coeﬃcient. ITA membership boosts
imports by a further 21 per cent.17 Also, we do not ﬁnd any trade diversion of the WTO.
With regards to currency union membership, we now ﬁnd it to be statistically signiﬁcant,
in line with much previous literature (again started by Rose, 2000), boosting trade similarly
as RTA membership by 30-35 per cent.18
16Apart from the diﬀerent sample coverage, the second main diﬀerence is that Bora and Liu maintain GDP
per capita regressors. Arguably, BL include them, because they start their analysis from speciﬁcations which
do not include country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. In regressions without country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects, such regressors can
serve a purpose, capturing that, from a cross-sectional perspective, richer countries trade more, for instance
to better transport connections and domestic infrastructure in addition to higher preference for variety.
However, as BL's estimates suggest that such relations do not hold within a country over the short time-frame
portrayed by the sample periods, country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects are included and thereby only variation across time
within any country-pair is considered. Their inclusion seems to capture eﬀects typically captured by GDPs,
as their coeﬃcients are diminished, even becoming negative for importers, while GDP per capita coeﬃcients
take very high values (1.96*** for importers and 1.16*** for exporters in BL's preferred regression). We
therefore do not include GDP per capita in our regressions, as we maintain country-pair (or more detailed)
ﬁxed eﬀects throughout to forestall possibly substantial omitted variable bias from unobservable country-pair
characteristics (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007). Dropping GDP per capita variables does not aﬀect our main
results, particularly on the impact of the ITA on exporters, and in later tables, the impact of tariﬀs and
zero tariﬀs. In the aggregate regressions of Table 4.3, however, exclusion of GDP per capita does increase
the magnitude of the ITA importer coeﬃcient by around 0.2. Furthermore there are a couple of further
minor diﬀerences of our regression 1 vis-a-vis BL. BL also include a couple of other variables which are not
commonly included in gravity equations and we therefore drop. These variables are dummies for political
alliances and for presence of a Generalized System of Preferences scheme. Any bias that could be introduced
by exclusion of the latter will be addressed by inclusion of the tariﬀ directly in our further analysis from
Table 4.4 forward.
17Equals exp(0.187)− 1. See the linear combination of coeﬃcients at the bottom of Table 4.3.
18It is furthermore noteworthy that (given that GDP per capita are not included) both our GDP coeﬃcients
take values close to unity as suggested by many theoretical models (e.g Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)).
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We follow BL by including remoteness in most of our regressions. To obtain a single
remoteness measures for any bilateral pair in the interest of parsimony, importer and ex-
porter remoteness are then multiplied before taking the natural logarithm. Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003) have highlighted the importance of controlling for "multilateral resis-
tance, i.e. general equilibrium eﬀects represented by a country's overall trade cost (with
the rest of the world in general). If a country faces relatively high overall trade costs, for
instance because it is very remote, it will trade more with the few trade partners that are
relatively proximate. We agree with Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) that a remoteness
index is not theoretically adequate to control for multilateral resistance, as it is only based
on distance, and overall trade costs are determined by various factors.19 Nonetheless it con-
stitutes a limited distance-based proxy, which can be valuable in applications such as ours,
where inclusion of more complete multilateral resistance controls has important drawbacks
in eliminating identifying variation; we will elaborate on this further below).Furthermore,
Anderson and Yotov (2010a) illustrate that multilateral resistance is correlated with country
size and therefore including GDPs as explanatory variables will likely address some of the
variation attributable to multilateral resistance.
In Regression 1, remoteness takes a statistically signiﬁcant negative sign. In presence of
the country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects, this implies that, when countries become more remote, they
will trade less on average.20 Coeﬃcients on remoteness remain negative and statistically
signiﬁcant in the vast majority of our regressions.
One of the main novelties of our dataset compared to BL is that it covers a substantial
period of time after China's ITA accession. This allows us to analyse to which extent China's
performance has diﬀered from that of other ITA members. As section II already highlighted,
China's importance in trade of ITA products has increased immensely on the export side, and
to a lesser extent on the import side.21 Interestingly, however, excluding China's imports
from the sample hardly changes results; in other words, in terms of its import behaviour
regarding ITA product, China does not act signiﬁcantly diﬀerently from other countries.22
However, on the export side, China has a substantial impact on results, i.e. its export
19For instance, a country that is proximate to many other countries that represent a signiﬁcant share of
the world economy could nonetheless face high overall trade costs, if it is politically and economically isolated
visavis those neighbouring countries.
20The remoteness index varies over time as the geographical composition of world GDP shifts. Thereby
countries close to Asia, for instance, have become less remote over time.
21Higher Chinese IT imports are partly also a result of its higher exports given its high integration into
supply chains.
22These results are not reported in the tables for space reasons. They are available from the authors upon
request.
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performance has been much diﬀerent from other countries. To analyse which results hold for
other ITA members and to gauge China's impact, we therefore present results for the whole
sample and the sample excluding China's exports side-by-side in all our tables.23
Regression 2 excludes China's exports. This implies that we are looking at ITA importer
coeﬃcients derived from an incomplete import sample, which is somewhat artiﬁcial from
the viewpoint of importers. However, from the viewpoint of non-Chinese exporters they
provide a notion of how much more sales can be expected to these importer groups. The
ITA importer coeﬃcient is now much lower, signalling that much of ITA members' increased
imports originated from China. There is also some weak evidence that exporters are di-
verting shipments away from non-ITA WTO importers. Meanwhile, China deﬁes this trend,
exporting strongly to non-ITA WTO members.24 The same is true for non-WTO members,
from which WTO members deviate trade away, while China aggressively orients its exports
also toward these countries.25 On the whole, the Regression 2 results are much closer to the
BL speciﬁcation, which seems intuitive, because BL's sample excludes much of China's rise
to being a powerful exporter of IT products. On the ﬂipside, this suggests that when imports
from China are disregarded, import patterns have not changed as much since BL's sample
end in 2003. However, we still estimate that a country joining the ITA would increase its
imports from countries other than China by 30 per cent  more than double BL's estimate.
4.5.3 How does the ITA boost trade: Peeling away the layers
We posit that there may be various layers to the ITA's impact on trade. As their quan-
tiﬁcation requires tariﬀ data, these can hardly be quantiﬁed in aggregate data, requiring
product-level data instead. We hold that the ITA's impact on imports may be three-layered
and there may also be a fourth layer operating through ITA members' exports.
The three layers on the import side are the following. First, the ITA may boost imports
by reducing tariﬀs. Introducing tariﬀs directly as an explanatory variable in the estimation
will identify this impact.
Second, reducing tariﬀs to zero may have an additional impact on imports beyond tariﬀ
reduction. Reducing the tariﬀ to zero implies that there might less transaction and admin-
istrative costs related to clearing customs and have a positive impact on trade (e.g. Freund
23This can of course also be seen as an ongoing ﬁrst robustness test of our results.
24This interpretation results from the decrease in the "Non-ITA WTO importer" coeﬃcient from Regres-
sion 1 to Regression 2.
25This interpretation results from the decrease in the "One in WTO" coeﬃcient from Regression 1 to
Regression 2.
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and Pierola (2012)). However one must note that in the case of ITA these gains could be
smaller due to complexities of product coverage of ITA.
Third, the ITA may have a further positive trade impact apart from tariﬀ reductions.
This is suggested by the literature positing that trade policy uncertainty has an impact on
investment and entry decisions of ﬁrms, including through ﬁrm location (Handley and Limao
(2012) and Handley and Limão (2013)), which in light of global production sharing depend
increasingly on importers.
This last layer may apply also on the export side. It is well documented that the IT sector
(see Milberg and Winkler (2013) chapter 2 for analysis of US economy) is among those most
strongly characterized by global production sharing. Given that in global production chains,
imports are crucial inputs, particularly for downstream ﬁrms, the trade policy certainty
inherent in ITA membership can be positive for exports.
We proceed in reverse in introducing these layers into the estimation, starting from the
exporter side. This is because an ITA exporter dummy (for the fourth layer) can also be
added already to speciﬁcations on aggregate data.26 Obtaining an estimate of the exporter
impact on aggregate data is useful for comparison purposes, because such aggregation may
reduce noise inherent in disaggregate product level data.
Regressions 3 and 4 suggest that this ITA impact on exports may indeed by positive and
strong  a 50 per cent boost in exports for all ITA members and a 37 per cent boost for ITA
exporters other than China  with estimates highly statistically signiﬁcant. These export
boosts are across all importers on average. In addition, imports by ITA members also remain
higher, but mainly on account of exports from China, as the comparison between the two
regressions highlights.27
Table 4.4 uses product-level data, which allows quantiﬁcation all four layers of ITA trade
impacts. Fixed eﬀect controls consequently generalize to country-pair-product to also ac-
count for any product-speciﬁc characteristics in bilateral relationships. Likewise, the time
ﬁxed eﬀects generalize to product-time to account for any global shocks to trade in diﬀerent
products.28
26Unlike the ITA importer dummy, the ITA exporter dummy will take the value of "1" for all ITA exporter
observations, regardless if the importer is WTO member or not. Making the dummy's value dependent on
an importer's status would not make sense as any barriers to exporting from a country would not vary
depending on such status. The same applies consequently to any potential exporter analogue to the trade
diversion variable on the import side ("Non-ITA WTO importer" in Table 4.3).
27Evidence in Regression 4 also suggests that exporters other than China are diverting away shipments
from non-ITA importers, but this result does not hold up in later speciﬁcations.
28Evidence in Regression 4 also suggests that exporters other than China are diverting away shipments
from non-ITA importers, but this result does not hold up in later speciﬁcations.
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Table 4.4: Product-level data: The layers of ITA trade creation
Includes China's Exports Yes No Yes No
Regression No. 5 6 7 8
ITA Exporter 0.349*** 0.0767*** 0.362*** 0.0886***
(26.54) (4.82) (23.95) (4.77)
ln(1+tariﬀ) −0.248** −0.198*
(−2.77) (−2.17)
Zero tariﬀ 0.108*** 0.105***
(19.78) (18.99)
ITA Importer 1/ 0.317*** 0.168*** 0.343*** 0.243***
(15.87) (8.29) (14.14) (9.81)
Non-ITA WTO Importer 1/ 0.227*** 0.0525* 0.337*** 0.198***
(10.91) (2.47) (13.33) (7.71)
One in WTO 0.00710 −0.0231 0.0725** 0.0786***
(0.38) (−1.25) (3.18) (3.44)
RTA 0.0640*** 0.0846*** 0.0475*** 0.0742***
(6.38) (8.31) (3.89) (5.98)
Currency Union 0.178*** 0.168*** 0.137*** 0.128***
(9.40) (8.86) (7.22) (6.72)
ln(remoteness) −0.314*** −0.586*** −0.192* −0.447***
(−4.81) (−8.89) (−2.43) (−5.60)
ln(Importer GDP) 0.956*** 0.897*** 1.104*** 1.031***
(45.72) (42.46) (39.28) (36.16)
ln(Exporter GDP) 1.439*** 0.517*** 1.417*** 0.537***
(55.96) (17.83) (47.00) (15.64)
Number of observations 3,216,747 3,100,247 2,477,294 2,386,043
R2 adjusted (per cent) 74.58 74.24 76.39 76.02
Linear combination of coeﬃcients: 2/
ITA Importer minus 0.090*** 0.116*** 0.007 0.044***
Non-ITA WTO Importer (9.28) (11.75) (0.55) (3.57)
All regressions include country-pair-product and product-time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Notes 1/ and 2/, see Table 2. Note 3/ of Table 2 also applies.
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Results experience some important changes when we use product-level data and subse-
quently allow for diﬀerent layers of impacts in the import side by introducing tariﬀs and the
zero tariﬀ dummy.
First, purely moving to product-level data mutes ITA exporter trade impacts for countries
other than China. Joining the ITA increases these countries' exports by about 8-9 per cent
across all importers (Regressions 6 and 8). Yet, some additional impact for these exporters is
now contained in the ITA importer and non-ITAWTO importer coeﬃcients, which rise across
speciﬁcations. These export boosts are accessible to all WTO members, however, regardless
of ITA membership. To see this, recall that these two dummies are a decomposition of a
"Both in WTO" dummy. When the non-ITA WTO importer coeﬃcient becomes positive
as in table 4.4, its interpretation changes from ITA trade diversion (within the WTO) to
WTO trade creation. The additional impact of ITA accession on imports  expressed by the
diﬀerence between the ITA importer and non-ITA WTO importer coeﬃcients  is meanwhile
much diminished (see bottom of table 4.4).29
Second, when tariﬀs and the zero tariﬀ dummy are introduced directly into estimation,
the ITA importer eﬀect in fact disappears completely (Regression 7). However, it is crucial
to highlight that after these additional variables are included, the interpretation of the ITA
importer eﬀect changes: It now quantiﬁes only the third layer of ITA trade creation, i.e.
beneﬁts over and above those of tariﬀ reductions and setting the tariﬀ to zero, for instance
those related to trade policy certainty. Thus, that the ITA importer eﬀect in Regression 7
"peels away" completely suggests that for importers ITA accession's beneﬁts are exclusively
related to the tariﬀ reductions and "zeroing" of tariﬀs that the agreement institutes.30 Not
surprisingly, exporter impacts stays the same in response to introducing tariﬀs and zero
tariﬀs, because these really only decompose eﬀects related to the importer side.
Our tariﬀ coeﬃcient signals that each one percentage point reduction in tariﬀs would
result in an import increase of 0.25 per cent, i.e. an import demand elasticity of -0.25. This
is low relative to most import demand elasticities reported in the literature and derived based
on aggregate trade (rather than ITA products). For instance, Kee et al. (2008) and Tokarick
(2014) estimate such elasticities for many diﬀerent countries and come up with averages in
the range of -1.1 to -1.2. Only an earlier study by Senhadji (1998) is relatively close to our
value, at -0.32.
29This is shown by the linear combination of the ITA importer trade creation and diversion coeﬃcients,
reported at the bottom of all regression tables.
30Recall that odd-numbered regressions, which include Chinese exports, are the relevant ones from im-
porters' perspective, as they cover all imports.
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The reason for this divergence seems to be that the impact of tariﬀ reductions on import
demand seems to be highly non-linear. Reducing tariﬀs to zero has an immense impact on
imports, boosting them by over 11 per cent. Thus, making the last eﬀort to reduce small
tariﬀs, say from 1 to 0 per cent, will bring double the impact than reducing a high tariﬀ by 20
percentage points without reaching zero. The big deal about the ITA is therefore that it gets
tariﬀs down to zero. That there is an additional impact of zeroing the tariﬀ seems intuitive,
because zero tariﬀs reduce border formalities considerably. In our view, these results have a
broader signiﬁcance than the IT sector. We believe that it would seem reasonable to expect
such non-linearity also in other sectors, particularly in light of aforementioned literature
on trading costs, as well as the large empirical literature on preferential trade agreements
(PTAs). The large PTA trade impacts often found in the latter literature also suggest that
there may be additional impacts of reducing tariﬀs to zero, as many of these agreements do.
With regards to policy, these results make strong cases for countries (i) to expand the ITA's
product coverage through an ITA 2 agreement, (ii) to pursue further zero-for-zero sectoral
agreements and/or (iii) unilateral, non-discriminatory, tariﬀ reductions to zero. There is a
particularly strong case for reducing those tariﬀs to zero that are already small
In concluding our discussion of Table 4.4, we note a few other interesting changes in these
product-level results. Any evidence of WTO trade diversion disappears. If anything, trade
between WTO and non-WTO members is higher than that between two non-WTO members
 by an order of 8 per cent. The magnitudes of RTAs' and currency unions' eﬀects on trade
are diminished to 8 and 16 per cent, respectively. These smaller eﬀects are maintained in our
further speciﬁcations going forward. These results are retained, as we continue to introduce
further reﬁnements.
4.5.4 Exogenous versus individual joiners
We next explore whether impacts of the ITA were diﬀerent among individual and exoge-
nous joiners. Recall that the graphical evidence in section II pointed to higher impacts for
exogenous exporters. To explore this comprehensively, we split both the ITA importer and
exporter dummies into individual and exogenous joiners. Regressions 9 and 10 in Table 4.5
present the results.
Among exporters, indeed exogenous ITA joiners seem to be the only ones proﬁting from
accession. The average exogenous joiner increases its exports by about 14 per cent (Re-
gression 10), when China is disregarded, whose out-performance persists throughout our
estimates. Exports of individual joiners, on the other hand, experience a statistically signif-
icant 7 per cent decrease with China partly crowding out their exports (Regression 9). This
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Table 4.5: A natural experiment to control for endogeneity
Goods type All goods Intermed. Goods 5/ Final goods 5/
China's Exp. Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Reg. No. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Individual −0.0752*** 0.00602 −0.0739** −0.00126 −0.0253 0.0604 −0.109** −0.0801*
ITA Exporter (−3.32) (0.25) (−3.25) (−0.05) (−0.59) (1.32) (−2.94) (−2.04)
Exogenous 0.480*** 0.128*** 0.429*** 0.0177 0.393*** 0.0597 0.507*** 0.0808*
ITA Exporter (26.56) (5.55) (23.41) (0.75) (12.17) (1.48) (16.05) (2.01)
ln(1+tariﬀ) −0.262** −0.185* −0.347*** −0.296** −0.116 −0.142 −0.677***−0.560***
(−2.92) (−2.03) (−3.87) (−3.25) (−0.66) (−0.80) (−4.18) (−3.41)
Zero tariﬀ 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.0709*** 0.0683***
(19.13) (18.61) (18.60) (18.09) (12.90) (12.77) (7.81) (7.37)
Individual 0.290*** 0.173*** 0.336*** 0.393*** 0.405*** 0.448*** 0.339*** 0.437***
ITA Imp. 1/ (10.84) (6.23) (10.58) (12.35) (6.76) (7.36) (6.13) (7.98)
Exogenous 0.327*** 0.269*** 0.349*** 0.381*** 0.478*** 0.497*** 0.347*** 0.380***
ITA Imp. 1/ (12.78) (10.36) (13.02) (14.13) (9.59) (9.84) (7.54) (8.23)
Non-ITA 0.293*** 0.191*** 0.325*** 0.340*** 0.446*** 0.453*** 0.265*** 0.281***
WTO Imp. 1/ (11.58) (7.41) (11.55) (12.02) (8.43) (8.47) (5.43) (5.76)
One in 0.0669** 0.0723** 0.0702** 0.101*** 0.0656 0.0907* 0.181*** 0.207***
WTO (2.93) (3.16) (3.12) (4.50) (1.61) (2.20) (4.45) (5.16)
Exporter late −0.0357 −0.256*** −0.0468 −0.249*** −0.0265 −0.294***
WTO joiner 3/ (−1.32) (−8.85) (−0.94) (−4.70) (−0.57) (−6.03)
Exporter late 0.480*** 0.665*** 0.376*** 0.534*** 0.823*** 1.013***
EU joiner 4/ (16.69) (23.12) (7.31) (10.39) (16.49) (20.32)
Exporter late −0.116 0.0860 −0.0686 0.133 0.0178 0.229
US-FTA joiner 4/ (−1.58) (1.18) (−0.53) (1.05) (0.15) (1.94)
No. obs. 2,477,294 2,386,043 2,477,294 2,386,043 680,728 658,002 825,203 793,820
R2 adj. (%) 76.40 76.02 76.41 76.05 79.26 78.90 74.24 73.71
Linear combinations of coeﬃcients: 2/
Indiv. ITA Im. −0.003 −0.018 0.010 0.052*** −0.041 0.005 0.074** 0.156***
- non-ITA WTO Im. (−0.21) (−1.14) (−0.63) (3.21) (−1.36) (−0.16) (2.57) (5.49)
Exog. ITA Im. 0.034* 0.078*** 0.023 0.041* 0.032 0.044 0.082** 0.099***
- non-ITA WTO Im. (2.27) (5.00) (1.49) (2.56) (1.08) (1.44) (3.08) (3.67)
All regressions include country-pair-product and product-time ﬁxed eﬀects. They also include the standard gravity variables
as in Table 2 before (coeﬃcients not reported). Notes 1/ and 2/, see Table 2. Note 3/ of Table 2 also applies. 3/ Takes the
value of one for all exporters that acceeded to WTO after 1997. 4/ Takes the value for exports of "1" for intra-EU trade (after
accession) of all countries that joined the EU after 1997. Analogously for US FTA. 5/ Intermediate/ﬁnal goods classiﬁcation
based on that developed for electronics by Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010). Unfortunately, their classiﬁcation only covers about
half of our ITA products, resulting in a loss of usable observations in these regressions.
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is intuitive in view of China's strongly rising and (individual joiners' strongly falling) market
share in world IT export markets during our sample period, as illustrated in Section II.
One explanation why only exogenous joiners may gain from ITA accession may be based
on political economy considerations.31 Many individual joiners may have already had an es-
tablished domestic IT industry, which lobbied them to join; thereby their decision to pursue
ITA membership as a policy objective in and out of itself. Through ITA membership, the
domestic IT industry in these countries realized cost savings through lower trade costs, which
in this highly competitive industry may have been at least partly passed on to consumers.32
As a result, export value did not rise much. Exogenous joiners, on the other hand, more
likely did not yet have a domestic IT sector (because they joined the ITA mainly to achieve
another broader policy objective). As a result, ITA membership and increased ease of im-
porting may have led to the development of a domestic IT sector, which took to exporting.
ITA membership may have been a particularly important catalyst in these cases, because
countries which are only starting to develop their capabilities tend to initially integrate in
downstream production stages such as manufacturing and assembly, where access to imports
is very important (Gereﬃ et al., 2005; Park et al., 2013).
Returning to the results of Regressions 9 and 10, we note that not much changes on the
import side. The impacts of tariﬀ reductions, in general and to zero, remain on the same
order as before. ITA accession does not increase imports compared to other WTO importers,
neither for individual nor for exogenous joiners.33
We point out here again that exogenous joiners approximate a natural experiment, having
joined the ITA to a signiﬁcant extent as a by-product of a broader policy objective. The
results of Regressions 9 and 10 therefore also shed light also on whether endogeneity bias
may be a concern mainly in the estimates for the individual joiners. As Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) rightly highlight, joining a trade agreement is a policy decision, which may more likely
be taken aﬃrmatively if a country produces a lot of the products covered by the prospective
agreement. In this case, estimates could be biased upwards and we agree with the authors'
recommendation to incorporate country-pair-product ﬁxed eﬀects, in our case as controls, to
limit such bias. But incorporation of such ﬁxed eﬀects may not suﬃce if individual joiners
accede to the ITA, because they can already foresee that their production and exports of ITA
31See Grossman and Helpman (1994) and subsequent literature on the political economy of trade policy.
32Hallak and Schott (2011) for instance, show that Malaysia, whose exports are heavily concentrated in
electronics, needs to upgrade the quality of its exports at a fast pace only to maintain the price of its exports
constant.
33To be exact, there is an economically small impact of 3 Â½ per cent in Regression 9 for imports of
exogenous joiners, but it is less statistically signiﬁcant and does not hold up as we move to Regression 11.
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products will rise disproportionately in the future. For this case our individual/exogenous
split serves a distinct purpose. That estimates for exogenous joiners are higher throughout
than those for individual ones, suggests that endogeneity bias is not a big concern for latter
countries, for which  in contrast to the exogenous joiners  it is hard to rule out such reverse
causation.
We now present a second robustness check, which (along the sample split to exclude
China) is directly incorporated into our main analysis. Indeed this robustness check is
suﬃciently important that we consider the resulting Regressions 11 and 12 our preferred
speciﬁcations covering all ITA goods. This check questions whether the export increases
identiﬁed for exogenous joiners were really due to ITA accession, or whether they were
caused by achievement of the broader policy objective, i.e. WTO accession, EU accession,
or accession to an FTA with the United States.
We control for this by including three additional variables. The ﬁrst is a WTO member-
ship dummy, which is one for the exports of all countries that joined the WTO late, i.e. after
1997. The research by Tang and Wei (2009) suggest that WTO accession for such late joiners
often included far-reaching reforms. To the extent that thereby WTO accession (unrelated
to the ITA) had a bigger eﬀect on their trade than for earlies WTO joiners, it would not be
correctly picked up in the regression and could bias the ITA exogenous exporter coeﬃcient
upwards.34 The second variable is a dummy for exports to other EU members after EU
accession for those countries that joined the EU after 1997. Because EU members are also
ITA members, this variable helps avoid that intra-EU trade creation is identiﬁed as ITA
trade creation. The third variable is an U.S. FTA analogue to this EU late joiner dummy. It
is one for the exports to the United States of those countries that have joined an FTA with
the U.S. after 1997. It can be necessary to avoid bias if some RTAs' trade impact diﬀers
from that that of RTAs on average, as captured by the RTA dummy. Such heterogeneous
impacts are suggested by some of the empirical literature analysing trade impacts of many
individual RTAs (e.g. Eicher et al., 2011).
In Regressions 11 and 12, we add these three additional dummies. As these dummies
speak to export, we note that, as expected, the results on imports including tariﬀ and zero
tariﬀ elasticities remain the same. Inclusion of the 3 additional dummies, however, shows
that intra-EU trade in IT products is substantially higher. And some of this impact was
attributed to the ITA exogenous exporter eﬀect previously. Thus, as a result of including
34In Table 4.5, this would be picked up by the combination of the individual and exogenous ITA importer
and non-ITAWTO importer dummies, which, as pointed out previously, together make up a "Both in WTO"
dummy.
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these additional eﬀects, the exogenous ITA exporter eﬀect vanishes for countries other than
China  but only for the moment.
4.5.5 Intermediate versus ﬁnal goods
The literature on global value chains highlights that diﬀerent countries occupy diﬀerent
positions in these chains with some (upstream) countries focusing on the production of
intermediate components while other countries are more engaged in downstream stages in-
cluding assembly (see Park et al., 2013 for a comprehensive review of this literature). It
is therefore likely that impact of ITA membership diﬀer depending on a country's position
in these supply chains. We therefore rerun our preferred regressions on separate samples
only containing intermediate and ﬁnal goods, respectively. The classiﬁcation of electronics
products by Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010), which is set to become part of an updated
BEC classiﬁcation, allows us to classify half of our HS 6-digit ITA product lines into these
two categories and retain over 60 per cent of our observations.35
The results are presented in Regressions 13-16. As expected, the exogenous ITA exporter
dummy regains statistical signiﬁcance in the ﬁnal goods regressions, signaling an 8 per cent
increase in exports for downstream countries in response to ITA membership. This seems
intuitive, given that these countries rely highly on imports for production of their exports;
therefore a liberal and certain trade regime as created by ITA accession will bring the most
beneﬁts for these countries.
ITA accession has just a single-layered eﬀect on intermediate goods imports, but three-
layered eﬀects on ﬁnal goods imports. First, a one percentage point tariﬀ reduction stimulates
ﬁnal goods imports by 0.7 per cent, closer to the import demand elasticities by Kee et al.
(2008) and Tokarick (2014) cited above.
Second, zero tariﬀs have favourable trade impacts for both intermediate and ﬁnal goods
imports, intermediate goods double those of ﬁnal goods (14 versus 7 per cent). This is also
intuitive from a supply chain perspective: Being able to bypass transaction and administra-
tive costs inherent in border formalities is most trade-enhancing for downstream countries,
which rely heavily on imported inputs.
Third, ITA members, whether individual or exogenous, also import 8 per cent more ﬁnal
goods imports than non-ITA WTO members  above and beyond the impact of tariﬀ reduc-
tions. With tariﬀ costs borne by consumers in these countries, ITA membership seems to be
35The other half of ITA product lines are not covered by the Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010) classiﬁ-
cation either because they are not electronics or because they cannot be identiﬁed as being predominantly
intermediate or ﬁnal goods.
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valuable in assuring durable absence of zero tariﬀs. Thereby it may motivate deeper invest-
ments by exporters in distribution and marketing in ITA countries (given that continuity
in competitive position is assured not to suddenly change in response to tariﬀ increases).
This may then in turn explain deviation of more ﬁnal products by exporters toward ITA
importers.
4.6 Robustness
Alongside our main results, we already incorporated two robustness checks, for China's ex-
ceptionalism and for WTO, EU, and U.S. FTA trade creation among late accession countries
to such agreements. This section adds a further two robustness checks to address economet-
ric concerns: First, we address the issue of zero trade ﬂow observations. Second, we consider
an alternative way of controlling for multilateral resistance.
4.6.1 Zero trade ﬂows
To be able to ensure that non-linear Poisson estimation achieves convergence in our appli-
cation, we need to ﬁrst improve its tractability in various ways. We start by reducing the
number of observations in our data set in two ways. First, we aggregate the data along
the 7 broad product categories of World Trade Organization (2012) described in section II.
Second, we eliminate all countries that do not account for at least 0.25 per cent of world
trade in either imports of exports in at least one of the seven product categories in 2010.
This reduces the number of countries by half to 112, while still retaining more than 97 per
cent of world trade in the sample. In addition, we need to simplify the dimensionality of the
ﬁxed eﬀects. We therefore substitute time ﬁxed eﬀects for the more detailed product-time
controls.
We start in Table 4.6 by presenting least squares analogues to our preferred speciﬁcations
11 and 12, which only incorporate the changes in ﬁxed eﬀects while maintaining the 6-digit
product disaggregation (Regressions 17 and 18). Coeﬃcient estimates remain very similar
throughout, suggesting that global shocks are relatively symmetric across ITA products.36
Regressions 19 and 20 then incorporate in addition the aggregation into product cate-
gories and reduction in the number of countries. As also noted before, when we moved from
aggregate to product-level data, the estimates now change a bit more. However, they remain
36 Regressions 11 and 12 with the product-time ﬁxed eﬀects are, however, statistically preferred at higher
than the 0.1 per cent level based on F-statistics.
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Table 4.6: Robustness I: Addressing zero trade ﬂows with Poisson estimation
Estimation technique Least Squares Poisson
Data disaggregation 6-digit products Prod. Categories 5/ Prod. Categories 5/
Zero trade ﬂows No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes China's Exports Yes No Yes No Yes No
Regression No. 17 18 19 20 21 22
Individual ITA Exporter −0.134*** −0.0820*** −0.0360 −0.0159 −0.629*** −0.901***
(−5.83) (−3.36) (−0.62) (−0.26) (−5.30) (−5.57)
Exogenous ITA Exporter 0.413*** 0.0580* 0.315*** 0.162* 0.783*** 0.245
(21.79) (2.41) (5.38) (2.22) (8.35) (1.58)
ln(1+tariﬀ) −0.416*** −0.356*** −1.576*** −1.545*** −3.855*** −3.492***
(−4.47) (−3.77) (−4.78) (−4.56) (−4.26) (−3.71)
Zero tariﬀ 0.0669*** 0.0672*** −0.176*** −0.172*** −0.215** −0.238***
(12.02) (11.82) (−6.41) (−6.12) (−3.21) (−3.31)
Individual ITA Importer 1/ 0.333*** 0.377*** 0.390*** 0.401*** 0.0116 −0.0349
(10.16) (11.52) (4.00) (3.99) (0.08) (−0.21)
Exogenous ITA Importer 1/ 0.350*** 0.379*** 0.489*** 0.437*** 0.794*** 0.827***
(12.73) (13.70) (6.30) (5.47) (5.24) (5.31)
Non-ITA WTO Importer 1/ 0.318*** 0.331*** 0.459*** 0.414*** 0.396*** 0.394***
(11.01) (11.40) (5.29) (4.69) (3.54) (3.46)
One in WTO 0.0674** 0.0933*** 0.106 0.0354 0.0565 0.0746
(2.91) (4.02) (1.52) (0.49) (0.52) (0.66)
Exporter late WTO joiner 3/ −0.0793** −0.277*** −0.100 −0.189 0.194 0.174
(−2.81) (−9.10) (−1.13) (−1.95) (1.15) (0.88)
Exporter late EU joiner 4/ 0.518*** 0.682*** 1.307*** 1.372*** 0.955*** 1.187***
(17.61) (23.16) (16.64) (17.39) (5.74) (8.70)
Exporter late US-FTA joiner 4/ −0.110 0.0681 −0.0275 0.0156 −0.556 −0.478
(−1.43) (0.90) (−0.12) (0.07) (−1.95) (−1.67)
Number of observations 2,477,294 2,386,043 230,386 224,840 262,011 256,240
R2 adjusted (per cent) 75.39 75.03 84.30 83.92 N/A N/A
Linear combinations of coeﬃcients: 2/
Individual ITA Importer minus 0.015 0.046** −0.069 −0.014 −0.385*** −0.426***
non-ITA WTO Importer (0.86) (2.69) (−1.39) (−0.26) (−4.18) (−3.88)
Exogenous ITA Importer minus 0.031 0.048** 0.030 0.022 0.398*** 0.432***
non-ITA WTO Importer (1.93) (2.90) (0.50) (0.36) (4.13) (4.41)
All regressions include the standard gravity variables as in Table 2 before (coeﬃcients not
reported). They also include country-pair-product and time ﬁxed eﬀects. While the time
ﬁxed eﬀects regressions 17 and 18 are statistically rejected in favor of the product-time ﬁxed
eﬀects of our analog preferred speciﬁcations (Regressions 11 and 12) at the 0.1 percent level
or higher by F-Statistics, Poisson estimation does not achieve convergence in the presence
of the high dimensional product-time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Notes 1/ and 2/, see Table 2. Notes 3/ and 4/, see Table 4. Note 3/ of Table 2 also applies.
5/ For these regressions the dataset is collapsed to the 7 broad ITA product categories
described in Section II. In addition all countries are dropped which do not make up at least
0.25 per cent of either world imports or exports within at least one of these categories; this
reduces the number of countries to 112 (from 235), while retaining more than 97 percent of
global trade. This reduction in the dimensionality of the dataset is necessary in order to
include zero trade ﬂows, while still allowing the Poisson estimation to converge. In these
regressions the Zero tariﬀ variable, instead of being a 0-1 dummy, describes the fraction of
product tariﬀ lines within the category in which the tariﬀ is zero. Thus, it takes values
between 0 and 1.
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broadly comparable. Mainly, the elasticity of tariﬀ reductions rises considerably, while the
zero tariﬀ dummy now carries a little intuitive negative sign.
Regressions 21 and 22 then repeat the exact exercise using Poisson estimation. We ﬁnd
that magnitudes of some coeﬃcients, and in a few instances their statistical signiﬁcance,
can indeed vary somewhat. We, however, take comfort that the general pattern of results
remains the same with respect to the four layers of ITA eﬀects, which are our main focus.
One drawback of regressions 21 and 22 as robustness checks is that ultimately only about
12 per cent of their sample consists of zero trade ﬂows. The culprits behind this are the tariﬀ
data, which are missing for many of those zero trade observations. Therefore, Annex Table
4.8 repeats regressions 19-22 without the tariﬀ regressors, which increases the fraction of zero
observations to about one third of the sample. Reassuringly, the general pattern of results
again remains comparable between the least squares and Poisson regressions.
4.6.2 Multilateral resistance
This subsection presents results from an estimation strategy to account for multilateral
resistance that includes a set of "country-period" dummies as another set of ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our identiﬁcation relies on time variation. The obvious drawback of introducing the country-
period dummies is therefore that we curtail our identifying variation. A concrete example is
useful to illustrate this point. Vietnam joined the ITA in 2006. In our baseline estimation,
we therefore identify the ITA impacts for Vietnam by comparing its trade during 1996-2005
to that of 2006-12. Introduction of the country-period eﬀects implies that the comparison is
now shortened to 2005 versus 2006-2008. Thus, to the extent that (i) ITA impacts build over
longer periods of time, as the graphs in Section II suggest or (ii) trade ﬂows are volatile, as
is typically the case in product-level data or (iii) 2005 was an abnormal year for Vietnam's
ITA trade, we run the risk of obtaining misleading estimates.
Table 4.7 presents the results. It is an exact analogue to Table 4.5 with added country-
period eﬀects. As expected, the magnitudes of most all coeﬃcients are muted against the
background of the reduced identifying variation. The main exception is the zero tariﬀ coef-
ﬁcient, which suﬀers from less of such a loss as it is also driven non-ITA members that have
reduced tariﬀs to zero on certain products. However, a few eﬀects that were closer to zero or
less statistically signiﬁcant in our baseline results now become insigniﬁcant. These include
for instance the 8 per cent ITA exogenous exporter impact in ﬁnal goods of Regression 16,
which is now negated. Most importantly, however, the pattern of results resembles other-
wise very closely the one of Table 4.5, albeit with smaller magnitudes and some reductions
in statistical signiﬁcance. We therefore draw much comfort from this robustness check and
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look forward to exploring further alternatives to control for multilateral resistance in future
work.37
37Yet other alternatives to control for multilateral resistance would be to introduce a control sector of
non-ITA products and then rely on between-product variation within any year and country pair to identify
ITA trade impacts. Yet another option may be to apply the approximation method of Baier and Bergstrand
(2007).
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Table 4.7: Robustness II: Addressing multilateral resistance using country-period eﬀects
Goods type All goods Intermed. Goods 5/ Final goods 5/
China's Exp. Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Reg. No. 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Individual −0.0554* −0.000232 −0.0469* 0.00585 −0.00150 0.0641 −0.0872* −0.0732
ITA Exporter (−2.56) (−0.01) (−2.16) (0.25) (−0.04) (1.48) (−2.48) (−1.93)
Exogenous 0.232*** 0.00669 0.190*** −0.0731** 0.173*** −0.0339 0.249*** −0.0522
ITA Exporter (13.57) (0.30) (10.91) (−3.14) (5.65) (−0.86) (8.40) (−1.32)
ln(1+tariﬀ) −0.0640 −0.0144 −0.0619 −0.0171 −0.480* −0.377 0.151 0.0962
(−0.65) (−0.14) (−0.63) (−0.17) (−2.43) (−1.88) (0.84) (0.53)
Zero tariﬀ 0.0790*** 0.0800*** 0.0792*** 0.0806*** 0.0974*** 0.101*** 0.0590*** 0.0576***
(14.32) (14.18) (14.35) (14.28) (9.57) (9.72) (6.43) (6.14)
Individual 0.114*** 0.180*** 0.0531 0.204*** 0.152* 0.299*** 0.0854 0.298***
ITA Imp. 1/ (4.15) (6.39) (1.63) (6.08) (2.46) (4.57) (1.53) (5.33)
Exogenous 0.0857** 0.157*** 0.0533 0.176*** 0.149** 0.270*** 0.0868 0.250***
ITA Imp. 1/ (3.18) (5.76) (1.89) (6.10) (2.78) (4.75) (1.82) (5.22)
Non-ITA 0.116*** 0.166*** 0.0634* 0.179*** 0.219*** 0.329*** 0.0233 0.195***
WTO Imp. 1/ (4.41) (6.25) (2.15) (5.85) (3.90) (5.48) (0.46) (3.81)
One in 0.101*** 0.107*** 0.0798*** 0.104*** 0.0551 0.0661 0.182*** 0.214***
WTO (4.41) (4.58) (3.56) (4.58) (1.38) (1.63) (4.59) (5.36)
Exporter late 0.0697* −0.0264 0.0691 −0.0273 0.101* −0.0580
WTO joiner 3/ (2.47) (−0.82) (1.34) (−0.46) (2.12) (−1.10)
Exporter late 0.377*** 0.491*** 0.175*** 0.277*** 0.702*** 0.822***
EU joiner 4/ (12.81) (16.56) (3.31) (5.21) (13.86) (16.13)
Exporter late 0.00444 0.119 0.120 0.227 0.0662 0.205
US-FTA joiner 4/ (0.06) (1.66) (0.99) (1.89) (0.56) (1.72)
No. obs. 2,477,294 2,386,043 2,477,294 2,386,043 680,728 658,002 825,203 793,820
R2 adj. (%) 76.40 76.02 76.41 76.05 79.26 78.90 74.24 73.71
Linear combinations of coeﬃcients: 2/
Indiv. ITA Im. −0.003 −0.018 0.010 0.052*** −0.041 0.005 0.074** 0.156***
- non-ITA WTO Im. (−0.21) (−1.14) (−0.63) (3.21) (−1.36) (−0.16) (2.57) (5.49)
Exog. ITA Im. 0.034* 0.078*** 0.023 0.041* 0.032 0.044 0.082** 0.099***
- non-ITA WTO Im. (2.27) (5.00) (1.49) (2.56) (1.08) (1.44) (3.08) (3.67)
All regressions include country-pair-product, product-time and country period eﬀects. They also include the standard gravity
variables as in Table 2 before (coeﬃcients not reported), except for the remoteness regressor, because the country-period ﬁxed
eﬀects now proxy for Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003) multilateral resistance eﬀects. Retaining the remoteness regressor
would leave results virtually unchanged. All regressions in Table 7 are statistically preferred to their analogs excluding country-
period eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, Table 3 speciﬁcations are rejected at the 0.1 per cent level or higher by F-Statistics in favor of the
corresponding Table 7 speciﬁcations.
Notes 1/ and 2/, see Table 2. Notes 3/ to 5/, see Table 4. Note 3/ of Table 2 also applies.
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4.7 Conclusion
The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is perhaps the most signiﬁcant plurilateral
tariﬀ reduction agreement to date. Under the aegis of the WTO, 75 countries eliminated all
import tariﬀs on a wide range of ITrelated goods. The broad coverage within the sector, as
well as comprehensive implementation of the agreement, makes the ITA an ideal case study
to understand the impacts of tariﬀ reduction  or indeed elimination  agreements.
This paper contributed to the understanding of the impact of the ITA in three ways.
First, by using a large panel data set of productlevel data, we were able to dissect the
layers through which the agreement aﬀects trade ﬂows. In particular, we distinguish three
eﬀects: the tariﬀ reduction eﬀect, tariﬀ elimination eﬀect and value chain eﬀect (through
intermediate goods prices). Second, we carefully investigate the role of China and verify
that ITA eﬀects are not driven just by the experience of this single country. Finally, we use
Poisson maximium likelihood regression to correct for the presence of zero trade ﬂows.
The positive impact of the ITA on trade is driven by tariﬀrelated factors. In particular,
the elimination of tariﬀs has a benign impact over and above the trade gains predicted from
tariﬀ reductions alone. After controlling for these tariﬀ policies, the ITA dummy is no longer
signiﬁcant. This creates some hope that similar tariﬀ elimination treaties in other sectors
may promote trade just as strongly. Furthermore, elimination of tariﬀs on intermediate IT
goods due to ITA helps to promote exports in two ways: ﬁrst, by creating policy certainty, it
aﬀects the location decisions of MNEs. Second, lowering the cost of inputs makes producers
more competitive when exporting. This is reﬂected in a much higher ITA semielasticity for
zero tariﬀs in intermediate goods visavis ﬁnal goods.
While China is clearly a key beneﬁciary of the ITA, having become a dominant exporter
of electronics products in the world, a careful investigation reveals that other exogenous
joiners also beneﬁted from the agreement. In particular, the layers identiﬁed earlier are ro-
bust to estimation on a subsample containing all signatories except China. Finally, Poisson
maximum likelihood regression conﬁrms the robustness of our results to taking into account
zero trade ﬂows.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.8: Maximizing the number of zero observations in the Poisson
Estimation technique Least Squares Poisson
Includes China's Exports Yes No Yes No
Regression No. A1 A2 A3 A4
Individual ITA Exporter −0.129* −0.0675 −0.350** −0.882***
(−2.56) (−1.23) (−2.97) (−5.86)
Exogenous ITA Exporter 0.319*** 0.159* 0.761*** 0.345*
(5.58) (2.25) (8.19) (2.28)
Individual ITA Importer 1/ 0.491*** 0.512*** 0.0753 0.0473
(5.34) (5.48) (0.51) (0.31)
Exogenous ITA Importer 1/ 0.564*** 0.488*** 0.963*** 0.970***
(7.36) (6.22) (6.64) (6.55)
Non-ITA WTO Importer 1/ 0.473*** 0.418*** 0.502*** 0.511***
(5.47) (4.77) (4.27) (4.31)
One in WTO 0.200** 0.0993 0.101 0.120
(2.92) (1.40) (0.95) (1.09)
Exporter late WTO joiner 3/ −0.0742 −0.212* 0.182 0.180
(−0.90) (−2.36) (1.22) (1.02)
Exporter late EU joiner 4/ 1.348*** 1.418*** 0.987*** 1.179***
(17.51) (18.35) (6.20) (8.72)
Exporter late US-FTA joiner 4/ −0.0710 −0.0279 −0.564 −0.486
(−0.30) (−0.12) (−1.90) (−1.64)
Number of observations 268,438 261,936 392,416 384,816
R2 adjusted (per cent) 0.836 0.832 N/A N/A
Linear combinations of coeﬃcients: 2/
Individual ITA Importer minus 0.018 0.093* −0.426***−0.463***
non-ITA WTO Importer (0.48) (2.44) (−5.96) (−5.71)
Exogenous ITA Importer minus 0.091 0.070 0.461*** 0.459***
non-ITA WTO Importer (1.58) (1.20) (5.39) (5.28)
In all regressions, the dataset is collapsed to the 7 broad product categories described in Section II and
includes zero trade ﬂows; see also note 5/ of Table 5.
Notes 1/ and 2/, see Table 2. Notes 3/ and 4/, see Table 4. Note 3/ of Table 2 also applies.
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